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Summary: 
Since the 1 January 1995, Austria and Sweden have been members of the European 
Community (EC). This thesis analyses why the two countries joined the EC at a 
moment, when the latter's development towards a neo-liberal economic policy 
embodied in the Internal Market and the convergence criteria of the Economic and 
Monetary Union endangered their traditional Keynesian economic policy making and 
when the steps towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy threatened Austria's and 
Sweden's policies of neutrality. 
It is argued that the process leading to application and then the struggle around 
the referenda on membership in Austria and Sweden have to analysed against the 
background of globalisation, a structural change experienced since the early 1970s and 
characterised by the transnationalisation of production and finance and a shift from 
Keynesianism to neo-liberalism. Established theories of integration, which take existing 
power structures as given, are unable to explain instances of structural change. 
Consequently, a critical theory derived from neo-Gramscianism is developed as an 
alternative for the investigation of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. Most 
importantly, its focus on social forces, engendered by the production process, allows the 
approach to conceptualise globalisation. 
Applied to the Austrian and Swedish case, it is established that alliances of 
internationally-oriented and transnational social forces of capital and labour 
respectively, supported by those institutions linked to the global economy such as the 
Finance Ministries, were behind the drive towards membership in the neo-liberal EC. 
While they succeeded in their undertaking, the forces opposed to the EC and neo-
liberalism should not be underestimated. Nationally-oriented labour and capital in 
Austria and labour mainly from the public sector in Sweden together with the Green 
Parties in both countries may well mount a successful challenge in the future. Changes 
in the international structure, although not of primary importance, implied that neutrality 
was no big obstacle to EC membership in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Gorbachev's 
liberal foreign policy and a general decline in the power of the Soviet Union in the case 
of Austria and the end of the Cold War in the case of Sweden allowed the pro-EC forces 
in both countries to redefine neutrality in a way that made it compatible with 
membership. 
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Introduction: 
On 17 July 1989 and on 1 July 1991, Austria and Sweden respectively applied to the 
European Community (EC)l for membership. In 1994, after successfully completed 
negotiations between the applicants and the EC, the Austrian and Swedish populations 
voted in a referendum with a majority in favour of membership. Both countries have 
been members of the EC since January 1995. This was an apparent paradox: firstly, 
the EC had moved towards a neo-liberal economic policy embodied in the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1987 and the convergence criteria of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), part of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, while Austria and Sweden 
had been pursuing a Keynesian economic policy with the focus on full employment 
throughout their post-war history.2 Secondly, the EC had moved towards a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the possibility of a future common defence 
policy and common defence, while Austria and Sweden had always put great 
emphasis on their neutral status. How can this paradox be explained? 
In this thesis, the processes in the two countries leading first to application and 
eventually to accession to the EC are analysed in order to solve the puzzle outlined 
above. It is argued that this analysis has to be conducted against the background of 
globalisation, a structural change in the global economy experienced since the early 
1970s and that, therefore, a critical theory is required. Neo-Gramscianism is 
I Since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. one speaks about the European Union. Nevertheless, since the 
analysis of this thesis starts with the events before Maastricht, the tenn EC is used throughout the 
thesis. Of course, the qualitative changes introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht are referred to where 
required. 
2 Therbom points out that anti-crisis policies pursued by Austria and Sweden in the 1970s and early 
1980s "would have been either outright impossible or extremely difficult to carry out within the .. I Eel 
... " (TIlerbom: 1986. p.12S). After the EC's shift to neo-Iiberalism from the mid-1980s onwards. this 
would have been even more so the case. 
considered to be a critical theory of this type and developed as an alternati ye to the 
established neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist theories of integration. which 
for a range of reasons are unable to account for structural change.3 
The contribution of the thesis is twofold: firstly. it contributes to 
understanding why these two countries chose to join the EC in 1995; secondly. it adds 
to International Relations (lR) theory in general and European integration theory in 
particular by applying neo-Gramscianism to a case of European integration for the 
fi . 4 Irst tIme. 
In this introduction, "integration" and its relation to enlargement are defined 
(section 1). Then, the development of the EC from 1952 to the Treaty of Maastricht 
(section 2) and of the relationship between the EC and Austria and Sweden until 1985 
(section 3) are sketched out. In section 4, integration theories and their application to 
the analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession are introduced. Some 
methodological issues are addressed in section 5, before an outline of the structure of 
the thesis is provided in section 6. 
) Neo-Gramscianism is not a coherent approach. Its concepts and the way they are used in this thesis 
are outlined in Chapter I, section 3. 
4 Holman analyses the integration of Spain in Europe with the help of neo-Gramscian concepts. His 
definition of integration, however, includes the general integration of Spain into the Western European 
capitalist system via the transnationalisation of the Spanish state-civil society configurations. EC 
membership is only regarded as a final "logical step" of Spain's socio-political modernisation and 
Westernisation in this process of integration (Holman: 1996, pp.26-30). By contrast, this thesis focuses 
solely on the explanation of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC as cases of integration. 
Apeldoorn/Holman (1994) and HolmanlPijl (1996) employ neo-Gramscian concepts for the 
explanation of the role of the European Round Table of Industrialists in the process leading to the 
Internal Market. A more comprehensive attempt at explaining an instance of European integration with 
neo-Gramscian concepts is Apeldoom's analysis of the possible developments of a future European 
model of capitalism (Apeldoorn: I 996a and I 996b) . 
.., 
-
1. The definition of "integratjon" and its relation with enlargement: 
1.1. IIIntegration": 
It is useful to distinguish between intergovernmental co-operation and integration in 
IR. Both imply in the broadest sense the co-ordination of policies between 
governments. In contrast to intergovernmental co-operation, however, "when states 
engage in integration, they cede some part of their individual sovereignty in favour of 
its joint exercise with other states" (Laffan: 1992, p.3). In other words, integration 
goes further than intergovernmental co-operation and includes the partial transfer of 
national sovereignty. 5 In the case of the EC, this occurs either through the pooling of 
sovereignty in the Council of Ministers (Council) by the use of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) or through the delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions, 
i.e. the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECl). Austria and Sweden, by deciding to become members of the EC, have ceded 
parts of their sovereignty, and their accession can, consequently, be regarded as an 
instance of European integration. 
Wallace distinguishes between "formal" and "informal" integration. The 
former consists of political decisions on further integration and is similar to the 
definition above. Informal integration, on the other hand, "consists of those intense 
patterns of interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political 
decisions. following the dynamics of markets, technology. communications networks. 
5 Sovereignty can be defined as follows: internally. states exercise authority within a territory 
demarcated by boundaries; externally, "the Treaty of Westphalia institutionalized the principles of 
mutual rl.~ognition of the sovereignty of states and non-intervention into internal affairs" (NL1rgaard: 
1994, p.247). This thesis does not focus on the problem of sovereignty in relation to European 
integration. For an argument of why "sovereignty" is in generallikcly to persist. sec: Krasner 1988; for 
an analysis of "sl)\'~'rl'ignly" related to the post-1985 EC, scc: N"rt.;IJrd: 199.1 
3 
and social change" (Wallace: 1990, p.9). For the purpose of this study, the definition 
of integration will exclude these patterns of interaction and concentrate on those 
political decisions, which directly lead to the partial cession of sovereignty. New 
technologies and communication networks increase the interconnectedness between 
countries, which may put pressure on decision-makers to think about 
intergovernmental co-operation and/or integration, but they do not constitute instances 
of integration. 
1.2. Integration and EC enlargement: 
To date, theories of integration have not been applied to EC enlargements. Further 
integration can be of both a qualitative and a quantitative nature. If it is accepted that 
integration implies the pooling of sovereignty and the transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational institutions, qualitative integration is represented in treaties such as the 
SEA and Treaty of Maastricht, which have resulted in an increased degree of pooled 
sovereignty and further transfer of sovereignty to the EP, the Commission and the 
ECl. Quantitative integration, on the other hand, is exemplified by the extension of 
pooled and transferred sovereignty to other countries. A problem would only occur, if 
further quantitative integration was accompanied by lesser qualitative integration, as it 
would be difficult to assess whether the overall balance was still larger than before 
this step of integration. It has, however, been a basic condition of all EC enlargements 
including the one of 1995 that the new members had to accept the acquis 
communautaire (Preston: 1995, pp.452/453).6 Consequently, Austria and Sweden had 
to adopt the degree of pooled and transferred sovereignty, when they acceded to the 
6 The acquis communauloire includes all those policy areas, which are within the competence of the 
EC. 
EC in 1995. In short, their membership can be regarded as a case of further 
integration, since it represented the extension of the existing level of pooled and 
transferred sovereignty to other countries. 
2. The development of the EC: 
The origins of the EC go back to April 1951, when the original six member states, i.e. 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, signed the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, coming into force in July 1952.7 
The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) followed five years later, when the Treaties of Rome were 
signed in March 1957. Supranational institutions, the Commission, the ECJ and the 
Assembly (replaced later by the elected EP) were established and sovereignty was 
pooled and transferred in several aspects. A timetable for setting up the common 
market was introduced in 1957 and accelerated in the early 1960s. 
In July 1965, however, the French President Charles de Gaulle halted the 
move towards further integration. Fearing a loss of national sovereignty, he blocked 
the introduction of QMV in the Council through the withdrawal of French ministers 
from all Council meetings, the so-called "empty chair" policy. Moreover, separate 
financial resources for the EC and the transfer of power to the EP to control the 
budget were rejected. The ensuing Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 
guaranteed member states a veto on matters of important national interest. 
During the following decades, European integration slowed down. In the 
1970s, the European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the European Monetary System 
7 For a short overview of the Ee's posl-war history until 1985. see George: 1996. pp.I-I:' and Pinder 
1991. pp.3-15. 
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(EMS) were established, the meeting of heads of member states was fonnalised on a 
regular basis in the so-called European Council and the EP was directly elected for the 
first time.8 Nevertheless, this did not signify any further qualitative integration as 
defined above, because the EPC, the EMS and the European Council were of an 
intergovernmental nature. At the same time, quantitative integration occurred. On 1 
January 1973, the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC. Greece became a member 
on 1 January 1981 and Spain and Portugal followed on 1 January 1986. 
In the early 1980s, it was realised that the USA and Japan had coped better 
with the economic recession of the 1970s than the EC members. In a common 
European response, EC integration experienced a dramatic revival. In the following, 
the impact of this revival in the spheres of economic policy and foreign and security 
policy is outlined. 
2. J. The Internal Market and EMU: integration around economic neo-liberalism. 
In June 1985, the Commission published its famous White Paper "Completing the 
Internal Market", which proposed 300 (later reduced to 279) measures designed to 
facilitate progress towards the completion of the Internal Market by 1992 through the 
abolition of non-tariff barriers. The final goal was the free movement of people, 
capital, goods and services throughout the EC. The Milan European Council meeting 
approved the White Paper in June 1985 and the SEA, coming into force in July 1987, 
confinned the 1992 deadline and introduced the principle of "mutual recognition" for 
Internal Market issues. The economic rationale of the SEA was of a neo-liberal nature. 
8 The EPe provided the framework for first steps towards a common foreign policy (see below). 
whereas the EMS was a monetary arrangement with the main goal of stabilising the exchange rates 
between member states (George: 1996. pp.211-219; Pinder: 1991. pp.1 ~4-13~). 
6 
It intended to minimise transaction costs, to provide companies with a bigger home 
market and to achieve efficiency via more competition and economies of scale. 
During the Milan Council, it had also been considered necessary to reform the 
EC institutions in order to carry out the Internal Market programme. In the SEA. 
firstly, QMV was introduced in the Council for new internal market measures and 
secondly, the supranational institutions of the EC were significantly strengthened. It is 
the Commission, which decides the legal basis for a proposed directive, which 
"becomes very important as different articles are associated with different decisional 
rules" (Sbragia: 1993, p.1 03). Thus, the Commission can invoke QMV if it asserts 
that a matter pertains to the internal market. Furthermore, the ECJ was strengthened 
by becoming the arbiter of the Internal Market. In cases of disagreement about 
whether member states comply correctly with Internal Market harmonisation 
measures, "the Commission or any member state could bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice directly ... " (Corbett: 1987, p.246). Finally, the EP's power was 
increased through the introduction of the co-operation and assent procedure. The 
former applies to the majority of internal market issues. It provides the EP with a 
conditional, positive agenda-setting role "through the requirement that the Council of 
Ministers can only unanimously alter those amendments by the legislature which the 
Commission supports" (Schneider, G.: 1994, p.9). Moreover, the EP enjoys a 
conditional blocking power, since the Council needs unanimity to pass legislation 
which the EP has rejected in its new second reading. One ally among the member 
states is, consequently. sufficient for the EP to block legislation. The assent procedure 
gives the EP the additional right to veto association agreements and new members. 
7 
In December 1991, the EC members agreed on the Treaty of!\laastricht~ which 
laid out a timetable leading to a single currency and EMU. It was envisaged to be 
fully in place by 1999 at the latest, made up of the states which meet the economic 
convergence criteria. The centrepiece of EMU will be the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCBs), a new supranational institution. It is legally committed to price 
stability, independent of national and EC institutions and its task is to design and 
implement a common monetary policy, while the monetary financing of public 
deficits is prohibited (Kenen: 1992, pp.462-467). Thus, member states partly gave up 
their right to an autonomous monetary policy by ceding aspects of their sovereignty to 
a new central institution being in charge of a common policy. "Once a single currency 
has been adopted, states will be unable to regain competitive advantage by 
devaluation of the exchange rate" (Barnes: 1992, p.l1). 
In order to become a member, countries have to fulfil the so-called 
convergence criteria, which are of a neo-liberal type centred around low inflation and 
"sound" budget targets (Grauwe: 1992, p.131). These criteria constrained national 
economic and monetary policy autonomy even before the start of EMU. The Treaty of 
Maastricht stipulates in Article 10ge that EC members had to draw up a convergence 
programme before the beginning of the second stage of EMU on 1 January 1994, in 
which they outlined the measures they intended to undertake in order to meet the 
criteria. In other words, it obliged EC members to pursue a policy of budgetary 
restraint, low inflation and price stability. Keynesianist programmes to create jobs, on 
the other hand, were implicitly prohibited. Barnes even argues that "some states will 
have to pay a high price in terms of unemployment and slower growth in order to 
achieve the criteria" (Barnes: 1992, p.12). 
8 
This impact on national policy autonomy in the area of economic policy will 
be even stronger, when EMU is in place. As the common monetary policy focuses on 
price stability, member states are committed "to setting constraints on public 
borrowing to GDP ratios and also to limiting budget deficits" (McDonald: 1994, 
p.48). Article 104c of the Treaty of Maastricht gives the Commission the task to 
monitor the budgetary situation and government debt of EC members. If there is a 
member with "excessive deficits", i.e. a ratio of actual government deficit to GDP of 
more than 3 per cent and/or a ratio of government debt of more than 60 per cent to 
GDP, the Commission has to inform the Council, which, in turn, publishes a report on 
what this member should do to rectify the situation. If the member state does not meet 
the Council's recommendations, various sanctions can be adopted, including the 
imposition of fines (Bempt: 1993, p.252).9 Importantly, all decisions related to EMU 
membership are to be taken by QMV. Overall, EMU puts member states firmly on a 
neo-liberal economic course and restricts their policy autonomy in the areas of 
monetary and economic policy. 
Finally, the Treaty of Maastricht further strengthened the EC institutions 
through the extension ofQMV and the introduction of the co-decision procedure, 
which gives the EP the right to veto Council decisions in certain areas (e.g. 
d .) 10 e ucatlOn . 
9 Article I0ge states that the Commission's task to monitor member states' financial situation started 
on I January 1994. the beginning of the second stage of EMU. Sanctions, howe\t~r. cannot be applied 
before the finall'slablishment of EMU. 
10 For a short o\'l'rvil'\\ of the institutional changes. sec Nugent: 1992. pp~OO-40~ 
9 
2.2. The CFSP: towards a common defence policy and common defence? 
First steps towards a common foreign policy had already been undertaken in 
November 1970, when the Foreign Ministers met for the first time within the EPC 
framework. The objectives of the EPC were the improvement of the mutual 
understanding of international problems, the harmonisation of views, the co-
ordination of positions and, where possible and desirable, common actions (Luif: 
1996, pp.29/30). The common foreign policy was mainly expressed in declaratory 
statements without a legally binding status. The EPC remained totally separated from 
the EC. It was an instrument of intergovernmental co-operation and decision-making 
was based on unanimity. 
The SEA established a legal basis for the EPC and linked it to the EC, which 
effectively consisted of two pillars from 1987 onwards, the original EC and the 
intergovernmental EPC. Nevertheless, "in contrast to the 'new dynamics' of the EC, 
EPC continued with 'business as usual', albeit in a new (legal) framework" (Luif: 
1996, p.34). 
It was the Treaty of Maastricht, which had a more significant impact in the 
area of foreign policy. The EPC was transformed into the pillar of the CFSP. The 
treaty introduced the possibility of common positions, which go beyond declaratory 
statements in that they enjoy a legally binding status for member states, and allows for 
the adoption of joint actions by the Council (Luif: 1996, pp.57-74). 
Moreover, for the first time, defence matters were considered within the EC. 
"A crucial statement is contained in Article 1.4, in which it was agreed that a CFSP 
'shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual 
framing ofa common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" 
l(l 
(NicoIVSalmon: 1994, p.208). In this respect the Treaty of Maastricht declared the 
West European Union (WEU)II to be an integral part of the development of the EC. It 
should have the task to elaborate and implement those decisions of the EC. which 
contain defence implications. In the WEU's response, the so-called Peters berg 
Declaration of 19 June 1992, the foreign and defence ministers of the WEU members 
decided to make available military units for military tasks conducted under the 
authority of the WEU. In addition to collective defence, these tasks include 
humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping missions and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-enforcement (Luif: 1996, p.75). 
The shift from the EPC to CFSP increased the policy co-ordination of the EC 
members in the area of foreign and security policy. So far, however, this is not a case 
of further integration. The CFSP is still a predominantly intergovernmental structure. 
The Commission and EP play only a small role and the powers of the ECJ do not 
apply at all. Unanimity is required with the exception of procedural matters and even 
these exceptions are to be determined by unanimity in the Council (NicolVSalmon: 
1994, p.211). 
Moreover, the exact way the EC is linked to the WEU is not clear and the 
question of a common defence policy has not been settled. While the WEU was 
declared to be an integral part of the EC development, the links between the WEU and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the role of the WEU nine within 
NATO were also strengthened. Eventually. it was agreed that these issues were to be 
reviewed and clarified in 1996 (NicoIVSalmon: 1994, p.21 0). 
II The WEU was established in 1954 by those Western European countries. which were willing to co-
operate in military matters. It was reactivated from October 1984 onwards because ofthe perceived 
need for a European view on security and has nine members. i.e. all EC members at the time of the 
signing of the Treaty of Maastricht except for Ireland. Denmark and Greece. 
II 
3, Austria and Sweden and the development of the EC: the struggle for association, 
3, 1. A chronology of events: 
Austria did not participate in the discussions about the ECSC in 1952. As it was still 
occupied by the war allies, the regaining of national sovereignty had an absolute 
priority over participation in European integration (Gebler et al: without date, p.62). 
In 1956/57, now independent, Austria favoured a free trade area in the framework of 
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Integration with 
supranational institutions was considered to endanger its status of neutrality and, 
therefore, deemed impossible. When this attempt failed in 1958, it participated in the 
setting-up of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), a free trade area of the non-EEC 
members. 
Neutral Sweden was similarly sceptical of the EC's supranational ism and its 
implications for neutrality and opted instead for the EFTA solution. This seemed to 
provide the perfect combination of national independence and European-wide trade 
liberalisation. In any case, Sweden had strong trade links with the UK and with the 
latter "intent on remaining outside the new Community, the economic benefits of 
joining were limited" (Phinnemore: 1996, p.34). 
The situation changed when Britain applied for membership in the EEC. 
Together with Switzerland, Austria and Sweden applied for association with the EEC 
according to Art. 238 of the Treaty of Rome on 15 December 1961. Sweden and 
Switzerland withdrew after Britain's bid for membership had been vetoed by the 
French President de Gaulle in 1963, but Austria continued negotiating. The Austrian 
goal was a de-facto customs union with some aspects of an economic union in areas 
such as agriculture policy, in so far this was necessary to avoid infringement of 
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competition (Luif: 1988, p.97). The negotiations carried on with changing fortunes 
until 1967, when Italy vetoed any further steps due to the problems surrounding the 
question of South Tyrol and Austria's support for the Gennan-speaking minority. The 
real reason for the failure of Austria's bid for association must, however, be seen in 
the negative French attitude. De Gaulle did not want to compromise EC autonomy via 
joint association institutions with neutral Austria (Schaller: 1994a, p.41). 
Additionally, the international environment was not very supportive. The Soviet 
Union, on the one hand, regarded any kind of arrangement with the EC as 
incompatible with Austria's status of neutrality. The USA, on the other hand, accused 
the neutral countries in general of wanting to enjoy the economic benefits without 
carrying the political duties of full membership, i.e. the abandonment of neutrality and 
participation in the Western bloc (Luif: 1988, pp.115/116). 
After the death of de Gaulle in 1969 and the settlement with Italy on South 
Tyrol of the same year, new steps became possible. While Britain and Denmark left 
EFTA in order to become members of the EC, the remaining EFTA members 
including Austria and Sweden concluded bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
the EC, coming into force on 1 January 1973. The FTAs implied the removal of all 
tariff barriers on manufactured goods until 1977 with the exception of steel (1980) 
and paper (1984). The food processing industry and agricultural sector were excluded 
except for some specific products. Overall, the majority of the political and economic 
elites and populations of both countries were satisfied with this outcome. The FTAs 
promised economic advantages without the political "drawbacks" of membership. 
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Until the mid-1980s, there were no discussions on EC-policy in Austria and Sweden 
(Jerneck: 1993, p.25; Schultz: 1992, p.187).12 
3.2. The mainfeatures of Austria's integration policy until 1985: 
In Austria, it was generally accepted that neutrality implied the impossibility of EC 
membership. It was regarded as a partial loss of sovereignty and, therefore, as casting 
doubt on the credibility of Austria's commitment to neutrality. Additionally, it was 
frequently argued that EC membership would signify some kind of "Anschluss" to 
Germany and this was prohibited by Article 4 of the State Treaty (Luif: 1988, pp.112-
114). 
Integration was, furthermore, an ideological matter of what the future 
economic, socio-political model should look like. Within the grand coalition, 
association with the EC had always been a compromise. The Christian Democratic 
Osterreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party, OVP) was generally in favour 
of integration. It hoped that a closer relationship with the common market would 
further liberalise the domestic sphere towards a dynamic and pluralist industrial 
society (Luif: 1988, p.l 02). Additionally, it was regarded as an opportunity of 
undermining two Social Democratic strongholds, firstly, the trade unions' monopoly 
in the control of the labour market and secondly, the position of the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreich (Austrian Social Democratic Party, SPO) in the 
12 It is often argued that Sweden had made an "open" application to the EC in 1967 not excluding 
membership (Luif: 1996, p.202; Viklund: 1989, p.16). The exact meaning of this "open" application. 
however, never became clear and, probably, has to be regarded in the light of the Luxembourg 
Compromise, which stalled the move towards further integration (Huldt: 1994, p.III). When the 
Davignon and Werner reports on further co-operation in foreign policy and economic and monetary 
policy respectively were accepted by the Council in February 1971 and further integration became 
more likely, Sweden quickly withdrew any doubts about its position and declared these policies 
incompatible with its status of neutrality and independence (Pedersen: 1994, p.86). Membership was 
declared impossible by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme. 
14 
nationalised industry. The majority of Austria's heavy industry had been nationalised 
after World War Two, mainly in order to protect it against the reparation demands by 
the occupying allies. For a large part of the SPO, however, it was also a precondition 
for two crucial changes in the economy: the inner restructuring of the companies and 
the introduction of a planned economy (Schneider: 1990, p.43). The EC was viewed 
by the EC-sceptic wing of the SPO as a project of "big capital" and dominated by 
Christian Democratic parties. "Rightly, the Socialists argued that the contribution of 
the state-owned sector in economic stabilization, full employment, and regional 
development would be menaced if Austria were forced to accept supranational 
direction from Christian Democratic governments" (Kurzer: 1993, p.207). EFTA, 
dominated by Social Democratic governments and without the danger of having to 
cede decision-making power to supranational institutions in the sphere of economic 
policy, represented the optimal alternative. 
To conclude, the discussion about Austria's participation in European 
integration had started long before the mid-I 980s. Nevertheless, full membership was 
excluded as a possibility; firstly, because of Austria's neutrality and secondly, because 
of a strong Social Democratic distaste for the domination of "big capital" and 
conservative parties within the EC. 
3.3. The main/eatures o/Sweden 's integration policy until 1985: 
Huldt identifies Sweden's neutrality and sovereignty as the two main arguments 
against membership, the latter being a precondition for the fonner (Huldt: 1994, 
p.III). This view is shared by Phinnemore, who points to neutrality and independence 
(Phinnemore: 1996, p.34). The focus on foreign policy, however, needs to be 
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amended with the fear that membership could endanger the so-called Swedish Model 
and its autonomous welfare and full employment policy, because it reduced national 
economic policy autonomy and submitted it to Christian Democratic influence. 
Especially the left wing of the Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (Social Democratic 
Party, SAP) and the Communist, since 1990 Vansterpartiet (Left Party, VP) argued 
that "Swedish involvement in the political integration of the EC would harm rather 
than sustain her capacity to pursue a welfare programme based on the principles of 
equal rights and advanced state-intervention" (Jerneck: 1993, p.26). In the SAP 
internal debate before the 1994 referendum on membership, this argument was to play 
an important role on the no-side (see Chapter 4, section 3.3.2). 
Lundberg even ascribes primacy to the Swedish Model argument in the debate 
of all Nordic countries and, thereby, also Sweden: 
in the postwar Nordic debate on European integration there seems to have 
existed a common view, shared by both proponents and opponents of Nordic 
participation in a closer European economic and political cooperation, that in 
order for the Nordic model in this sense to survive, a necessary as well as 
sufficient condition would be that the Nordic countries stayed out of the 
European Community. Thus, the proponents wanted a membership because 
they wanted to disband the model, whereas the opponents wanted to stay out 
because they wanted to keep it alive (Lundberg: 1994, p.717). 
Various social forces of capital, represented by the employers' associations, the 
conservative Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderate Party, MS) and the Folkpartiet 
liberalema (Liberal Party, FP), had favoured EC membership with an escape clause 
for Swedish neutrality as early as 1961 (Luif: 1996, p.200). In this situation, neutrality 
was more a pretext for the rejection of membership by those social forces, which 
wanted to retain the Swedish Model (Interview No.39; Stockholm, 08/11/1996). 
Overall, it is difficult to say whether it was the security or the Swedish Model 
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argument, which was more important in Sweden's rejection of any participation in 
European integration. "Together, however, they have constituted a strong barrier 
against any proposal suggesting that a close economic relationship with the EC should 
be followed by a political one" (Jemeck: 1993, pp.26/27). The majority of Swedish 
forces, mainly represented by the SAP and trade unions with the support of the 
Centerpartiet (Centre Party, CP) only considered association with the EC and, when 
this had failed, FT As to be compatible with the Swedish Model and neutrality. 
4. Inte2ration theories and the 1995 enlar2ement of the EC; 
Neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches have dominated the study of 
European integration. The former assumes that integration starts when governments 
realise that certain economic problems yield higher welfare gains, if they are dealt 
with at the supranational level. The success in one area of transnational functional co-
operation will initiate the demand for further co-operation in other spheres (Haas: 
1958; Lindberg: 1963). On the other hand, the various strands of 
intergovernmentalism stress the convergence of national preferences as a precondition 
for European integration and consider governments to be the sole decision-makers on 
whether this precondition has been met (Hoffmann: 1966). Both neo-functionalist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 1, section 
A lot of work has been done on the processes which led, first, to Austria's and 
Sweden's application for membership, then, to the negotiations and, eventually, to the 
referenda and accession to the EC. In contrast to investigations of qualitative 
D Federalism is not regarded as a theory of integration in this thesis, because it has been more a 
political strategy of how to bring about integration than an analytical approach to the explanation of it 
(Harrison: 1974, p.47). 
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integration such as the SEA, however, a lack of theorising EC enlargement can be 
noticed (Church: 1994). 
Some implicit traces of the neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist 
integration theories can be found nonetheless. Several studies combine a state-centric 
discussion of Austria and Sweden in the international sphere, concentrating on the 
countries' response to "external shocks", with a pluralist discussion of national 
preference formation, investigating the positions of political parties and/or interest 
associations (Fioretos: 1997; Gebler et al: without date; Hamilton/StAlvant: 1989; 
Huldt: 1994; lerneck: 1993; Kunnert: 1993; Luif: 1988, 1992 and 1996; Miles: 1996; 
Schneider, H.: 1990 and 1994; StAlvant: 1992; Traxler: 1992; Viklund: 1989). These 
studies largely maintain the notion of the state as a gate-keeper between the domestic 
and international sphere and can, therefore, be rougbly subsumed under the approach 
intergovernmentalism combined with a domestic perspective (see Chapter 1, section 
1.3). A second group of investigations only adopts a state-centric and, thus, 
intergovernmentalist view of Austria and Sweden in the international system (Gstohl: 
1996; Koch: 1994; Miles: 1994a), while a third group of authors concentrates on the 
domestic preference formation and studies the position of political parties and/or 
interest associations without linking this discussion to a study of the two countries in 
the international system (Leitner: 1993; Schaller: 1994a; Widfeldt: 1996). Finally, 
some of these studies also incorporate one or the other neo-functionalist concept in 
their investigation, pointing to economic pressure towards membership and the active 
role of interest associations, which direct their attention to Brussels and the central EC 
institutions (Gstohl: 1996; Jerneck: 1993; Pedersen: 1994). Overall, however. except 
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for Pedersen (1994), these studies do not link their findings explicitly to a theoretical 
framework. 
This general lack of theorising does not mean that these investigations are 
without any use. On the contrary, they often provide rich empirical material, and this 
thesis draws on them in this respect. At the same time, however, it is here attempted to 
go beyond them and to provide both additional empirical material and a coherent 
theoretical analysis. 
5. Methodological issues: 
5.1. Comparative research: 
This thesis follows the methodology of comparative research. This methodology, it is 
argued, enhances understanding of events through the comparative knowledge gained 
by studying more than one case. 14 Phenomena observed can be strengthened or 
qualified by investigating their appearance in other occasions. 
Comparative research has to deal with three areas of consideration, the 
formulation of the problem, the strategy adopted and the theory employed. "First ... 
there has to be a problem or issue, a question to which comparative analysis can, at 
least in principle, provide an answer ... " (Roberts: 1978, p.288). It was asked above 
why Austria and Sweden applied to the EC exactly at that time, when the EC had 
moved further away from their traditional economic policy and further endangered 
their status of neutrality through the CFSP. Secondly, a strategy has to be formulated 
(Roberts: 1978. pp.290-297). The units of comparison need to be chosen and the 
temporal context to be decided. i.e. whether the comparison is across time or across 
14 The study of one case can also be of a comparative quality provided concepts are used, which could 
be applied to further cases. "Even though the study is not explicitly comparative, it is comparable" 
(Rose: 1991. p.454). 
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space. In this thesis, the units are states, i.e. Austria and Swede~ and the comparison 
is across space, since both countries decided on application and membership around 
roughly the same time. Furthermore, it has to be decided whether a "most similar" or 
a "most different" approach is used. I 5 Here a "most similar" approach is adopted. 
Both Austria and Sweden have been neutral during the post-war period (see Chapter 
5), they are characterised by similar economic and political systems (see Chapter 2. 
section 1), and their relationships with the EC until the mid-1980s resemble each 
other in that they both sought close economic relations short of political 
responsibilities. Having decided on a "most similar" approach, this thesis provides the 
ground for studying the differences and their consequences in the two cases. Finland's 
accession to the EC and Norway's failed attempt are two possible further cases, since 
they were part of the same enlargement group. Nevertheless, Norway had already 
applied to the EC in the early 1970s and Finland used to have a special relationship 
with the former Soviet Union, which gave its neutrality a different quality. 
Consequently, they are not suitable for a "most similar" approach. 
"Theory is both the end and the beginning of the comparison ... " (Roberts: 
1978, p.289). At the beginning, theory is responsible for the formulation of the 
concepts of investigation and comparison. They "provide the categories into which 
information about particular countries can be sorted" (Rose: 1991, p.448). In other 
words, it is the application of concepts, which makes a comparison possible in the 
first place, since individual cases are compared according to the same categories. In 
this thesis, the concepts of comparison such as "social forces", "historic bloc", 
horganic intellectuals" are defined and introduced at the beginning of the study in 
1\ In a "most similar" approach, similar cases are selected to investigate their few differences, whereas 
the cases are different to allow the examination of their few similarities in a "most different" approach. 
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Chapter 1. In a second step, the fonnulated concepts need to be operationalised. It has 
to be stated in what way empirical evidence can be collected and related to the 
concepts. Only then are concepts able to provide the link between empirical material 
and theoretical analysis. In this thesis, the concepts introduced in Chapter 1 are 
operationalised in the third section of Chapter 2, before the empirical investigation 
commences in Chapter 3. At the end of the research, theory is responsible for the 
analysis of the results. During this process, the fmdings are not only assessed, but the 
concepts of the theory themselves might be revised and improved in response to the 
results. This assessment is made in the Conclusion of the thesis. 
There are, however, different understandings of what theory is. The definition 
of theory adopted for one's research greatly influences the wayan analysis is 
conducted. At one level, theory is considered to be a general framework of reference 
for the investigation (Roberts: 1978, p.298). It consists of the concepts, which guide 
the investigation. In traditional comparative research, however, theory is also 
considered to be a set of "generalizations which is capable of providing systematic 
explanation of some area of knowledge or body of observations, or which may be 
used to predict events, or which prescribes conduct" (RobertslEdwards: 1991, p.143). 
Following such a definition of theory, analysis then includes the testing of hypotheses 
with the goal of arriving at general findings related not only to the case studies but 
also transferable to other events. Such a view of theory and scientific enquiry is based 
on positivism, which accepts the separation of object and subject and includes the 
search for observable causal relationships. As it is outlined in Chapter 1, section 2, a 
positivist enquiry is rejected in this thesis, since it prevents a sophisticated analysis of 
structural change. Neo-Gramscianism is instead adopted as the theoretical framework 
21 
to guide the investigation. As a critical theory, it "does not envisage any general or 
universally valid laws which can be explained by the development of appropriate 
general applicable theories" (Cox: 1986, p.243). Its task "is to explain transformations 
from one structure to another" (Cox: 1986, p.244). Therefore, neo-Gramscianism is 
applied to the Austrian and Swedish accession to the EC, which have to be analysed 
against the background of structural change and which are, consequently, part and 
parcel of this structural change. The problem of this thesis is not the explanation of 
states' accession to the EC in general, but only the specific Austrian and Swedish 
cases. This analysis is not supposed to lead to general findings transferable to other 
cases. Only the method of how to investigate such cases of accession and the concepts 
used in the analysis can be transferred. It is in this sense that this thesis pursues 
comparative research. 
Finally, as Devetak maintains, ''the knowledge critical ... theory seeks is not 
neutral; it is politically and ethically charged by an interest in social and political 
transformation" (Devetak: 1996, p.1Sl). The discussion and construction of an 
emancipatory project is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is, however, hoped that the 
configuration of the Austrian and Swedish social forces on EC membership, provided 
by this study, may help others to identify those forces and ideas, which are able to 
provide the basis for a project of transformation. 
5.2. Empirical data: official documents and elite interviews. 
One way of gaining information about the position of ministries, parties. trade unions 
and employers' associations is the study of their final official documents. They are an 
important empirical source in this thesis, as are declarations by leading officials 
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representing these organisations. Neo-Gramscianism, however. does not treat these 
organisations as unitary actors, but as institutional frameworks within which and 
through which social forces act (see Chapter 2, section 3). Since minutes of meetings 
related to the internal decision-making processes were unavailable and the documents 
obtained present only the outcome of these processes, elite interviews were conducted 
to assess the various positions of class fractions and their strategies within 
organisations. These interviews were also useful in determining how the eventual 
position of Austria and Sweden as countries, represented in official state documents, 
had come about. 
The "notion of an elite implies a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, 
a privileged position in society and, as such ... are likely to have had more influence 
on political outcomes than general members of the public" (Richards: 1996, p.199). 
Current or former ministers, secretaries of state institutions and general-secretaries 
and other leading individuals of interest associations are, therefore, the logical targets 
for interviews. Nevertheless, the definition of elite in this thesis also stretches to lower 
ranking officials in ministries and organisations. Being, for example, the head of a 
research department on European integration in one of these institutions, they often 
have a more detailed knowledge than the leading representatives about the different 
positions within their organisation and the process, which led to the eventual official 
position. 
The people to be interviewed were identified in accordance with my 
understanding of the operationalisation of neo-Gramscianism (Chapter 2, section 3). 
Trade unions and employers' associations were divided into transnational, 
intemationally- and nationally-oriented industrial sectors, ministries and state 
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institutions according to their place in the global economy and political parties and 
interest associations along the social forces they represent. If there were more than 
one class or fraction of class represented by a political party, then representatives from 
all different groups within the party were interviewed. 
The reliability of data is always a problem in empirical studies (Roberts: 1978, 
p.295). Interviewees tend to present their personal, subjective view of political 
processes. In general, empirical material about a particular institution or organisation 
was always obtained via an interview with a representative of this institution or 
organisation. It was cross-checked by drawing on the accounts of other interviewees 
about this institution or organisation. Relatively large interview samples - 36 
interviews were conducted in Austria, 35 in Sweden - were collected in this respect. 
Further verification was obtained by comparing the material to other political science 
studies, which also generated empirical insights and often conducted interviews 
themselves (e.g. Schaller: 1994a). Overall, this indicates at least a certain degree of 
reliability. 
All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, i.e. instead of a rigid 
questionnaire, an aide memoir, which could be referred to during the interview, was 
used. There are two ways of recording the information. An interview can be taped or 
notes are made throughout the interview and written up immediately afterwards. For 
this thesis, the second method was adopted. Firstly, because some interviewees 
rejected the taping. Secondly, even if they accepted, "some interviewees may be less 
forthcoming in the information they provide, if their comments are being recorded" 
(Richards: 1996. p.202). As a consequence and because the interviewees have been 
guaranteed anonymity. direct quotes and interviewees' names are not used in the 
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presentation of the empirical material. Interviews are, however, referred to in the text 
through a number, place and date whenever material is used stemming from a 
particular interview. These are listed including the interviewees' organisation and 
function in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis. 
6. Outline of the thesis: 
Theoretically, this thesis argues that a critical theory is necessary to analyse Austria's 
and Sweden's accession to the EC against the background of globalisation. Neo-
Gramscianism is developed in this respect. Applied to the Austrian and Swedish case, 
it is established that alliances of internationally-oriented and transnational social forces 
of capital and labour respectively, supported by those institutions linked to the global 
economy such as the Finance Ministries, were behind the drive towards membership in 
the neo-liberal EC. Importantly, the transnational production structure allowed Swedish 
capital to press the SAP government indirectly towards membership via the transfer of 
production units to the EC. Internationally-oriented Austrian capital, on the other hand, 
did not have this option, because it was based on a predominantly domestic production 
structure. Hence, it had to devise a political strategy and fonn an alliance with 
internationally-oriented labour to bring about, first, application, and then, membership. 
While pro-EC groups succeeded in their undertaking, the forces opposed to the 
EC and neo-liberalism should not be underestimated. Nationally-oriented labour and 
capital in Austria and labour mainly from the public sector in Sweden together with the 
Green Parties in both countries and the VP in Sweden may well mount a successful 
challenge in the future. Neutrality proved to be no big obstacle to membership. 
Although not of primary importance, changes in the international security structure, i.e. 
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Gorbachev's liberal foreign policy and a decline in Soviet power in the case of Austria 
and the end of the Cold War in the case of Sweden, allowed the pro-EC forces in both 
countries to redefme neutrality in a way that made it compatible with membership. 
In the first part of Chapter 1, the various versions of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism will be presented and their internal contradictions discussed. 
This is complemented by examples from the studies on Austria's and Sweden's 
accession to the EC indicated above in section 4.2. In a second step, it is argued that 
the shortcomings of the established theories of integration are partly due to their 
positivist foundation. In particular, it is pointed out that they are unable to account for 
structural changes such as globalisation, experienced since the early 1970s. The 
revival of European integration since the mid-1980s and the 1995 enlargement of the 
EC, however, have to be analysed against the background of globalisation and a 
critical theory is required. Neo-Gramscianism is considered to be a critical theory of 
this type. Its core assumptions are outlined and applied to globalisation in the latter 
part of Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 turns to analyse the Austrian and Swedish political and economic 
systems and the impact globalisation had on them in order to provide the background 
for understanding the accessions. In the third section of Chapter 2, neo-Gramscianism, 
introduced in Chapter 1, is developed as an alternative analytical approach to the 
study of European integration and individual concepts are operationalised for the 
cases of the Austrian and Swedish EC membership. 
Chapter 3 points to the social forces in favour or against application and 
analyses how the process developed, which eventually led to application. After a brief 
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look at the negotiations, the link between application and referendum, Chapter 4 
investigates the struggles around the referenda in Austria and Sweden. 
During the debates on membership, the world experienced drastic changes. In 
1989, the Berlin Wall fell, Germany was united one year later and the Warsaw Pact 
was dissolved. Chapter 5 analyses the impact of these changes on the Austrian and 
Swedish accession to the EC, including the question of neutrality and its compatibility 
with membership. 
The Conclusion sums up the results of the thesis and provides an overview of 
the arguments put forward. It assesses the conceptual and methodological 
development of the thesis, qualifies and improves the concepts used and evaluates the 
neo-Gramscian alternative as such. 
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Chapter 1: Theories of Integration, EC Enlargement and Globalisation: a 
critique and alternative. 
Neo-functionalist and intergovemmentalist approaches have dominated the study of 
European integration. They are closely linked to IR theories and section 1 takes this 
into account, when providing an overview of the theories of integration. By giving 
examples of the investigations of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC, 
identified in the Introduction, the limits of the established theories of integration are 
demonstrated. In section 2, it is argued that these limits are partly due to their 
positivist foundation. Because they take existing structures of social and power 
relations for granted, they are unable to account for structural change. However, 
globalisation, a structural change outlined in the second part of section 2, has been 
experienced since the early 1970s. Therefore, a neo-Gramscian alternative, which can 
explain structural change, is offered in section 3. The independent role of ideas is an 
important feature of neo-Gramscianism. The method of conceptualising this role is 
discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 applies neo-Gramscianism to globalisation, 
as defined in section 2. Overall, this Chapter provides the theoretical background and 
empirical context for the analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. 
1. Theories of intei:ration; 
J. J. Neo-functionalism: the automaticity of the integration process. 
Neo-functionalism is the sister theory of the IR theory of functionalism. David 
Mitrany, the main proponent of functionalism, was interested in how to create a 
"working peace system" in order to avoid war. Violent conflicts occur, because "the 
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international system of nation-states had blinded men to their real welfare needs" 
(Harrison: 1974, p.29). Thus, the attention of human beings must be shifted to 
transnational welfare problems and the general benefits of solutions to these problems. 
A harmony of interests can be formed, since welfare interests are the ultimate 
determinant of human beings' behaviour. The functional prescription for action is to 
spread a web of international activities and agencies, concerned with non-conflictual 
issues of human welfare needs, over the state-system. The success in one area of 
transnational functional co-operation will initiate the demand for further co-operation 
in other spheres (Mitrany: 1966, pp.54-81). 1 
Mitrany considered regional international integration to be detrimental to the 
creation of a peace system. "There is little promise of peace in the mere change from 
the rivalry of Powers and alliances to the rivalry of whole continents ... " (Mitrany: 
1966, p.45). Nevertheless, several of his functional assumptions were incorporated 
into neo-functionalism and its study of European integration. 
Neo-functionalism was developed by Haas and Lindberg in the 1950s and 
early 1960s alongside the early development of the EC. A group theory of interest 
politics is one of its major assumptions. Haas rejects the notion of a natural harmony 
of interests between different groups. Unlike functionalism, he realises that different 
economic groups led by their elites have different interests and compete with each 
other for influence on the government. Agreements are possible, as all groups accept 
that conflicts need to be settled by peaceful means within the given legal framework 
(Haas: 1964, p.34). 
I Mitrany's essay "A Working Peace System", here 1966. was first published in 1943. For the 
functional method of international co-operation. see also Mitrany: 1975. 
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Similar to functionalism, neo-functionalism assumes the primacy of weI fare-
issues as the motivating force for integrative behaviour. "Every policy at least aims at 
the satisfaction of someone's welfare, and many policies have consequences 
consistent with welfare aims even if inspired by other considerations" (Haas: 1964, 
p.4 7). Integration starts when governments realise that certain economic problems 
yield higher welfare gains, if they are dealt with on a supranational level. Haas defines 
integration as follows: 
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of 
political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-
existing ones (Haas: 1958, p.16). 
Lindberg is more cautious about the outcome of integration, stating that "a significant 
amount of political integration can be achieved without moving toward a 'political 
community' as defined by Haas" (Lindberg: 1963, p.5). Nevertheless, he agrees on 
the other points of the definition. He also considers integration to be a process, 
involving some degree of institution-building in a new centre and "they both 
emphasised the changes in expectations and activities on the part of political actors" 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991, p.4). 
The notion of spill-over is crucial for the neo-functionalist explanation of the 
process of integration: 
In its most general fonnulation, "spill-over" refers to a situation in which a 
given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original 
goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in tum create a 
further condition and a need for more action, and so forth (Lindberg: 1963, 
p.IO). 
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According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen, this spill-over effect takes place in three spheres 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991, pp.4-6). Firstly, functional spill-over occurs in the 
economic sphere. Because of the interdependence between industrial sectors, the 
integration of one sector makes the integration of another necessary to reap the full 
welfare benefits of the first integration. This causes political spill-over. Interest groups 
of an integrated sector need to shift their focus to the new decision-making centre in 
order to influence the policy-making important to them. "As the main barrier would 
be that integration in one sector could not be effective without the integration of other 
sectors, they would become advocates of further integration" (George: 1996, p.39). 
Finally, cultivated spill-over refers to the important position of central institutions. As 
an autonomous and institutionalised mediator, especially the Commission may be able 
to upgrade the common interest attaining results above the minimum common 
denominator and reinforce political spill-over by encouraging national bureaucrats to 
shift their loyalty to the new power centre. Overall, the "main thesis was that sectoral 
integration was inherently expansive ... " (Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991, p.6), leading to 
an automatic process of integration once started (Haas: 1958, p.297; Lindberg: 1963, 
p.294). 
The early development of the EC seemed to vindicate neo-functionalism. The 
establishment of the EEC and Euratom in 1957 were seen as a functional spill-over 
from the ECSC of 1952 and the acceleration of the timetable for setting up the 
common market in the early 1960s was attributed to pressure from employers' 
associations, representing a case of political spill-over. The French President de 
Gaulle, however. put an end to the neo-functional view of integration with his "empty 
chair" policy in 1965/66 (see Introduction, section 2). 
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In 1975, Haas denounced his own brainchild against this background. He 
argued that the concern should be directed towards the world level in times of 
"turbulence" and increasing world-wide interdependence. "Integration theories are 
becoming obsolete because they are not designed to address the most pressing and 
important problems on the global agenda of policy and research" (Haas: 1975, p.17). 
It became apparent that neo-functionalism concentrates too much on the inner 
dynamics of integration, while the impact of changes in the structure at the world 
level, within which regional integration takes place, cannot be accounted for. 
Only with the revival of European integration in the mid-l 980s, has neo-
functionalism regained the attention of scholars. Burley and Mattli analyse the role of 
the ECJ and argue that "the legal integration of the community corresponds 
remarkably closely to the original neofunctionalist model developed by Ernst Haas in 
the late 1950s" (BurleylMattli: 1993, p.43). Mutimer and Tranholm-Mikkelsen point 
out that the SEA created functional spill-over towards EMU following the free 
movement of capital, towards a common immigration policy resulting from the 
removal of border controls, towards a strengthened common regional policy due to the 
hannonisation of technical regulations, and towards a common social policy as a 
result of the free movement of labour (Mutimer: 1989, pp.85-92; Tranholm-
Mikkelsen: 1991, pp.l2/13). Nevertheless, the claims are more modest than in the 
original formulations by Haas and Lindberg. Acknowledging that nationalism and the 
socio-economic diversity of EC members may restrict further integration, Tranholm-
Mikkelsen concludes that "we cannot return to the automaticity of spill-over" 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991, p.18). The notion of spill-over is still seen as a useful 
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tool of analysis, although only as a part of an eclectic and less ambitious theoretical 
framework (George: 1996, pp.275-283)? 
Some studies of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC incorporate one 
or the other aspect of neo-functionalism in an eclectic way. Jerneck, for example, 
touches upon the notion of political spill-over as a force towards further integration by 
highlighting the increasing involvement of Swedish transnational actors in Brussels. 
They "have gradually involved themselves in a multitude of cross-cutting links and 
transnational interest coalitions" (Jerneck: 1993, p.42). There are also examples, 
where the important role of central institutions such as the Commission is outlined. 
Gstohl, for example, highlights the Commission's and here especially Delors' role in 
starting the European Economic Area (EEA)3 process in January 1989 (Gstohl: 1996, 
p.55). Pedersen utilises all three versions of spill-over in his explanation of the move 
from the EEA to membership. The attempt to establish an Internal Market comprising 
all EC and EFTA members created functional spill-over, which led to an expansion of 
the negotiation agenda. This pressure was intensified by political spill-over of EFT A 
interest groups, which shifted their loyalty to the EC. Eventually, not to loose 
involvement in decision-making in too many areas, EFTA governments opted for 
membership, which gave them co-decision making power. An explanation along the 
2 Cocks (1980) provides a functionalist Marxist account of European integration. In order to secure 
surplus value, expansion is the ultimate necessity of capitalism. This, however, needs to be legitimised 
politically. Cocks adopts a broad historical perspective and argues that integration has taken place in 
Europe since the 16th century in the form of the spread of state functions in order to cope with this 
double-problem of capital expansion and its legitimation. The EC is only the most recent stage in this 
process of integration. Although intellectually interesting, this approach incorporates the same 
problems as neo-functionalism. It also includes a notion of automaticity in the process towards further 
integration and merely concentrates on internal aspects of European capitalism, leaving the wider 
structure aside. 
) In a speech to the EP in January 1989, Delors spoke about the possibilities of a closer relationship 
between the EC and EFTA. which allowed the latter to participate in the four freedoms of the Internal 
Market without becoming members of the EC. This led to the EEA. signed in May 1992 and coming 
into force on I January 1994 (see Chapter 4. section 1.1). 
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line of cultivated spill-over focuses on directed change and political leadership. "One 
may thus interpret the apparent failure of the EEA as a success in disguise, as part of 
an incrementalist strategy aimed at integrating EFTA in the EC" (pedersen: 1994, 
p.l6). 
Overall, these studies employ neo-functionalist concepts only as partial 
explanations. A neo-functionalist explanation of the entire process leading towards 
membership is neither attempted nor deemed to be possible. Especially for the 
explanation of the impact of structural changes at the world level such as the end of 
the Cold War, neo-realist explanations, sometimes combined with an analysis of 
domestic politics, are sought (e.g. Pedersen: 1994, p.17). 
1.2. State-centric approaches I: intergovernmentalism. 
In contrast to neo-functionalism, which emphasises the importance of non-
governmental interest groups in the process of European integration, 
intergovernmentalism, the sister theory of neo-realism in IR, considers states to be the 
key international actors. Neo-realist scholars like Waltz realise that there have always 
been other actors (e.g. international regimes), "but the structures are defined not by all 
of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones" (Waltz: 1979, p.93). At 
the structural level, international anarchy, i.e. the absence of world government, is the 
principal force shaping the motives and actions of states. The second structural 
property is the distribution of capabilities, i.e. military and economic power resources, 
which arranges states in the international system according to their particular level of 
capability. At the unit level, states differ widely from each other with regard to 
attributes such as cultural background or ideology. These differences, however, can be 
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disregarded because "the functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them 
arise principally from their varied capabilities" (Waltz: 1979, p.97). Faced with the 
anarchic system, states as unitary actors carefully calculate the costs of alternative 
courses with the goal of power maximisation and security enhancement. Considering 
that the anarchy at the structural level is a permanent condition and that states are 
functionally similar, neo-realists explain events by referring to the distribution of 
capabilities. Changes in this distribution, it is argued, lead to changes in states' 
actions. "Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only 
marginally" (Grieco: 1988, p.488). If they are established, it is because states consider 
them to further their particular interests and they exactly reflect the existing 
international power structure. Once this structure changes, they change as well. 
With reference to European integration, Hoffmann argues from a neorealist 
point of view and accuses neo-functionalism of not realising the difference between 
"low politics" such as welfare and "high politics" such as security or defence. The 
neo-functionallogic of integration is limited to "low politics", where the national 
interest is not involved. In the area of "high politics", however, which is of "key 
importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled 
uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested 
blender ... " (Hoffinann: 1966, p.882). "High politics" is considered to be ruled by the 
logic of diversity: as the definition of the national interest depends mainly on the 
national situation, i.e. the position in the structure according to the distribution of 
power resources, which varies from country to country, integration will be impossible 
in this area.4 On the other hand, we can conclude that a convergence of national 
4 To do Hoffmann justice. he cannot be considered to be a neo-realist in this respect, since. in his eyes. 
n country's national situation "is made up altogether of its internal features ... and of its position in the 
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preferences is the precondition for European integration. Europe "has to wait until the 
separate states decide that their peoples are close enough to justify the setting up of a 
European state ... " (Hoffmann: 1966, p.910). Thus, states are seen as "gate-keepers" 
between their people and Europe. They carefully guard their sovereignty, which is 
ensured by the principle of unanimity voting in the Council. 
According to intergovernmental ism, European integration after World War II 
was possible due to a shift from a mUltipolar to a bipolar structure. The fear that co-
operation could lead to greater advantages to others disappeared, since there was no 
"high politics" rivalry between Western European countries in the shadow of the 
superpower conflict. As "consumers of security", national interests converged around 
the benefits of economic co-operation (Waltz: 1979, p.70). Intergovernmentalism also 
seems to explain well the problems of the mid-1960s and the developments of the 
1970s, when two new intergovernmental bodies were established, i.e. the European 
Council and the EPC (see Introduction, section 2). In the mid-1980s, changes in the 
international distribution of economic capabilities - Japan and the USA had coped 
better with the economic recessions of the 1970s than the EC members - led to a 
common European response. "Competitiveness on the global market remained the 
main issue, but now it appeared that regional integration was, after all, the 
prerequisite" (Hoffmann: 1989, p.30). The basis for the revival of integration leading 
to the Internal Market and SEA was a convergence around the neo-liberal, 
deregulatory economic programme of the 1980s (HoffmannlKeohane: 1991, 
5 pp.23/24). 
world" (HotTmann: 1966. p.868). instead of only the latter. Apart from this. however. he agrees on the 
neo-realist assumptions mentioned above. 
~ For an intergovcmmentalist explanation of the SEA. see Moravcsik: 1991. 
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There are some explanations of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC 
along this intergovemmentalist line. Koch, for example, argues that Austria responded 
to the pressure of economic necessity. Its close economic links with the EC and its 
bad economic performance in comparison to other Western European countries from 
the early 1980s onwards left no other option than membership (Koch: 1994). 
Similarly, Miles points to economic imperatives, which drove Sweden towards 
membership. The end of the Cold War and the concomitant changes in the 
international structure facilitated this move in that it "removed the shackles of keeping 
a rigid neutrality policy" (Miles: 1994a, p.83). In short, both countries joined the EC 
in response to changes in the distribution of economic and military resources between 
states. 
In contrast to neo-functionalism, intergovemmentalism takes the international 
setting of integration into account. Nevertheless, it cannot explain the particular 
choices made by states in response to changes in the distribution of capabilities. As it 
is demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, there was significant opposition to membership 
in both Austria and Sweden. A closer economic relationship short of full membership 
was debated as an alternative and eventual accession was not the result of structural 
necessity, but the outcome of an open-ended struggle. Moreover, while it is correct 
that neo-liberal economics was the basis of the revival of integration in the mid-1980s 
- Austria and Sweden also converged around it (see Chapter 2, section 2) -
intergovernmentalism does not explain how this change in the economic paradigm 
from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism came about and why it was neo-liberalism and 
not. for example, a Keynesian demand-led economic policy at the European level. 
which was adopted. Sandholtz and Zysman infer that "the global setting can be 
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understood in neorealist terms, but the political processes triggered by changes in the 
system must be analyzed in other than structural terms" (SandholtzlZysman: 1989. 
p.127). 
1.3. State-centric approaches II: intergovernmentalism-cum-domestic politics. 
As Bulmer makes clear, "a particular problem of intergovernmentalism is the 
tendency to view national governments as omnipotent, monolithic structures ... " 
(Bulmer: 1983, p.356). Changes in the foreign policies of states, however, are not only 
due to changes in the power distribution within the international system, but also to 
changes at the unit level, i.e. changes within the domestic realm of states. Milner 
identifies three points as to why domestic politics is important for understanding 
international co-operation and, by extension, European integration. Firstly, "domestic 
politics tells us how preferences are aggregated and national interests constructed" 
(Milner: 1992, p.493), because every state is characterised by a different set of 
internal social and economic conditions, which shape its national interest. Secondly, it 
explains the strategies adopted by a particular state and finally, it shows when national 
ratification of international agreements is possible. It is especially the first point which 
is of importance here, because, if the convergence of national interests is the 
precondition for international co-operation and European integration, as 
intergovemmentalists point out, it is necessary to analyse the construction of these 
various national interests. Putnam combines the domestic perspective with 
intergovemmentalism by suggesting that "the politics of many international 
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game" (Putnam: 1988, p.434). 
Level I refers to agreements between states at the international level. whereas Level II 
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looks at the ratification process at the domestic level. Putnam's hypothesis is that a 
government only concludes an international agreement, for which it expects to be able 
to construct a majority coalition between societal groups at the domestic level. 
To sum up, "domestic politics" usefully amends intergovernmentalism by 
highlighting how national preferences are formed, but it maintains the view of states 
as "gate-keepers". National governments are still assumed to "hold a key position at 
the junction of national politics and Community politics" (Bulmer: 1983, p.354). 
Interest groups do play an important role, but, in contrast to neo-functionalism, only at 
the domestic, not the EC level. 
As noted above, the convergence of national interests around a neo-liberal, 
deregulatory programme with the focus on low inflation was a precondition for the 
revival of European integration. Cameron points to the changes in the partisan 
composition of national governments in the early 1980s to explain the shift from 
Keynesianism to neo-liberalism. Most notably, Mrs. Thatcher took office in Britain in 
1979, but changes also took place in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Germany and they "shared one feature in common: they all represented a shift toward 
a more conservative position" (Cameron: 1992, p.57). Transferred to the cases of 
Austria and Sweden, however, this explanation based on domestic politics shows 
deficiencies. In Sweden, the turn to neo-liberalism occurred under a Social 
Democratic government, while in Austria it was not only the inclusion of the 
conservative OVP into a coalition government in 1987, but also the internal change of 
the SPO, the stronger party in the government, which led to the adoption of neo-
liberal policies (see Chapter 2, section 2). The European left changed during the 1980s 
and this cannot be explained by pointing to structural and domestic events alone. 
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Instead, the impact of neo-liberalism as a set of economic ideas has to be investigated 
to explain the general tum to neo-liberalism by parties of the right and the left.6 
This approach is further limited, because lobbying by interest groups can only 
be considered to take place within a countries' domestic realm. Thereby, the 
significance of transnational actors, as for example transnational corporations ONCs), 
is neglected. Their level of action is European if not world-wide, maintaining 
production sites in several countries at the same time. This allows them, firstly, to 
develop initiatives with the Commission and to lobby several governments at the 
same time. Secondly, they can put pressure on national governments by either 
threatening to transfer production units to other countries or by actually carrying out 
this threat, if certain conditions are not met. State-centric approaches can only account 
for TNCs by regarding them as several, unconnected actors in their individual 
domestic sphere, not as transnational actors transgressing the line of separation 
between international and domestic politics.7 
TNCs were especially crucial in Sweden's accession to the EC. They 
transferred production units to the EC prior to the SAP's decision to apply for 
membership (see Chapter 3, section 2.1.2) and they threatened further cutbacks of 
their activities in Sweden during the referendum campaign, should the Swedish 
population decide against membership (see Chapter 4, section 3.5). Fioretos (1997), in 
an intergovernmentalist variation, acknowledges the crucial role of Swedish TNCs in 
bringing about Swedish membership. His intergovernmentalist framework, however, 
6 In contrast to Cameron, Ludlam demonstrates that the tum to neo-liberalism in the UK occurred 
during the last pre-Thatcher Labour government between 1974 and 1979 due to a policy change within 
the Labour government before the 1976 IMF crisis (Ludlam: 1992). This further supports the point that 
the shift to neo-Iiberal policies was predominantly the result of a general change in economic ideas. 
7 Putnam. for example. considers international banks and TNCs to be Level II actors, i.e. actors in the 
domestic sphere of a state (Putnam: 1988. p.4SS). 
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does not allow him to conceptualise adequately the role of TNCs. Instead of focusing 
on their transnational role, exemplified in their production units in several countries, 
Fioretos describes them as domestic actors with an international orientation. 
Considering that some TNCs even transferred their headquarters to the EC and~ 
thereby, gave up their distinctive Swedish identity (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1), this 
inadequacy becomes apparent. 
A final criticism of the intergovemmentalism-cum-domestic politics approach 
is its inability to account for the partial transfer and pooling of national sovereignty as 
a part of the SEA and EMU (see Introduction, section 2.1). According to 
intergovernmental ism, the state as a gate keeper should not give up parts of its 
sovereignty to supranational institutions. In the next section, it is investigated whether 
regime theory, a further state-centric approach, can rectify these problems. 
1.4. State-centric approaches III: regime theory. 
In the 1970s, interdependence theorists such as Cooper questioned the notion of states 
as "gate-keeper" between the domestic and international sphere, because "growing 
economic interdependence ... negates the sharp distinction between internal and 
external policies ... (Cooper: 1972, p.179). Keohane and Nye developed the concept of 
interdependence further. In order to highlight the differences from neo-realism, they 
defined an opposite ideal type, i.e. the situation of "complex interdependence": (1) 
societies are connected via multiple channels, i.e. interstate, transgovemmental and 
transnational relations, (2) a clear distinction between "high" and "low politics" is 
missing, and (3) military force only plays a minor role (KeohanelNye: 1977. pp.24-
29). Consequently, the line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred and 
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it becomes more difficult, if not impossible, for states to formulate a coherent foreign 
'"" 
policy. Interdependence as an approach switched the focus from regional international 
integration to global issues with integration theory, at best, being "both included in 
and subordinated to the study of changing patterns of interdependence" (Haas: 1975. 
p.86). 
Nevertheless, the focus on intergovernmental and transgovemmental actors, as 
formulated in the ideal type of "complex interdependence", has never been further 
developed by interdependence scholars. "Complex interdependence remained a 
relatively underdeveloped and undervalued concept" (KeohanelNye: 1987, p.733). 
Instead; academics, among others Keohane himself, concentrated on the role of 
regimes in international co-operation, and this eventually fed into the study of 
European integration. 
In general, it is agreed that "international regimes are defined as principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner: 1982, p.185). Authors of this strand still 
consider realism and its assumptions as "a good starting-point for explaining the 
outcomes of conflicts ... "(Keohane: 1986, p.189).8 It has, however, to be amended by 
an examination of international regimes and their impact on international relations 
giving this approach the label regime theory (Keohane: 1984).9 Regimes facilitate the 
making of substantive agreements in three ways and, consequently, increase the 
efficiency of international co-operation. Firstly, regimes lower the transaction costs of 
making agreements in comparison with ad hoc agreements. Secondly, they "perform 
I For a detailed discussion about the modification of the structural approach, see Keohane: 1986. 
fP.190-197. 
This approach can also be named "neoliberal institutionalism" as, for example. in Keohane: 1989. 
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the function of reducing uncertainty and risk by linking discrete issues to one another 
and by improving the quantity and quality of information available to participants" 
(Keohane: 1989, p.117). Thereby, the monitoring of compliance to agreements is 
improved. Finally, although to a lesser extent, they provide frameworks for 
establishing legal liability. Because of these benefits, states as rational-unitary, utility-
maximising decision-makers will foster regimes in situations of complex 
interdependence, even if the underlying power structure changes. In summary, regime 
theory represents a modified structural approach, a functional theory of international 
co-operation. 
With reference to European integration, Hoffmann retreating from his pure 
intergovernmental position argued in 1982 that "the best way of analysing ... is to look 
at the ... [EC] ... as an international regime ... " (Hoffmann: 1982, p.33). However, "the 
EC differs from nearly all other international regimes in at least two salient ways: by 
pooling national sovereignty through qualified majority voting rules and by 
delegating sovereign powers to semi-autonomous central institutions" (Moravcsik: 
1993, p.S09). As a result, Moravcsik developed the so far most sophisticated state-
centric approach, labelled "liberal intergovernmental ism" (LI). This is a combination 
of intergovernmental ism, domestic politics and an extended version of regime theory. 
As all three share the same basic assumptions, i.e. states are considered to be the most 
important international actors, behaving in a rational, utility-maximising way and are 
gate-keepers between their domestic and the international sphere, this combination is 
theoretically acceptable. 
In more detail, Moravcsik, firstly, connects a liberal theory of national 
preference fonnation, i.e. "domestic politics". with an intergovernmentalist analysis of 
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inter-state negotiations in a two-level game. Then, he addresses the question of why 
the supranational EC institutions were strengthened. In general, member states as 
rational, utility-maximising decision-makers use them, because they increase the 
efficiency of interstate co-operation by lowering the transaction costs and improving 
the quantity and quality of interstate bargaining. Nevertheless, this does not explain 
the pooling and delegation of sovereignty. By extending regime theory, Moravcsik 
argues that in situations of low political risk of uncontrolled issue-linkage 
governments are willing to delegate power in order to attain a higher decision-making 
efficiency. The predominant position of states is maintained through the control of the 
power-delegating process, for example by nesting "specific decisions inside a set of 
larger decisions already reached by unanimity, thereby both diversifying and limiting 
political risk" (Moravcsik: 1993, p.511). Overall, this explains why the Commission 
has the right to choose the procedure for particular directives. This is more efficient 
than if the Council has every time to decide first whether QMV applies, before it deals 
with the matter itself. The same is correct with regard to the ECJ. tO As Garret 
declares, "one must view the delegation of authority to the European court in tenns of 
the monitoring and incomplete contracting problems confronting EC members" 
(Garrett: 1992, p.557). Being the arbiter in internal market issues, the Court increases 
the efficiency of policy-making by identifying transgressions of rules and by solving 
disputes, which were not foreseeable at the time the SEA was signed. 
There is a further line of argument exploring why member governments are 
wi II ing to pool and delegate sovereignty. They accept the restriction of their external 
10 Moravcsik himself rejects this and considers the expansion of the judicial power as an unexplainable 
exception (Moravcsik: 1993. p.S 13). Nonetheless. Garrett (1992). on whom I base the following 
reasoning. shows how Moravcsik's argument can be extended to the Eel 
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sovereignty, because "EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national political 
leaders vis-a.-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity" 
(Moravcsik: 1993, p.507). By engaging themselves in EC policy-making, national 
governments increase their relative bargaining power in their four domestic political 
resources, i.e. initiative, institutions, infonnation and ideas. They "cut slack" and 
loosen domestic constraints on policy-making. In short, "EC policies tend, on balance, 
to reinforce the domestic power of national executives" (Moravcsik: 1994, p.52), and 
European integration, therefore, strengthens rather than diffuses state power. II 
Nonetheless, even LI shows severe deficiencies. Firstly, the combined 
approach cannot explain why the EC members agreed on the strengthening of the EP. 
Instead of yielding higher efficiency, the co-operation, assent and co-decision 
procedures (see Introduction, section 2.1) are more likely to complicate and slow 
down EC policy-making. Furthermore, LI provides no insight into how the 
independent role of ideas is to be investigated or how transnational actors can be 
accounted for. TNCs' behaviour such as the investment boom of the 1980s in the EC 
are interpreted as rational adaptations to credible intergovernmental commitments, 
while policy ideas are merely viewed as the result of intergovernmental demands, but 
not as an independent force (Moravcsik: 1995, p.618). 12 In short, this predominant 
emphasis on states as main actors in international relations prevents all types of 
II Within intergovernmentalism. Fioretos (1997) contests this point. Rather than being a way for 
governments to regain autonomy. integration is the result of governmental loss of autonomy vis-a-vis 
domestic business groups, which have gained power due to external economic changes such as the 
Iiberalisation of financial markets and demand further integration. 
12 Elsewhere, Moravcsik accounts for ideas as "legitimate ideological justifications for specific 
policies" (Moravcsik: 1994, pp.5/6). While this captures an important "cognitive" dimension of ideas. 
it is still unable to understand their structural quality in the fonn of intersubjeclive meanings (see 
section 4.1 in this Chapter). 
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intergovernmentalism from dealing with ideas and transnational actors as independent 
forces behind integration. 
Finally, the exclusive state-centric focus makes all varieties of 
intergovernmental ism concentrate on negotiations as the crucial event of further 
integration. Wincott, however, points out that instances of integration such as the SEA 
are not so much the result of intergovernmental negotiations, but emerge from the 
"everyday grind of the Community" (Wincott: 1995). In other words, the process 
leading to negotiations and setting the agenda is more important than the negotiations 
themselves. It is argued in Chapters 2, section 3 and Chapters 3 and 4 that although 
not without importance, the Austrian and Swedish accession negotiations are only a 
link between the original decision to apply and the fmal decision in the referendum to 
accept the terms of membership. Instead of concentrating on the negotiations, this 
thesis, consequently, studies in-depth the processes leading to application and the 
struggle over the referenda. 
To sum up section 1, no mainstream theory of integration is able to fully 
explain Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC in a satisfactory way. Several 
scholars suggest combining intergovernmentalism with neo-functionalism as a 
remedy, because "taken together rather than as alternative approaches - ... [they] 
are useful for, and indeed necessary to, an understanding of the 1992 initiative" 
(Cameron: 1992, p.30).13 The same combination is suggested in respect of EC 
enlargement and, thus, Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC by Pedersen 
(1994), Miles (1995b), MileslRedmondlSchwok (1995) and Schwok (1996). 
Nevertheless, this is misleading. As Puchala had already observed in 1972. "attempts 
I) See also Webb: 1<)83. pp.37-39 and Cornett/Caporaso: 1992. p.244. 
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to juxtapose or combine the conventional frameworks for analytical purposes by and 
large yield no more than artificial, untidy results" (Puchala: 1972, pp.276/277). Neo-
functionalist approaches cannot be combined with state-centric approaches. as their 
basic assumptions diametrically oppose each other. While the fonner speak about the 
supersession of states, the latter consider sovereignty to be unchangeable. Hence, we 
have to look for a completely different, alternative approach. In order to do this, the 
theoretical foundations of the theories of integration, introduced in this section, have 
to be analysed more closely. This helps to understand the implications of certain 
assumptions and, hopefully, to avoid the same pitfalls. 
2. Positivism and the e'Wlanation of structural chanie: 
2.1. A critique of integration theories: 
In this section, it is argued that the theories of integration, reviewed in section 1, show 
severe deficiencies due to their positivist theoretical basis. 
Briefly, "in its most general meaning, positivism refers to the so-called 
'received model' of natural science" (Ashley: 1986, p.280). This involves a separation 
of subject and object and the search for observable causal relationships. In more 
detail, Neufeld identifies three tenets of the positivist logic of investigation. Firstly, 
the tenet "truth as correspondence" is underlain by the assumption of the separation of 
subject and object. "This assumption postulates the existence of a 'real world' - 'the 
object' - which is separate and distinct from the theoretical constructions of the social 
scientist - the subject" (Neufeld: 1995. p.33). As a consequence, the truth of concepts 
and claims is deemed to be testable according to the objective, empirically observable 
reality. This also implies that knowledge is produced by sensory observation alone. 
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The second tenet postulates the "methodological unity of science" and is underlain by 
the naturalist assumption that the social world contains the same kind of regularities 
as the natural world despite the existence of human SUbjectivity. Ashley points out 
that these assumptions cause severe problems. Firstly, how can science itself, 
conducted by subjective human beings, yield objective results? Here, positivists 
distinguish between the research of the individual scholar and the process of the 
scientific discourse, in which the validity of concepts and knowledge are tested 
according to principles such as falsification and the scientific method. The former 
may be influenced by the scholar's subjectivity, but the latter guarantees scientific 
objectivity provided that "all questions that cannot be formulated and solved within 
the allegedly objective logic of technical rationality" (Ashley: 1986, p.285) are 
excluded. In accordance with the first two tenets, integration theorists consider 
themselves to be detached from the integration process, where they try to identify 
causal relationships and behavioural regularities similar to natural scientists in their 
areas of enquiry. 
Secondly, how can social action guided by human subjectivity be objective? 
Positivists solve this problem by assuming that "all explanations of social action must 
ultimately come to rest with the interpretation of some frozen set of actors, their 
values, and their ends" (Ashley: 1986, p.284). In other words, whatever the individual 
properties of actors are and however subjective their behaviour is, investigating them 
from the outside shows that they all act according to the same principles and they all 
attempt to achieve the same goals. For state-centric approaches, the frozen set of 
actors are states. Despite their different unit attributes, they all act according to the 
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principle of rationality and try to maximise their utility in the sense of power 
maximisation and security enhancement in order to ensure their survival. 
The difference between intergovernmentalism and "two-level game" 
approaches is that there is an additional domestic game in the case of the latter. Thus, 
states are not only constrained by the international structure but also by the structure 
of the domestic interest group fonnation. These interest groups are also conceived as 
rational-unitary, utility-maximising actors which compete with each other for 
influence on government policy. They are the frozen set of actors in the domestic 
realm. In this situation, governments pursue a policy "that perfectly balances the many 
preferences of their constituents so that their chances of election are maximized" 
(Milner: 1994, p.l 0). At the international level, they "seek to maximize their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments" (Putnam: 1988, p.434). In short, as "gate-keepers" between the 
domestic and international realm, they still calculate the costs of alternative courses of 
action and try to maximise their expected utility. 
The structural aspect of state-centric approaches is closely related to their 
positivist basis. Despite the ontological primacy of states, once the international 
system is fonned via the positioning of states, it "becomes a force in itself, and a force 
that the constitutive units acting singly or in small numbers cannot control" (Waltz: 
1979, p.90). That is, Waltz considers the structure of the international system to be 
beyond the influence of the state-as-actor and, therefore, to be objective and 
unchangeable. As a result, the system consisting of states is deemed to be a 
transhistorical fact, while the only possible changes within this structure are changes 
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in the distribution of capabilities. 14 These changes, then, cause changes in the 
individual actor's behaviour. Since they occur independently of the actor's influence. 
they constitute objective causal relationships, which can be analysed by scientists and 
used to explain or predict the foreign policy of states. Nevertheless, by virtue of the 
fact that the current international structure based on sovereign nation-states is taken as 
given and the rationale of state behaviour is understood as fixed, state approaches are 
static and ahistoric. They cannot account for changes in the world order beyond the 
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state-centnc system. 
Regime theory additionally considers international regimes, but only in the 
sense that rational-unitary states will use them in order to increase the efficiency of 
decision-making and, thereby, the expected utility. International structures including 
regimes differ from structures without them, but they are still objective structures 
constraining and influencing the individual state's action. 
By arguing that structure determines actors' behaviour, state-centric 
approaches further deny the historical significance of practice. Individuals "appear as 
mere supports for the social process that produces their will and the logics by which 
14 Due to changes in the distribution of capabilities between states, a limited range of variations within 
the system is deemed to be possible (Waltz: 1979, pp.97/98). Firstly, the international system is either 
characterised by bipolarity, i.e. two superpowers enjoy considerably more capabilities than the other 
states and balance each other (e.g. the USA and Soviet Union during the Cold War), or multipolarity, 
i.e. several big powers balance each other (e.g. Europe between the two World Wars). A third variation 
is the hegemony of one state with predominant power resources (e.g. Britain in the 19th century). 
Gilpin, for example, explains world history as the rise and fall of hegemonic powers, as a continuing 
clcle of stable order and war (Gilpin: 1981). 
1 Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) attempt to explain structural change beyond the state-system by 
extending neo-realism. Firstly, they introduce functional differentiation of units in order to account for 
the change from Medieval competing authority relations of functional differentiation to the "classic" 
neo-realist stance of functionally undifferentiated states in the international system. Secondly, they 
establish "interaction capacity" as a third level of analysis between the unit and the structural levels. 
This makes it possible to distinguish between systems with a political structure, which influence the 
units within the system. and systems without a political structure. i.e. extremely low levels of 
interaction capacity. which do not. Nevertheless, even this version of neo-realism poses problems, 
since it is still state-centric and because, once a globally. politically structured international system has 
emerged. a further transfonnation beyond the state-system cannot be accounted for. 
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they serve it" (Ashley: 1986, p.290) They are not deemed to be able to shape their 
environment. Thus, politics is denied as a creative enterprise of human beings to 
determine their own conditions of life. Since they are a frozen set of actors, they can 
only react to the impact of the objective structure, which itself is, however, beyond 
their influence. 
The third positivist tenet is "the value-free nature of scientific knowledge" 
with the underlying assumption of the separation of fact and value (Neufeld: 1995. 
pp.35-38). By assuming an objective reality, positivists separate beliefs and 
ideologies, considered to be value-laden, from objective facts. "Hence, for positivism 
... [and, by extension, the integration theories introduced earlier] ... the possibility that 
dominant belief systems could constitute a part of an external and objective reality is 
denied" (Tooze: 1988, p.290).16 Thereby, however, they overlook the fact that their 
own assumptions have already constituted part of the structure and causal 
relationships they try to explain. "With theoretical primacy ascribed to the activity of 
nation-states, empirical work (inevitably) is directed towards mapping interstate 
transactions" (Rosamond: 1995, p.398). Furthermore, state-centric approaches miss 
the fact that their supposedly objective theory has its own normative purpose. As for 
neo-realism, it is "the conservative ideology of the exercise of modem state power: it 
provides a terminology of international relations which dramatizes the dilemmas, 
legitimizes the priorities and rehearses the means of realpolitiK' (Rosenberg: 1994, 
p.30).17 
16 Square brackets are used throughout the thesis to indicate changes made by the author to direct 
"uotes. 
1 Rosenberg argues this with reference to realism, the predecessor of neo-realism. Nevertheless. the 
way he defines realism allows us to transfer his quote to neo-realism. 
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Neo-functionalism, unlike state-centric approaches, is not static, since it 
implies the transfer of sovereignty to central institutions and. thereby, the 
transcendence of nation-states. In other words, the international structure is not taken 
as given. However, a closer examination reveals the same problems. The logic of 
spill-over considers integration to be an automatically ongoing process, once it has 
been started. Therefore, neo-functionalism is also ahistoric; not however in the sense 
of a static structure, but in the sense of a movement towards a future detennined by an 
objective economic rationality, expressed in the notion of spill-over leading to an 
automatic process of further integration. As Harrison notes, neo-functionalism is 
grounded on "the concept of 'economic man' , a hypothetical rationalist who attempts 
assiduously to maximise his own economic returns and minimise his costs" (Harrison: 
1974, p.184). Thus, the frozen set of actors are not states, but rational, utility-
maximising individuals, who theoretically fulfil the same role. 18 Again, politics is 
denied as a creative activity of human beings. As the rationale, according to which 
they act, is fixed and history moves towards an end detennined be an objective 
rationality, historical development is not only beyond the influence of human beings, 
but it also detennines their behaviour. Finally, instead of being an objective theory 
explaining and predicting European integration, neo-functionallogic is often 
employed by actors as a nonnative argument in favour of further integration. For 
example, "Jaques Delors and the EC Commission portrayed EMU as functionally 
linked to the internal market program and necessary for its success" (Sandholtz: 1993, 
p.19) . 
• 1 Individuals are, in fact, considered to be aggregated into interest groups represented by their elites, 
who express the economic interests of their particular group. Thus, the frozen set of actors are interest 
groups, not individuals. Nevertheless. apart from that. the argument remains the same:. 
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In summary, integration theories incorporate severe methodological 
deficiencies. Firstly, they cannot account adequately for the role of ideas. Therefore, 
they overlook their own nonnative basis and they are unable to take into account neo-
liberalism as an independent force. Secondly, they incorporate ahistoric assumptions. 
The structure within which action takes place is taken as given, and the rationale 
according to which actors behave is deemed to be fixed. Consequently, they cannot 
account for structural change and human activity as political practice is denied. 
In the next section, it is argued that globalisation, a structural change, has 
occurred since the early 1970s. European integration has to be analysed against this 
background and, therefore, requires a non-positivist theory for its explanation. 
2.2. The processes of globalisation: 
"Globalisation" as a concept has entered the general academic debate in social 
sciences and is increasingly regarded as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It is partly 
defined, for example, as "the rise of global cultural flows and 'deterritorialized' signs, 
meanings, and identities" (AminfThrift: 1994, p.4).19 Although these processes are not 
without importance, globalisation is here mainly understood from a political economy 
perspective. Most importantly, it is characterised by two interlinked processes, the 
transnationalisation of finance and production at the materiallevel20 and a shift from 
19 For a wider discussion of"globalisation", see Higgott: 1997. pp.5-16. Apart from different 
definitions of globalisation. it is also a starting-point for normative discussions. Held. for example. 
argues that democracy has to be rethought in the context of globalisation and he suggests a 
"cosmopolitan model of democracy", which provides the basis for a global democratic order (Held: 
1993). Normative questions of this kind. although important, are of no concern in this thesis. 
20 "Transnationalisation" is used in this thesis to indicate structural change beyond the state system 
such as the organisation of production on a transnational scale, while changes in levels of cross-border 
flows such as trade are referred to as instances of"internationalis3tion". 
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Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the ideological level (Cox: 1992, p.30; Cox: 1993. 
pp.259/260 and pp.266/267}.21 
2.2.1. The transnationalisation of finance: 
The transnationalisation of finance has led to the emergence of a fully-fledged global 
financial market since the early 1970s. The first component of this process was the 
rise of financial offshore markets. "It was first in evidence in the 1960s when Britain 
and the United States strongly supported growth of the Euromarket in London" 
(Helleiner: 1994, p.8). While the USA did not control the oversees business of US 
financial institutions and banks, Britain refused to regulate dollar trading in London. 
As a consequence, "the Eurodollar loan became a new unregulated growth point in the 
international financial system; and the faster US corporations moved to Europe, the 
faster their bankers followed to London, and later to other European cities" (Strange: 
1994a, p.1 06). These offshore markets are characterised by minimal or non-existent 
reserve requirements and the fact that deposits can be taken in any currency. As non-
national money markets, they offer a regulation-free environment for the trading of 
financial assets and, therefore, facilitate expansion. "In consequence, banks seeking 
greater profits have had an incentive to concentrate their growth in the Euromarkets" 
(GilllLaw: 1988, p.165). Between 1973 and 1984, there was a dramatic rise in the 
offshore markets to $1.000 billion - especially the so-called petro-dollars were 
21 Within the political economy perspective. some authors emphasise new technological developments 
in microelectronics and telecommunications as a part. if not driving force of globalisation (e.g. 
Agnew/Corbridge: 1995. pp.178-185: Strange 1 994a, pp.119-138). Here, technology is not treated as 
an independent force and core feature of globalisation. Rather, it is regarded as "the means of solving 
the practical problems of societies. but what problems are to be solved and which kinds of solutions are 
acceptable are detennined by those who hold social power" (Cox: 1987, p.21). In short. while new 
technologies have facilitated the transnationalisation of production and finance. they could also have 
bel'n used to strengthen national controls and regulations and. thrrefore. to prevent transnationalisation 
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invested in these markets - having been only $3 billion and $75 billion in 1960 and 
1970 respectively (Strange: 1994a, p.1 01). The second component of the 
transnationalisation of fmance goes hand in hand with the support of financial off-
shore markets. Instead of responding with more regulation, ''the United States from 
the mid-1970s led the way to more deregulation of money markets and financial 
operators" (Strange: 1994a, p.ll 0). Due to competitive pressure, the other two major 
financial centres followed swiftly. In 1979, the British government abolished its forty-
year-old system of capital controls over-night, and Japan followed in the first half of 
the 1980s (Helleiner: 1994, p.149-156). Eventually, the EC as a whole, New Zealand, 
Australia and the Scandinavian countries went down the same road (Helleiner: 1994, 
pp.156-166). It is important to notice that the move towards a global financial market 
was not inevitable, but the result of conscious governmental decisions. Helleiner 
demonstrates how this movement could have been stopped, if not reversed at four 
historical points - Britain in 1976, the United States in both 1978-11:) and 1979-80 and 
France in 1983 (Helleiner: 1994, p.124). The Swedish SAP government's decision to 
deregulate the financial markets in the mid-1980s is another example in this respect. 
They clearly decided against the Employee Investment Funds, which was a possible 
alternative (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). 
Hirst and Thompson deny that the current degree of financial integration at the 
world level is something drastically new. In fact, financial integration was bigger 
during the time of the Gold Standard between 1879 and 1914 (Hirstffhompson: 1996. 
31-50). This does not, however. refute the argument in this thesis that globalisation as 
defined here constitutes a structural change in comparison to the post-war economic 
system between 1945 and 1971. National economic and monetary policy autonomy 
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was much greater due to the encompassing systems of financial market regulations at 
the national level. The Swedish government had, for example, the option to boost the 
country's exports and, thereby, economy through the devaluation of the national 
currency (see Chapter 2, section 1.1.2). Since the deregulation of the financial markets 
and the removal of exchange controls, this is no longer possible. In short. a globally 
integrated financial market has emerged since the early 1970s and led to a restriction 
of national policy autonomy in contrast to the preceding period. Whether this is 
something totally new is a secondary issue. 
It is also not argued here that the integration of financial markets is an 
irreversible development. Just as much as it was at least partly a conscious decision by 
governments to deregulate and liberalise financial markets, a re-regulation may be 
possible in the future (Helleiner: 1996). Again, it is important here to note that a 
structural change has taken place since the early 1970s. Predictions about future 
developments are not attempted. 
2.2.2. The transnationalisation of production: 
The transnationalisation of production "signifies the integration of production 
processes on a transnational scale, with different phases of a single process being 
carried out in different countries" (Cox: 1986, p.233). The growth ofTNCs in 
numbers and in size drives the transnational organisation of production. They are "the . 
agents that integrate trade, technology transfer and financial flows for the purpose of 
international production in the context of the firms' strategy" (UN: 1991. p.83). In the 
1970s and 1980s, "the growth of TNCs has taken place despite an economic 
environment marked by a deceleration in world economic growth, increasing 
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instability in key international variables, such as exchange rates and interest rates, and 
growing protectionist sentiment" (UNCTC: 1988, p.l). There were 24000 TNCs alone 
in 14 major home developed countries in the early 1990s compared to 7000 in 1970 
(UN: 1993, p.l). Overall, there were 37,000 parent firms with 170,000 foreign 
affiliates in 1990 (UN: 1993, p.l3)?2 
The rise in foreign direct investment is a good indicator of the rising 
importance ofTNCs. "Since FDI, by definition involves the establishment of lasting 
managerial control, it creates networks of ongoing relationships between parent firms 
and foreign affiliates and, increasingly, among foreign affiliates" (UN: 1992, 252). 
Between 1986 and 1990, outflows of FDI rose from $88 billions to $225 billions, 
which is an annual increase of26 per cent. There was a downturn in FDI in 1991 and 
1992, mainly due to recessions in the biggest economies, but it picked up again from 
1993 onwards up to $318 billions in 1995, i.e. an increase of 38 per cent over 1994 
(see Table No.2, Appendix, own calculations).23 The significance ofFDI demonstrates 
the close connection between the transnationalisation of production and finance. The 
deregulation of national currency control systems has been a precondition for the free 
movement of capital, making an increased level of FDI possible. 
The increase in FDI, however, does not indicate the overall importance of 
TNCs and, thus, the transnational organisation of production in the world economy. 
One way of doing this is to compare it with world exports and world output. Between 
21 These figures had further increased to 38,747 parent companies with 265,551 affiliates abroad by 
1995 (UN: 1996, p.9). 
13 FOI as an indicator for the extent of TNCs' activities is imperfect, since (I) it does not capture non-
equity linkages ofTNCs, such as contractual arrangements and turnkey agreements; (2) it 
underestimates the amount of FOI, because reinvested earnings are unavailable for several home 
countries; and (3) it underestimates the total amount of investment by foreign affiliates in so far as it 
does not include capital that is raised in the host country (UN: 1992, p.54). FOI is used here as an 
indicator, because the data is easily accessible. but it has to be kept in mind that the real extent of 
TNCs' activities is bigger. 
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1983 and 1989, outflows in FDI increased about three times faster than world exports 
and roughly four times faster than world output (see Table No.1, Appendix). HThe 
considerably faster growth of foreign direct investment '" compared to that of trade 
and output ... seems to suggest that ... [transnational] ... production is, in fact, 
assuming a leading role in international economic relations, and that transnational 
corporations are increasingly important agents of international economic activity" 
(UN: 1991, p.81). This is confirmed by the indicator of the global sales of foreign 
affiliates in host countries, better suited for the comparison with trade flows, since it 
includes the value of output ofTNCs' activities in contrast to FDI. Including world 
exports of commercial services and excluding intra-firm trade, global sales of foreign 
affiliates were $4.4 trillion in comparison to world exports of$2.5 trillion in 1989. 
The 1992 UN study of TNCs points out that "global sales of affiliates are considerably 
more important than exports in delivering goods and services to markets world-wide, 
which underlines the importance of TNCs in structuring international economic 
relations" (UN: 1992, p.54). 
Hirst and Thompson reject the idea of an emerging global economy based on 
the transnationalisation of production. Firstly, they argue that production across 
borders is not a new phenomenon. It appeared after the mid 19th century and was well 
established by the First World War (Hirstffhompson: 1996, p.19). Secondly, they 
point out that specific characteristics in national economic systems are still important 
in the attractiveness for FDI and that FDI is not globally spread in an equal way, but 
concentrated on the Triad of North America, Japan and the European Economic Area 
in respect of both the originators and destination for FDI (Hirstffhompson: 1996, 
pp.51-75). Finally, they stress the fact that there are only few "real" TNCs without the 
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identification of a home region/country, an internationalised management and the 
willingness to invest in the world, wherever the highest and/or securest returns are to 
be expected. Instead, the world economy is characterised by multinational 
corporations, which are still predominantly concentrated on a home region/country 
with reference to their assets and sales (HirstlThompson: 1996, pp.76-98). 
It is not doubted here that there have been forms of transnational production 
before the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is the magnitude (see above) and nature, which has 
changed. With the help of new technology, "foreign affiliates are increasingly 
becoming parts of networks in which they are closely linked with their parent firms 
and each other through intra-firm flows of trade, technology and training and through 
the common utilization ofa host of services ... " (UN: 1992, p.253). Secondly, it is not 
argued here that the transnationalisation of production has led to a borderless global 
economy, a level playing field with truly global frrms as the prime movers. 
Nevertheless, the growth in size and numbers ofTNCs with a regional home base, 
indicated by the concentration ofFDI in the Triad, is also part of the globalisation 
process. As Higgott outlines, regionalisation and globalisation are not necessarily 
contradictory phenomena. Rather, regional integration may be "an important 
dimension of the evolving world order in an era of globalisation" (Higgott: 1997, 
p.16).24 TNCs are predominantly characterised by a home region/country. Even with 
production units in only two countries, however, a TNC gains the ability of moving or 
threatening to move production units between countries (see the example of Swedish 
24 In general. this thesis is not concerned with the relation between globalisation and regionalisation. 
Rather. it deals with the relation of states, i.e. Austria and SWeden. to European integration against the 
background of globalisation. For a collection of essays on the various instances of regionalism, defined 
as a set of state projects in response to globalisation and regionalisation, regarded as combinations of 
historical and emergent structures. see GambeVPayne: 1996. 
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TNCs in Chapter 2, section 2.2.1) and, thereby, some degree of leverage over national 
regulations.2s 
Hirst and Thompson argue that the international economy was more open in 
the pre-1914 period than in the period from the 1970s onwards. "International trade 
and capital flows ... were more important relative to GDP levels before the First 
World War than they probably are today" (HirstlThompson: 1996, p.31). From their 
perspective, only the re-emergence of an open internationalised economy has been 
experienced. It is, however, important to note that FDI flows are not of a similar 
nature to trade flows. "FDI, unlike market-based exchanges, does not end with the 
initial transactions, it establishes a more lasting linkage between economic agents 
located in different countries" (UN: 1994, p.118). FDI is an indicator for the 
establishment of transnational production units, best expressed by the stock ofFDI. 
"The structure of this stock reflects the structure of ... [transnational] ... production as 
undertaken by mcs (UN: 1995, p.5). These stocks of productive assets nearly tripled 
from $1 trillion to $2.7 trillion between 1987 and 1995 (see Table No.2, Appendix). 
In short, it is this shift from an international economy, where states are linked with 
each other through trade flows, to a transnational economy with a production system 
across borders, which constitutes the structural change. "From being a collection of 
independent national economies linked primarily through markets, the world economy 
is becoming, for the first time, a ... [transnational] ... production system, integrated 
increasingly though numerous parts of the value-added chain of production" (UN: 
1994, p.146). 
2S This led Strange and Stopford to argue that states do no longer bargain only with other states in 
foreign policy. but that a '~iangular diplomacy" is emerging. in which states must also negotiate with 
TNCs (StopfordlStrange: 1991). Elsewhere. Strange infers that TNCs "are increasingly exercising a 
parallel authority alongside governments in matters of economic management ... " (Strange: 1996. 
p.65). 
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2.2.3. The change at the ideological level: 
The structural changes at the material level were accompanied and supported by a 
change in the dominant economic paradigm (Cox: 1993, pp.266/267; Helleiner: 1996, 
p.194). A neo-liberal, monetarist policy replaced Keynesianism from the mid-1970s 
onwards, when it had become clear that the latter's expansionary response to the 
economic crisis of the early 1970s had failed. "The importance of monetarism is the 
rejection of the commitment to a policy of full employment in favour of the 
subordination of social relations to so-called market freedom" (Bonefeld: 1995, p.37). 
Efficiency and price stability are the new priorities, the privatisation of the state-
controlled enterprises and the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy at the 
national level are advocated, social peace is imposed rather than negotiated and there 
is no commitment to redistribution or social reform. Globalisation, consequently, is 
not only a material reality, but also provides "a powerful ideological framework 
within which big business pushes for a redistribution of income, wealth and power 
towards economic elites" (Radice: 1997, p.16). In broader terms, it is "a discourse of 
political knowledge offering one view of how to make the post-modem world 
manageable" (Higgott: 1997, p.6). 
The changes at the material level and ideological level are closely interlinked. 
Helleiner points out that the decisions to follow the USA in deregulating financial 
markets was not only the result of competitive pressure. They also reflected '1he 
policy shift from embedded liberal ... [i.e. Keynesian] ... to neoliberal frameworks of 
thought" (Helleiner: 1994, p.167). In both Austria and Sweden, the adoption of neo-
liberal ideas accompanied the deregulation of the financial markets from the mid-
1980s onwards (see Chapter 2, section 2). 
61 
To sum up, since the early 1970s, we have experienced a structural change 
called globalisation with a global economy emerging above the state system, leading 
to the restriction of national autonomy and sovereignty. "The new reality is that the 
system of states is overlaid by a highly integrated, incompletely regulated, rapidly 
growing - but consequently somewhat unstable - world economy" (Strange: 1994b, 
p.212). 
Global in its nature, this structural change has not left the EC unaffected. As 
elsewhere, globalisation has led to a restructuring of social relations in Western 
Europe. In Chapter 2, section 2, this is demonstrated for the Austrian and Swedish 
cases. Hence, Gill infers that "an assessment of the recomposition of social structures 
and political arrangements during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s is crucial to 
understanding the complexities of the 'new' Europe ... " (Gill: 1992, p.lS9). And 
Rosamond argues "that the notion of globalization can and should be used to enrich 
our understanding of the processes at work within the space defined by the ... [EC] ... " 
(Rosamond: 1995, p.391 )?6 To conclude, the revived process of European integration 
since the mid-1980s and, by extension, the Austrian and Swedish accession as a part 
of it have to be analysed against the background of globalisation. The established 
theories of integration are, however, unable to do so, since they are inadequate at the 
explanation of structural change due to their positivist assumptions. The next section 
outlines neo-Gramscianism as an alternative approach capable of explaining structural 
change. 
26 For a similar argument. see Holman/Pijl: 1996, pp.65166. 
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3. A neo-Gramscian alternative: 
3.1. II Problem-solving" versus II critical" theory: 
Cox does not dismiss state-centric and functionalist theories completely. Instead, he 
argues that they may be useful as "problem-solving" theories for practitioners who 
are, for example, active in international organisations and deal with particular 
problems within stable social and power relationships (Cox: 1994, pp.l 0 111 02). 
However, in order to explain structural change we need a "critical" theory, which 
"does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them 
into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might 
be in the process of changing" (Cox: 1986, p.208). In other words, "critical" theory is 
a theory of history in that it is concerned with understanding the process of change, 
affecting the very structures, which "problem-solving" theory takes for granted. It, 
therefore, adopts a historical structures perspective, which regards "human nature and 
the other structures that define social and political reality - from the structure of 
language through those of laws, morals, and institutions, and including the state and 
world-order structures like the balance of power - as being themselves products of 
history and thus subject to change" (Cox: 1989, p.38). In short, in contrast to the state-
centric and neo-functionalist approaches outlined in section 1, human nature, the state 
and the international system are not treated as unchanging substances, but as a 
continuing creation of new forms (Cox: 1986, p.213). 
This view of structural change implies a dialectic conceptualisation of 
structure and agency. uStructures are formed by collective human activity over time. 
Structures, in tum mould the thoughts and actions of individuals. Historical change is 
63 
to be thought of as the reciprocal relationship of structures and actors" (Cox: 1995. 
p.33). This provides room for regarding politics as a creative activity by human beings 
able to shape their environment and destiny within and even beyond existing 
structures.
27 
Finally, "critical" theory considers ideas to be part of the structure in the 
form of intersubjective meanings. How the role of ideas can be conceptualised is 
outlined in section 4 below. 
Cox offers neo-Gramscianism as a "critical" theory.28 In what follows, basic 
neo-Gramscian concepts are outlined and defined. Then, these concepts are, firstly, 
used to analyse globalisation in section 5 of this chapter, and secondly, to guide the 
analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC in Chapters 3 to 5, after they 
have been operationalised for this purpose in Chapter 2, section 3. 
Firstly, neo-Gramscianism uses a dialectical method. "At the level of real 
history, dialectic is the potential for alternative fonns of development arising from the 
confrontation of opposed social forces in any concrete historical situation" (Cox: 
1986, p.215). This implies the rejection of the notion of a historically inevitable 
development and that one has to start the investigation by looking at the social forces 
27 There is an ongoing debate in IR about the way to conceptualise the relationship between structure 
and agency. Wendt (1987), for example, suggests a solution along Giddens' structuration theory. while 
Carlsnaes (1992) foHows Archer's model of morphogenetic cycles. Cox's interpretation may be best 
seen in the light of the "critical realism" position (Hay: 1995, pp.199-202). On the one hand. structures 
do not detennine outcomes, but define the potential range of alternative strategies, favouring certain 
strategies over others. Agents, on the other hand, have the opportunity to choose from several 
strategies within the structure. These strategies may reinforce existing structures or overcome them 
(Bieler: 1996, pp.128-130). 
21 Neo-Gramscianism is used here as the label for the distinct approach in I~ which was developed in 
response to. and based on, Cox's original two articles (Cox: 1983 and 1986). The label was chosen. 
because many of its important concepts are inspired by the work of the Italian Communist Antonio 
Gramsci (Gramsci: 1971). Although direct reference is made to Gramsci at several points. this thesis 
does not discuss the way neo-Gramscians have interpreted Gramsci. For an initial step in this 
undertaking. see Kenny/Gennain: 1997. Here, it is argued that neo-Gramscianism constitutes an 
approach in its own right and it is, consequently. neo-Gramscian and not Gramscian concepts, which 
are applied to Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. A collection of essays by neo-Gramscians 
can be found in Gill: 1993a. 
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of a particular historical period in order to identify possible alternatives and future 
developments. Social forces, as engendered by the production process, are the main 
collective actors. The concept of class is crucial for the definition of social forces.29 
F or the purpose of this study, classes are regarded "as social forces whose cohesion 
derives from the role played in a mode of production ... " (Holman!Pijl: 1996, p.55). 
The capitalist mode of production or accumulation based on private enterprise and 
wage labour is characterised by the opposition between capital, the entrepreneurial, 
property-owning stratum on the one hand, and free labour, which is the stratum of 
those forced to sell their labour-power, on the other. Labour and capital are, 
consequently, two collective actors opposing each other, engendered by the 
production process as social forces. There are, however, further differences within the 
capitalist mode of accumulation. Importantly for this study, while production was 
organised on a national basis in the post-war era, important parts have been 
transnationalised since the early 1970s (see above). As a consequence, capitalist 
accumulation is not necessarily any longer inscribed in national paths of economic 
development (Radice: 1997, p.5), and a split between national and transnational social 
forces of both capital and labour has emerged (see section 5 of this Chapter).3o 
29 The definition of social forces is not clear in Cox's and other neo-Gramscians' work. While class 
plays an important role, Cox also seems to point to a wider range of actors. For example, at one stage, 
he describes "leading cadres" and "scientific-humanistic elites" as distinct social forces (Cox: 1987, 
p.206). Whether this is a real intention or just a theoretical untidiness describing as social forces what 
should be called "organic intellectuals", i.e. the representatives of social forces (see below), cannot be 
solved here. In this study, however, the emphasis is on class. 
)0 Cox distinguishes between various modes of social relations of production, i.e. models that depict 
distinct types of production relations, which co-exist in the capitalist mode of accumulation and 
engender different groups of social forces (Cox: 1987, pp.51-82). In Overbeck: 1990, pp.23124, five 
criteria for the distinction of capital fractions are identified: the functional-institutional forms of 
capital, the use value of the products, the productivity conditions, the specific capital-labour relations, 
and the geographical orientation. For the purpose of operationalisation, however, this thesis focuses on 
the change from the national to the transnational level of production as engendering the most important 
social forces since the early 19705. In Chapter 2, section 3, only the distinction between nationaIly- and 
internationally-oriented social forces according to the trading patterns. i.e. the geographical orientation, 
of companies based on domestic production is additionally introduced. 
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Through the emphasis on social forces, Cox reintroduces the sphere of 
production into the analysis, arguing that it "creates the material basis for all forms of 
social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive 
processes affect all other aspects of social life, including the polity" (Cox: 1987, p.l). 
That is, the relations which organise material production are considered to be crucial 
for the wider institutional reproduction of social orders on both a national and an 
international level. Importantly, production is not understood simply in the narrow 
sense of the production of physical goods or in the form of different economic sectors. 
"It covers also the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social 
relations, morals, and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical 
goods" (Cox: 1989, p.39). Cox does not disregard the "non-class" issues such as 
peace, ecology, and feminism. However, while they are not to be set aside, they must 
be "given a firm and conscious basis in the social realities shaped though the 
production process" (Cox: 1987, p.353). 
Finally, neo-Gramscianism "enlarges the ... [state-centric] ... perspective 
through its concern with the relationship between the state and civil society" (Cox: 
1986, p.216). It speaks about various forms of states and shows that the "raison 
d' etat" cannot be separated from society, as it depends on the configuration of social 
forces at the state level. Forms of state are defined in terms of the apparatus of 
administration and of the historic bloc or class configuration that defines the raison 
d'etat for that form (Cox: 1989, p.4I). Gramsci's concept of the integral state is 
analytically useful for the conceptualisation of the relation between the state and 
society (Rupert: 1995, pp.27128). On the one hand. the integral state consists of 
"political society", i.e. the coercive apparatus of the state more narrowly understood 
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including the ministries and other state institutions. On the other, "civil society". made 
up of political parties, unions, employers' associations, churches, etc. 
represents the realm of cultural institutions and practices in which the 
hegemony of a class may be constructed or challenged. Gramsci uses civil 
society to designate an area of cultural and ideological linkage between class 
relations in the economy and the explicitly political aspect of the state (Rupert: 
1995, p.27). 
In section 5, it is argued that a change in the form of state from the Keynesian to the 
neo-liberal night-watchman state has been experienced as a part of globalisation in the 
Western World since the early 1970s. How this has happened in Austria and Sweden 
is outlined in Chapter 2, section 2. Overall, this implies that states cannot be treated as 
unitary actors, but as structures within and through which social forces operate. These 
structures may limit the possible strategies of action, but they do not determine 
outcomes, which are the result of struggle. 
In a further step, this makes it possible to overcome the artificial separation of 
domestic and international spheres. The international system is also actively 
reproduced as a set of social relationships and we need to see "the form of our states-
system as the geopolitical expression of a wider social totality" (Rosenberg: 1994, 
p.55). Thus, neo-Gramscianism helps us to understand a world order as stemming 
from the same basic social structures, which are the foundation of the forms of state 
within this world order. 
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3.2. A neo-Gramscianjrameworkfor analysis: 
Every historical structure represents a particular configuration of forces 
establishing the framework for action in a given period, within which alternative 
forms of development can take place, and which may be overcome by collective 
action. There are three different types of forces in any historical structure. Firstly, Cox 
identifies material capabilities, i.e. productive and destructive potentials. Secondly, 
there are two kinds of relevant ideas. "One kind consists of intersubjective meanings 
which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior; ... the other kind of 
ideas relevant to a historical structure are collective images of social order held by 
different groups of people" (Cox: 1986, p.218). Both kinds have different purposes. 
While intersubjective meanings tend to cut across social divisions and establish the 
ground for social discourse throughout a historical structure, there may be several 
collective images at the same time, the clash of which points to alternative 
developments. Finally, Cox identifies institutions as a means of stabilising and 
perpetuating a particular order by promoting those ideas which are consistent with this 
order. Having developed a life of their own, they may even become a battleground of 
rival collective images (Cox: 1986, p.219). All three types of forces interact with each 
other. 
Moreover, these types of forces operate on three different levels of activity, 
connected with, and influencing, each other. Firstly, there is the mode of accumulation 
in the sphere of production, i.e. the material and organisational structure of 
production, where the various social forces can be identified. Secondly, the three types 
of forces interact on the level of forms of state as derived from a study of state/society 
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complexes and thirdly, we have the level of world order, "that is. the particular 
configurations of forces which successively define the problematic of war or peace for 
the ensemble of states" (Cox: 1986, p.220). In summary, historical structures consist 
of three types of forces which interact on three interconnected levels of activity. There 
are always several possible developments within one historical structure and the 
structure itself may be overcome via the activity of social forces. 
The centrepiece of neo-Gramscianism is Gramsci' s concept of a historic bloc. 
At a basic level of understanding, a historic bloc is an alliance of classes or fractions 
of classes, which attempts to establish a particular form of state and/or world order 
preferable to them. Nevertheless, a historic bloc is also more than a simple alliance of 
social forces. "It encompasses political, cultural, and economic aspects of a particular 
social formation, uniting these in historically specific ways to form a complex, 
politically contestable and dynamic ensemble of social relations" (Rupert: 1995, 
pp.29/30). It is a solid structure of political society and civil society and consists of 
structure and superstructure, "in which precisely material forces are the content and 
ideologies are the form, ... " (Gramsci: 1971, p.377). The relationship between 
structure and superstructure is reciprocal. "Superstructures of ideology and political 
organisation shape the development of both aspects of production ... [i.e. the social 
relations and the physical means of production] ... and are shaped by them" (Cox: 
1983, p.168). 
Another important neo-Gramscian concept is hegemony. Unlike the neo-realist 
notion of hegemony, in which a hegemonic state controls and dominates other states 
and the international order thanks to its superior amount of economic and military 
capabilities (Gilpin: 1981, p.29; Keohane: 1984, pp.32133), it describes a type of rule. 
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which predominantly relies on consent, not on coercion. Additionally, it is established 
on a historic bloc that does not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of a state. 
Hegemony, according to neo-Gramscianism, "is based on a coherent conjunction or fit 
between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of ... order 
... and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of 
universality" (Cox: 1986, p.223). In Cox's writing, the concepts of historic bloc and 
hegemony are very close together, and, although it is not clearly stated, give the 
impression to be identical. In other words, the establishment of a historic bloc implies 
that this bloc enjoys hegemonic rule. Gill, on the other hand, distinguishes between 
the two concepts. He states that a historic bloc "may at times have the potential to 
become hegemonic" (Gill: 1993b, p.40), but it also may not. For the purpose of this 
study, Gill's definition is used. It offers the analytical advantage to make the 
identification of a strong combination of material and ideological forces possible, the 
historic bloc, without immediately leading to the conclusion that this is combined 
with hegemonic rule and, thereby, the absence of opposition.31 
"Organic intellectuals" playa crucial role in achieving hegemony. According 
to Gramsci, 
every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the 
social and political fields (Gramsci: 1971, p.S). 
31 Other neo-Gramscians also make the distinction between the two concepts. Rupert considers the 
historic bloc to be a precondition for hegemony (Rupert: 1995. p.29). This implies that there is no 
hegemony without historic bloc. but not the other way round. Augelli and Murphy speak about a 
period. during which the USA under Reagan in the 1980s was hegemonic within the Western World 
and exerted coercive domination over various Third World countries. In other words, they conceive a 
situation. in which a historic bloc combines hegemonic rule in some areas with coercive rule in others 
(AugellilMurphy: 1993. pp.134-136). 
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They do not simply produce ideas, but it is their task to organise the social forces they 
stem from and to develop a "hegemonic project" which is able to transcend the 
particular interests of this group so that other social forces outside the historic bloc are 
bl . h' 32 a e to gIve t err consent. Such a hegemonic project must be based on, and stem 
from, the economic sphere. It must, however, also go beyond economics into the 
political and social sphere, incorporating issues such as social refonn or moral 
regeneration, to result in a stable hegemonic political system. It "brings the interests 
of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates 
these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms" (Cox: 1983, 
33 p.168). 
Although neo-Gramscianism does consider ideas and "organic intellectuals" to 
playa crucial role, the exact nature of this impact is little discussed. Considering the 
importance of neo-liberalism in the revival of European integration in the mid 1980s, 
it is important to conceptualise when and how ideas played a role in Austria's and 
Sweden's accession to the EC in Chapters 3 to 5. 
32 Cox hardly uses the concept "organic intellectual" in his work. For an incorporation into neo-
Gramscianism, see Gill: 1990, especially pp.51-54. 
)) Members of the sometimes called "Amsterdam School", who also use neo-Gramscian concepts in 
their analyses of global restructuring and are, therefore, closely related to, if not part of. neo-
Gramscianism, speak about comprehensive concepts of control instead of hegemonic projects (e .g. Pij I: 
1984, especially pp.7/8). Both tenns are, however. defined in the same way and, in fact. are often used 
interchangeably (Holman: 1996; Overbeek: 1990. p.26; OverbeeklPijl: 1993). While comprehensive 
concepts of control and hegemonic project are frequently used to understand the fonnation of 
consensus between different fractions of capital within the capitalist mode of accumulation, this does 
not imply that labour or fractions of labour are unimportant in the formation of hegemony. Chapters 3 
and 4 show that transnational and intemationally-oriented labour were a crucial part of the class 
alliances in Sweden and Austria. which brought about membership. 
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4. Neo-Gramscianism and the role of ideas in IR: 
Positivist theories of integratio~ be they state-centric or neo- functionalist~ separate 
values and facts and concentrate on the latter. Thereby, they deny the role of ideas in 
international co-operation and integration. Instead, actors' interests are derived from 
structure. They are regarded as given and prior to the ideas held by actors. While the 
rational behaviour of actors is considered to be fixed, the emphasis of analysis is on 
the structural constraints faced by actors. (GoldsteinlKeohane: 1993, p.4; Woods: 
1995, p.l61). 
In recent years, it was realised that left unanswered by these accounts "are 
questions of which economic theories and beliefs are most likely to shape the 
definition of interests in international relations and why and how it is that particular 
sets of ideas prevail in the international arena" (Woods: 1995, p.l61). 
In the following, the renewed emphasis on the role of ideas in IR is discussed 
and the position of neo-Gramscianism as a critical theory assessed. 
4.1. "Cognitivist" versus "constructivist" approaches: a synthesis. 
Goldstein and Keohane define ideas as world views, which establish "the universe of 
possibilities for action" (GoldsteinlKeohane: 1993, p.8); principled beliefs, i.e. 
normative ideas, which provide the criteria to distinguish right from wrong and just 
from unjust; and causal beliefs, which are beliefs about cause-effect relationships, 
providing guides for individuals on how to achieve their objectives.34 In this thesis, 
14 For the purpose of this thesis. "idea" is treated synonymous with "belief' and "ideology". since all 
three words convey a non-material quality. Woods. to provide examples for the various types of ideas, 
identifies the belief that an increase in interest rates will diminish inflation as a causal belief. the idea 
that it is morally preferable to tax everyone by the same amount as a principled belief. and a belief in a 
neo-liberal economic model as a world view (Woods: 1995, p.162). 
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Woods' approach, in which every set of economic ideas encompasses all three types 
of ideas, is adopted (Woods: 1995, p.163). 
The approaches to the role of ideas in IR can roughly be divided into 
"cognitive" and "constructivist" approaches (Spindler: 1997, pp.8-1 0; Vee: 1996).3s 
There are two important characteristics of "cognitive" approaches. Firstly, they are not 
concerned with the sources of new ideas and the self-interest of their proponents. 
What matters is their causal effects on policy, i.e. when they are generally accepted as 
guidelines for public policy or international co-operation (GoldsteinlKeohane: 1993, 
p.7; Haas: 1980, pp.368/369; Jacobsen: 1995, p.291). In other words, it is the 
transmission of ideas into policy, not their creation, which is the main concern. 
Secondly, "cognitive" approaches neither challenge the positivist assumptions of 
traditional IR theories (GoldsteinlKeohane: 1993, p.5; Spindler: 1997, p.l 0), nor 
attempt to replace them. Rather, they "demonstrate that an ideas approach is always a 
valuable supplement to interest-based, rational actor models" (Jacobsen: 1995, p.285). 
Meaning-oriented behavioural ism is one way of attempting to identify causal 
connections between ideas and policy outcomes. It regards ideas as "subjective 
meanings", i.e. the meanings which human subjects attach to behaviour, and treats 
them as intervening variables between the "stimulus" (the action context) and the 
response (behaviour). "By correlating particular beliefs/motivations/values with a 
particular behaviour in a particular context, it becomes possible to derive empirically 
testable hypotheses about unifonnities of behaviour under specific conditions" 
(Neufeld: 1995, p.74). Nevertheless, meaning-oriented behaviouralists' attempts at 
H The labels "cognitivist" and "constructivist" are related to different approaches by different authors. 
Here. they are only used as defined in the following and the inverted commas are. therefore. retained. 
Vee (1996) makes the same distinction as Spindler (1997). "Cognitivists" are, however, called 
"behaviouralists" and "ideational institutionalists", while "constructivists" are labelled "discursivists" 
nnd "interpretivists". 
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specifying the causal linkage between ideas and policies by using either statistical 
associations or quasi-controlled experiments have been met with little success (Yee: 
1996, pp.71-82). Others have, consequently, tried to establish causal relationships via 
the identification of institutional and/or actor-centred causal mechanisms. It is argued 
that ideas acquire causal relevance, when they become embedded as organisational 
rules and procedures in institutions (Yee: 1996, pp.88-92; GoldsteinlKeohane: 1993, 
pp.20-24). Ideas can also acquire causal relevance, if they are carried by powerful 
actors, which use them as "weapons" in order to legitimise particular policies 
(Jacobsen: 1995, pp.298-300). 
!The "epistemic communities" approach is an example of where the focus on 
institutional and actor-centred causal mechanisms is combined. According to Haas, 
"an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas: 1992, p.3). Such communities 
have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, providing a value-based 
rationale for the social action of community members, shared causal beliefs, shared 
notions of validity, regarding the validation of knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise, and a common policy enterprise, presumably with the goal of enhancing 
human welfare. Epistemic communities may spread their beliefs and policy enterprise 
within countries and across borders through their activities within national policy 
agencies, think tanks and international organisations. 
The "epistemic communities" approach goes beyond neo-realism in that it 
does not deduce actors' interests merely from structure. Ideas also playa role in the 
shaping of preferences. Especially in times of uncertainty, states are likely to tum to 
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epistemic communities for advice (Haas: 1992, pp.3/4). Furthermore, the approach 
goes beyond regime theory. International organisations are not only deemed to be a 
functional way of improving co-operation. They are also treated as a forum for "the 
bargaining and negotiation that take place among different epistemic understandings 
and practices 'carried' by epistemic communities and later by policymakers as well" 
(Adler/Haas: 1992, p.369). This includes the possibility of a redefinition of national 
interests through the process of collective learning within organisations. 
Vee, however, makes clear that these approaches are still not able to account 
for the full impact of ideas. Their emphasis on empirical analysis of observable 
behaviour prevents them from capturing the structural quality of ideas in the form of 
intersubjective meanings (Yee: 1996, p.l 02). "Constructivist" approaches, on the 
other hand, acknowledge ideas as "intersubjective meanings" and define them as ''the 
product of the collective self-interpretations and self-definitions of human 
communities" (Neufeld: 1995, p.77). Together, these "intersubjective meanings" 
make up the "web of meaning", which is as much a part of the social totality, the 
structure human beings are confronted with, as material capabilities. It is argued, 
consequently, that "the practices in which human beings are engaged cannot be 
studied in isolation from the 'web of meaning' , which is, in a fundamental sense, 
constitutive of those practices, even as it is embedded in and instantiated through 
those same practices" (Neufeld: 1995, p.76). 
I Wendt follows a "constructivist" line and criticises state-centric approaches for 
taking the interests and identity of states as given, i.e. exogenous to the process of 
state interaction. This makes the explanation of "identities and interests, the 
reproduction and/or transformation of which is a key determinant of structural 
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change" (Wendt: 1994, p.394), impossible. He further argues that structure. within 
which action takes place, does not only consist of material capabilities, but also of the 
intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system (Wendt: 
1992, p.4O 1). Hence, in order not only to explain the change of identities and interests 
but also the structure as such, ideas need to be regarded as a part of the structure and 
be conceptualised as intersubjective meanings. 
Kratochwil and Ruggie provide another "constructivist" insight in IR. They 
argue that the intersubjective quality of convergent expectations as the basis of 
regimes requires for its explanation ''the incorporation into prevailing approaches of 
insights and methods derived from the interpretive sciences" (KratochwillRuggie: 
1986, p. 771).36 In a further study, Kratochwil argues that international relationships 
resemble the intersubjective dimension of games. Positivists can only observe the 
"facts" of overt behaviour. "Beyond that lies the realm of intersubjective rules which 
are constitutive of social practice, and which an interpretive epistemology has to 
uncover" (Kratochwil: 1988, p.277). 
As a "critical" theory, the neo-Gramscian approach does not follow positivist 
explanations of causal relationships. Its emphasis on ideas, consequently, has to be 
aligned with the "constructivist" perspective, which treats ideas as part of the structure 
in the form of "intersubjective meanings". It is in this way that we have to understand 
the assertion that ideas establish the wider frameworks of thought, "which condition 
the way individuals and groups are able to understand their social situation, and the 
possibilities of social change" (GilllLaw: 1988, p.74). At the same time, however, the 
contributions made by Ucognitivist" approaches should not be dismissed. Ideas are 
\" Knatochwil and Ruggie (1986). but also Neufeld (1995) use the tenn "interpretive" instead of 
"constructivist", 
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indeed often used to legitimise particular policies and it is important, who the carriers 
of these ideas are, as the neo-Gramscian emphasis on "organic intellectuals" 
demonstrates. This insight into the role of ideas can be incorporated into the 
"constructivist" perspective, provided it is not attempted to detect causal relationships 
between ideas and policy in general, but to identify such legitimation strategies in 
particular instances. A combination with "constructivism" makes clear that these 
strategies are likely to be successful in those cases, where the legitimising ideas 
correspond to the intersubjective meanings of the structure, because they will appear 
as logical. Conversely, it might be difficult to carry out actions legitimised with ideas, 
which are in contradiction to the intersubjective meanings. 
Hall provides an example of such a combination of "intersubjective meanings" 
and legitimation strategy in his analysis of the impact of Keynesianism in the post-war 
era. At the structural level, Keynesian ideas were influential through their terms of 
economic analysis. They changed the basic categories, the "intersubjective meanings" 
through which the economic world was seen. On the other hand, Keynesian ideas 
"were a potent weapon in the hands of those who sought to justify a new role for the 
state against the arguments of the old laissez faire" (Hall: 1989, p.366). This was so 
successful not least due to the fact that they corresponded to the "intersubjective 
meanings" of Keynesian ideas in the structure. However, the relationship is not one-
sided. Actors themselves, who use certain ideas to legitimise particular policies, may 
change the "intersubjective meanings" of the social totality. "Intersubjective 
meanings" are not only constitutive of social practices. They are also instantiated by 
them and human consciousness, thus, embodies a transformative quality. In Chapter 3, 
section 1.1, it is outlined how "organic intellectuals" of intemationally-oriented 
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capital in Austria achieved a change in the intersubjective meanings, which made the 
discussion of the compatibility of neutrality and EC membership possible. 
To conclude, the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation of ideas can be understood 
as a combination of the "cognitive" and "constructivist" insights. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on the role of ideas and "organic intellectuals" has been criticised by an 
approach labelled "open Marxism". 
4.2. The critique of II open Marxism": 
Burnham criticises the role attributed to ideas and "organic intellectuals" by 
neo-Gramscianism. He alleges that neo-Gramscianism pursues a pluralist road of 
investigation through giving equal importance to the different types of forces and 
levels of analysis. That is, parts of the overall structure such as the polity, the 
economy and civil society are given real autonomy without any analysis of the 
systematic connection between these parts. Burnham points out that 
however laudable in theory, the true consequence of this position is to produce 
a pluralist empiricism which lacks the power to explain either the systematic 
connection between values, social relations and institutions or the extent to 
which the historical appearance of capital as a social relation transforms the 
social order in such a way that all relations are subsumed under the capital 
relation as the basis of the valorisation process (Burnham: 1991, p.78). 
Rather than treating all factors as equal, he argues that the social relations of 
production must be attributed primary importance. By neglecting this, the neo-
Gramscian approach ends up giving the role of ideas and "organic intellectuals" too 
much emphasis in economic policy-making. Instead, 4'the contradictions of the capital 
relation and the nature of competition in the world market determine the path and the 
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pace of particular state strategies" (Burnham: 1991, p.83). A crisis is resolved via the 
sacrifice of inefficient capitals. 
Undoubtedly, the social relations of production must be the starting-point of 
Marxist investigations, because only this allows us to comprehend that the apparent 
separation of the political and economic spheres is not a transhistorical fact but the 
result of the development of specific social relations of production (Bonefeldl 
BrownlBumham: 1995, pp.23-26; Burnham: 1994). 
In this respect, Burnham is right in saying that a crisis in the accumulation 
regime is solved via the sacrifice of inefficient capitals. However, the end of one 
accumulation regime does not imply that there is only one automatic alternative 
accumulation regime, which will take its place. There is no logical result to which 
capital-in-general will automatically be driven via market forces. On the contrary, 
there are always various possible courses of action in times of structural change. 
Which course of action is chosen is not detennined by the market but depends on 
which historic bloc is able to establish its strategy as the one generally accepted to be 
the best. And it is here, where ideology plays a decisive role as a part of the new 
hegemonic project. 
As Gramsci points out, "it is on the level of ideologies that men become 
conscious of conflicts in the world of the economy" (Gramsci: 1971, p.l62). 
Consequently, ideas represent an independent force, but only in so far as they are 
rooted in the economic sphere, going beyond it at the same time, i.e. that they are in a 
dialectic relationship with the material properties of the sphere of production. Only 
such ideas can be regarded as "organic ideas". They "organise human masses, and 
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create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle, etc." (Grarnsci: 1971, p.377). 
Similarly, not every intellectual is an "organic intellectual". According to 
Grarnsci, there is the traditional, vulgarised type of intellectual, which "can be defined 
as the expression of that social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves 
as 'independent', autonomous, endowed with a character of their own etc." (Gramsci: 
1971, pp.8/9). "Organic intellectuals", by contrast, are regarded as the true 
representatives of a particular social group or historic bloc, generated by the sphere of 
production. 
To conclude, the fact that "organic ideas" and "organic intellectuals" are 
rooted in the material structure demonstrates the primacy attached to the sphere of 
production by neo-Gramscianism. It is the concept of a historic bloc, consisting of 
ideas and material circumstances, which best shows that ideas and other aspects of the 
superstructure are not autonomous factors of analysis, but have to be understood in 
their dialectical relationship with the economic structure. They need to be rooted in 
the economic structure, directly or via their carriers, the "organic intellectuals", in 
order to be of importance. "Organic ideas" and "organic intellectuals" are most likely 
to have an impact in times of crisis, i.e. the end of an accumulation regime. Such a 
crisis occurred in the early 1970s, when the Fordist accumulation regime broke apart 
and the structural change of globalisation ensued. 
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5. Neo-Gramscianism and its analysis of global is at ion: 
5.1. The post-war economic order of "embedded liberalism" and its demise: 
The post-war international economic order in the Western world was a compromise 
between the principles of economic liberalism and national interventionism~ labelled 
"embedded liberalism" (Ruggie: 1982, p.393). On the one hand, it consisted of the 
acceptance of the principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions, which led to 
several consecutive GAIT negotiation rounds furthering international free trade. This 
component was based on the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and "the 
ability of the US to maintain the growth of global aggregate demand through its 
balance of payment deficits, partly generated by heavy overseas military 
expenditures" (GilllLaw: 1989, p.478). On the other hand, the right for national 
governments to maintain capital controls and to intervene in their own economy in 
order to ensure domestic stability via economic growth and social security was 
generally accepted. 
From a neo-Gramscian point of view, in addition to the level of world order, 
hegemony also existed at the levels of production and forms of state. The social 
relations of production were arranged around the Fordist accumulation regime, a 
specific organisation of production and labour relations at the national level. It was 
based on the mass production of consumer goods and on mass consumption (Holman: 
. , 
1996, p.16), combined with a trade-off for workers between boredom during work and 
high pay ensuring pleasure after work (Holloway: 1995, p.19). This '"resulted in the 
subordination of the specific interests of both the working class and the bourgeoisie to 
an overall compromise between their respective interest groups, while preserving the 
fundamental subordination of wage labour to capital ... " (Holman: 1996, p.17). At the 
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form of state level, the compromise rested on the Keynesian demand management 
form of state with the goal of full employment via budget deficit spending and 
characterised by interventionism, the mixed economy and an expansive welfare 
system (GilllLaw: 1988, pp.79/80). 
At the end of the 1960s, the Fordist accumulation regime showed its technical 
limits within the capitalist core countries due to stagnating productivity and a decline 
in the rate of profit (Holloway: 1995, p.24). The attempt to overcome these problems 
within Fordism led to social unrest. "Labour increasingly ... [resisted] ... 
management's efforts to expand its control and step up the work pace" (Oberhauser: 
1990, p.215). 
At the world order level, faced with an inflationary surge due to the Vietnam 
war effort and President 10hnson's "Great Society" programme (GilllLaw: 1988, 
p.173), the USA was no longer prepared to sustain the international economic system. 
In 1971, President Nixon decided to ease the inflationary strain on the American 
economy through running a bigger balance of payments deficit and through cutting 
the link between the dollar and gold. While this eliminated the US current account 
deficit by transferring the adjustment burden overseas (Helleiner: 1994, pp.II21113), 
Nixon sounded the death-knell of the Bretton-Woods system of stable exchange rates. 
Globalisation ensued and led to structural changes, which can be observed at the three 
levels of activity. 
5.2. Structural changes in production and world order: 
The transnationalisation of production and finance broke apart the organisation of 
production at the national level and split both capital and labour to several fractions. 
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The hierarchy of capital "can be plotted as (1) those who control the big corporations 
operating on a world scale, (2) those who control big nation-based enterprises and 
industrial groups, and (3) locally based petty capitalists" (Cox: 1987. p.358). The third 
group has increasingly come under the dominance of the first group through 
"franchise" mechanisms, but there is room for a possible conflict between national 
and transnational capital. The latter strongly supports an open global economy, 
whereas the former may seek national or regional protectionism against global 
competition. Furthermore, "it can be seen that cumulatively ... [the changes in the 
production structure] ... have been destructive of labor's autonomous collective social 
power" (Cox: 1987, p.336). Cox identifies two main lines of separation within the 
working class. Firstly, there is a rift between workers of transnational companies and 
those of national companies, shadowing the conflict within capital. Secondly, while 
some few, highly skilled workers in core plants enjoy a high status and job security, 
the overall number of established workers has declined during the course of industrial 
restructuring and a rift between established and non-established workers has opened 
up (Cox: 1986, p.235). 
At the ''world order" level of activity, ''the world economic crisis of 
restructuring of the 1970s and early 1980s has been concomitant with the crisis of the 
bipolar system of superpower politics - that is, the spectacular break-up of Soviet 
dominance over Eastern Europe and the decline of American hegemony" (Holman: 
1992, p.13). Overall, globalisation is manifested in two upsurges in liberalism at the 
world level: firstly, in the global spread of neo-liberalism, heralding a new capitalist 
economic order and secondly, in the political democratisation of Southern Europe 
(1970s), Latin America (1980s) and Eastern Europe (1990s), preparing these countries 
to become a part of this new global economy. 
5.3. Globalisation and the restructuring of the state: 
There are different conceptualisations of the state's role in the global economy. 
Ohmae represents an extreme version, which regards globalisation as moving 
inevitably to a borderless world, an economic level playing field, within which truly 
global companies are the primary actors. There is no role left to states beyond the 
provision of infrastructure and public goods required by business (Ohmae: 1990 and 
1995). Similarly, Strange talks about an increasing hollowness of state authority, a 
terminal retreat of the state (Strange: 1996). On the other hand, there are the 
internationalists, who still consider states to be the main actors in international 
economics and politics. Hirst and Thompson argue that the economy is predominantly 
international, not global, and that, therefore, states, although in a slightly different 
way, still playa central role in its governance (Hirstffhompson: 1996, pp.178-189). 
The collection of essays contained in the book by Keohane and Milner (1996) provide 
case studies along this line. They analyse the impact of internationalisation, defined as 
a drastic increase in cross-border flows of goods, services and capital, on domestic 
politics world-wide, mediated by the countries' different institutional settings. 
I t is argued here the neither of the two extreme positions adequately 
conceptualises the role of states in globalisation. Globalisation should not be 
counterpoised to the state. The role of the state has not diminished. it has changed and 
the state has been restructured. Radice provides the example of the UK, where "what 
Thatcherism represented was of course not the promotion of free markets contra the 
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state as such, but the restructuring of the state away from the proto-socialist 
aspirations of welfarism and the pursuit of full employment, towards wholehearted 
support for private capital accumulation" (Radice: 1997, p.4). 
On the one hand, national autonomy and sovereignty in economic policy 
making has been restricted. According to Cerny, increased capital mobility and global 
market structures undennine domestic regulation (Cerny: 1996, p.3). Although big 
and developed countries are more able to counter the loss of autonomy than small and 
developing countries, "even the autonomy of the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union is constrained in matters of macroeconomic policy by the 
globalisation of finance and production" (Gill: 1995, pp.412/413).1t is, for example, 
increasingly difficult for governments "to tax capital, which has tended to shift the 
fiscal burden on to other factors of production, notably labour, and/or erode the tax 
base" (Oman: 1995, p.11).37 Furthermore, governments have to adapt their 
performance to criteria acceptable to global production in order to attract investment 
from TNCs and to global finance in order to obtain good credit ratings. For example, 
governments need to adjust their policies to the requirements of rating agencies, as 
these agencies allocate the credit ratings, which are so crucial in the increasingly 
important securities market (Sinclair: 1994a and 1994b). Cox concludes that states 
have been, "by and large, reduced to the role of adjusting national economies to the 
dynamics of an unregulated global economy" (Cox: 1994, p.1 05). This 
intemationalisation of the state "gives precedence to certain state agencies - notably 
ministries of finance and prime ministers' offices - which are key points in the 
adjustment of domestic to international economic policy" (Cox: 1986, p.232). 
n With regard to problems of taxing transnational capital. sec also Strange: 1996. pp.60-65. 
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This is, however, a very one-sided perception of the role of the state. which 
only grants states the ability to adapt to globalisation, perceived to be an external 
force. By contrast, Panitch points out that 
capitalist globalisation is a process which also takes place in, throu~ and 
under the aegis of states; it is encoded by them and in important respects even 
authored by them; and it involves a shift in power relations within states that 
often means the centralisation and concentration of state powers as the 
necessary condition of and accompaniment to global discipline (Panitch: 1994, 
p.64). 
In other words, states do not only respond to, but also bring about globalisation. In 
more detail, retaining the notion of the internationalisation of the state, officials of 
those state institutions, which are linked to the global economy, are likely to be an 
active part of the drive towards globalisation. Helleiner, for example, points out that 
officials of finance ministries and central banks "were often the most enthusiastic 
advocates of financial liberalization ... " (Helleiner: 1996, p.194). In short, the sources 
for globalisation may stem as much from the national sphere, as they do from the 
global economy and Chapter 2, section 2 demonstrates this in the cases of Austria and 
Sweden. 
Globalisation, thus, implies the reorganisation of states' structures and a 
change at the "forms of state" level. In general, ''the neo-liberal concept projected a 
transition away from the welfare, social compromise state towards the night-
watchman state of c1assicalliberalism" (Pijl: 1989, p.66).38 The institutions linked to 
the global economy have become dominant within the "political society" and 
transnational social forces dominate important parts of the "civil society" such as 
political parties, trade unions. etc. Nationalised industry is privatised. the economy in 
11 For a theoretical justification of the night-watchman state, see Nozick's discussion of the "minimal 
state" (Nozick: 1974). A state. he argues. is only justified in respect to the narrow functions of 
protection against force. theft. fraud. enforcement of contracts. etc. Anything beyond this. for example 
state intervention to redistribute wealth. infringes individuals' rights and is. therefore. unacceptable. 
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generalliberalised and deregulated, including the labour marke~ and the welfare 
system cut back. The goal of full employment is replaced by low inflation and price 
stability. 
Of course, not all states were welfare states to the same extent and not all 
states have moved to an extreme form of night-watchman. The historical reality of 
national political and social relations implies that neo-liberal restructuring has had a 
different face in every country. However, the character of neo-liberalism is 
transnational (Overbeek: 1993, pJ{l) and, on a continuum with the welfare state and 
the neo-liberal night-watchman state as ideal types at opposite extremes, a general 
move in the direction towards the latter can be identified throughout the developed 
world. Chapter 2, section 2 shows how both Austria and Sweden were restructured 
along this line from the early 1980s onwards, although in a different way and to a 
different extent. 
5.4. The emergence of a transnational historic bloc: 
Due to transnational production and finance, "it becomes increasingly 
pertinent to think in terms of a global class structure alongside or superimposed upon 
national class structures" (Cox: 1986, p.234). Thus, Cox "has noted that ... there may 
be an emerging transnational historic bloc" (GilllLaw: 1988, p.65). The transnational 
managerial class of TNCs in manufacturing and services and of the global financial 
management, the driving force behind the transnationalisation of production and 
finance. is at the apex of this historic bloc. Small and middle-sized businesses as 
contractors or suppliers, import-export businesses, and service companies, such as 
stockbrokers, accountants, etc. aJllinked to TNCs and~ thereby, the global economy 
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also fonn a part of it (Gill: 1995, pp.400/40 1). They are supported by officials of those 
national ministries and institutions, which are linked to the global economy through 
the internationalisation of the state, most importantly finance ministries, prime 
ministers' offices and central banks. Moreover, "the established workers in the sector 
of ... [transnational] ... production are potential allies of international capital" (Cox: 
1986, p.235). The system of "enterprise corporatism", which closely links core 
workers to their particular company via special benefits and secure employment, may 
provide the basis for an alliance of this type (Cox: 1987, pp.70-74). At the "world 
order" level of activity, an interstate coalition of developed countries centred around 
the so-called G7 state apparatuses and some more industrialised developing countries 
(e.g. Brazil) may fonn the basis of the new transnational hegemonic order (Cox: 1986, 
p.237). The new security order is still to be established after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, but NATO's enlargement to the East underlines the further extension of the 
neo-liberal market economy towards Eastern Europe and guarantees the protection of 
this market economy against the disruption by hostile regimes. If necessary, this 
alliance goes to war in order to secure the global economy and its supply with raw 
materials, as the Gulf War in 1991 showed. Finally, this order is further sustained by 
institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the World Bank, etc., which contribute to the spread of neo-liberal economic 
ideas to the newly democratised countries. 
Neo-liberalism has been the hegemonic project of the transnational historic 
bloc's bid for hegemony (OverbeeklPijl: 1993, pp.2. 14-16). In particular two neo-
liberal offensives were organised by "organic intellectuals" in networks such as the 
Mont Pelerin Society. The first was the propagation of a neo-liberal, deregulatory 
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economic programme to replace the Keynesian welfare state from the early 1970s 
onwards. The second had the goal to start a world-wide offensive against 
Communism, putting the Soviet Union economically against the wall in an intensified 
and highly technological arms race, in the late 1970s, early 1980s (pijl: 1995, pp.l22-
124). This does not mean that these intellectuals and their neo-liberal offensives were 
directly responsible for the various policy outputs. It implies, however, that they 
contributed to the setting of the agenda for a new, global hegemonic order based on 
the ideas of neo-liberal economics and strict anti-Communism. 
However, as in every truly dialectical process, there are also opposing social 
forces, pointing to alternative forms of development, to other possible hegemonic 
orders. The crisis due to the break-up of the hegemonic order of "embedded 
liberalism" is "a crisis of representation: one historic bloc is dissolving, another has 
not taken its place" (Cox: 1987, p.285). So far, the transnational historic bloc outlined 
above enjoys a position of supremacy. It is dominant within the current world order, 
but has not gained hegemony yet (Gill: 1995, p.400). The achievement of the latter is 
doubtful for two reasons. Firstly, internal contradictions may break the transnational 
historic bloc apart, unless new international regulatory mechanisms are established. 
There are the tensions between "short-term-thinking" transnational finance, causing 
insecurity in the financial markets, and "long-term-thinking" TNCs in manufacturing. 
Transnational capital is not a homogeneous class fraction.39 Furthermore, the neo-
liberal economic logic itself contains a contradiction. "If all countries compete to 
prove their monetary soundness, their deflationary policies will have negative 
W For the inherent conflict potential between these two different capitalist class fractions, see Pijl's 
discussion of the ideal-types of money-capital and productive-capital concepts of controllhegemonic 
projects (Pijl: 1984, pp.8-20). 
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multiplier effects. World recession is the natural outcome if all countries deflate 
simultaneously" (GilllLaw: 1989, p.494). 
Secondly, alternative historic blocs may arise with their own hegemonic 
project and endanger the transnational bloc's supremacy. For example, a neo-
mercantilist class alliance consisting of national industries, dependent on 
protectionism and state subsidies, their employees and those ministries which are 
concerned with national problems such as unemployment (e.g. labour ministry) is a 
possible alternative. "The hegemonic concepts within this type of bloc are those of 
national security and territorial sovereignty" (GilllLaw: 1988, p.l 05). So far, the 
transnational historic bloc has gained supremacy and may eventually win hegemony 
over the neo-mercantilist national or regional social forces, but the latter development 
remains possible too. As Higgott demonstrates, since the mid-1980s various types of 
new protectionism in countries including the USA have weakened the basic principles 
of the post-war free trade regime embodied in the GAIT negotiation rounds (Higgott: 
1996, pp.26-32). 
To conclude, globalisation and its impact on the three levels of analysis have 
been outlined in this Chapter. As stated above, this is the background against which 
the Austrian and Swedish accession to the EC have to be analysed. In other words 
Austrian and Swedish social forces as the main collective actors are regarded as 
embedded within these emerging transnational social relations, a particular historical 
configuration of social and power relationships. It has also been shown in this Chapter 
that the established integration theories are unable to account for such instances of 
structural change and, by extension Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. 
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Therefore, neo-Gramscianism with its emphasis on changing social and power 
relationships was introduced as an alternative approach. 
In the next Chapter, the neo-Gramscian concepts are operationalised and a 
framework for the analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC is 
developed. Before, however, it is analysed how Austria and Sweden have been 
affected by these changes. It is only by empirical studies of individual countries that 
we can substantiate the impact of globalisation. 
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Chapter 2: Austria and Sweden in an era of global structural change. 
At the end of Chapter 1, it was argued that globalisation has been manifested in the 
transnationalisation of production and fmance and in a shift from the Keynesian to the 
neo-liberal night-watchman state. This Chapter, firstly, outlines Austria's and 
Sweden's economic and political systems I (section 1) and secondly, discusses in 
which ways globalisation has had an impact on the two countries' production structure 
and state-society relations (section 2). It is demonstrated that, while finance has been 
transnationalised in Austria and Sweden and both countries have been restructured 
towards the neo-liberal night-watchman state, the impact on the production structure 
has been different. In Sweden, production has been transnationalised, whereas it has 
been internationalised in Austria, which is still mainly linked to the global economy 
via trade. This provides the basis for the development of a neo-Gramscian framework 
for the analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC (section 3). For this 
purpose, the neo-Gramscian concepts such as social forces, internationalisation of the 
state, etc., introduced in Chapter 1, are operationalised and related to the particular 
Austrian and Swedish economic and political systems. 
1. Post-war economic and political systems in Austria and Sweden: 
In this section, the Austrian and Swedish economic-political systems are outlined. The 
separation into one part on the economic systems and another on the political systems 
of the two countries is only a device for presentational purposes. It does not imply that 
I n,e tenn "economic-political system" was chosen without system-theoretical implications. It only 
represents the various institutions and social groups in Austria and Sweden and their interaction. 
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these two spheres are separate. In fact, the arrangements in both spheres are inter-
related and complement each other. 
1.1. The economic system: small states in world markets. 
According to Katzenstein, as countries with small, open and vulnerable economies. 
Austria and Sweden could adjust to economic change neither by relying on 
macroeconomic policies and market solutions, as for example the USA, nor by pre-
empting the costs of change through policies which pursue the structural 
transformation of their countries as, for example, Japan. "Instead, elites in the small 
European states, while letting international markets force economic adjustments, 
choose a variety of economic and social policies that prevent the costs of change from 
causing political eruptions" (Katzenstein: 1985, p.24). Austria and Sweden were, thus, 
always in favour of tariff reductions, co-operation in R&D matters and supported 
detente in the international sphere. At home, they tried to counter the harmful effects 
of internationalliberalisation in order to maintain industrial and social peace, which 
were, in turn, a precondition for economic success. An active investment and 
employment policy, restraints on wage and price increases and the maintenance of a 
large public sector were among the most important domestic policies. They can all be 
found in Sweden's and Austria's post-war economic history, although in different 
ways. 
1.1.1. "Auslrokeynesianism ": 
In the post-war era, the Austrian government had full employment as its primary 
economic target; it promoted investment; the restraint of wage and price increases was 
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achieved within the corporatist system of Economic and Social Partnership (see 
below); and "a few large, publicly owned companies employ about one-quarter of the 
Austrian labour force and generate about one-third of net production and almost half 
of all investment" (Marin: 1985, p.121)? These companies were expected to confonn 
to government policy. They were export-oriented, but subsidies were used to ensure 
full employment. The exposure of industrial sectors to international competition was 
further counterbalanced by a large sheltered sector encompassing areas such as 
agriculture and the food processing industry. Estimates indicate that up to 50 per cent 
of the market may have been part of the sheltered sector (Luif: 1994, p.26). 
The Keynesian policy of budget deficit spending during economic recession, 
especially practised during the 1970s (Lauber: 1996, pp.133/134), was flanked by a 
hard currency policy through linking the Austrian Schilling (AS) to the Gennan Mark 
(DM) (Dorfel et al: 1993).3 This gave the Austrian system the name 
"Austrokeynesianism". "As to the main instruments of 'Austrokeynesianism', they 
were (in order of appearance) a hard currency policy, promotion of investment by tax 
incentives and cheap credit, an effective incomes policy, and judicious use of the 
deficit in the budget, public sector industry and the social security system" (Lauber: 
1992, p.163). From a theoretical perspective, this unorthodox policy-mix cannot work. 
A hard currency policy usually endangers jobs linked to the export industry, because 
Austrian products become more expensive abroad, thereby undennining the policy of 
2 Parris et al provide lower figures: in 1982, the public enterprise sector accounted for 14.3 per cent of 
employment of the whole Austrian economy, for 17.8 per cent of the production in terms of value 
added and for 21.1 per cent of capital investment (Parris et al: 1987, p.29). This was, however, still the 
largest public sector in Western Europe (Parris et al: 1987, p.27) . 
. 1 "Hard" is understood here as the absence of depreciations or devaluations of the currency, measured 
via the nominal exchange rate as the relative price between two national currencies, and the pursuit of 
price stability, often achieved through the pegging of the national currency to a foreign currency with a 
stable real value (HorngrenlLindberg: 1994, p.I33). 
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full employment. Nevertheless, in the Austrian case, "full employment, normally 
endangered by the appreciation of one's own currency, was secured via expansive 
budget deficits, via one-time improvements in efficiency Iproduction gains or via the 
extension of export and investment support schemes" [translation by the author] 
(Winkler: 1988, p.226). Kurzer further points out that "the Austrian establishment 
could get away with this contradictory arrangement because the financial integration 
of the Austrian economy into the world economy was moderate" (Kurzer: 1993, 
p.190). This was to change in the course of the 1980s and Austria's integration in the 
emerging world financial market. 
1.1.2. Sweden: full employment via wage solidarity and active manpower policy: 
A sophisticated economic model, developed by the LO trade union theorists Gosta 
Rehn and Rudolf Meidner at the beginning of the 1950s, allowed Sweden to combine 
a policy of full employment with low inflation (Ryner: 1994, pp.400/40 1). The 
solidaristic wage principle was its core feature. The wage rate was not set according to 
the ability of an individual firm to pay, but as a ')ust" wage across all sectors. For 
inefficient firms, exposed to international competition, this wage was often too high 
and they, consequently, went bankrupt and set labour free. Efficient, competitive 
firms, on the other hand, were able to reap large profits, as the set wage was lower 
than what they were able to pay. Together, higher profits and the labour supply of 
bankrupt companies were strong incentives for expansion in the dynamic sectors of 
the economy. Hence, ~~wage determination became the key mechanism to regulate the 
balance in favour of dynamic accumulation and fair distribution" (Ryner: 1994, 
p.401). These incentives alone could not, however, guarantee that companies actually 
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invested in the economy. In order to ensure that profit-making companies did not bid 
up the price of labour, the Rehn-Meidner model included high taxes on profits. These 
public savings were, then, lent to the corporate sector for investment in new industrial 
capacities. "Low interest rates would offset whatever negative effects the combination 
of wage solidarity and fiscal frugality might have on the propensity of finns to invest" 
(Pontusson: 1995, p.27). Additionally, the state supported the transfer of labour from 
inefficient to efficient companies via an active manpower policy, which included 
education, job training, information, generous grants for families to move and the 
creation of some sheltered employment (Esping-Andersen: 1985, pp.229-231). This 
active manpower policy together with the solidaristic wage principle made wage 
restraint acceptable to Swedish trade unions. It was based politically on a corporatist 
system of central wage negotiations by peak organisations of employers and trade 
unions (see below). 
The Swedish public sector is of a different nature than the Austrian. Between 
1978 and 1980, state-owned enterprises accounted for about 6 per cent of Sweden's 
GDP. Except for the Netherlands, this is the smallest share in Western Europe (parris 
et al: 1987, p.27). The public sector is, instead, responsible for the provision of 
education, health care, day nurseries, pre-school educational facilities and (although 
less so) housing, all areas which are not exposed to international competition. Public 
spending in these areas rose from roughly 30 per cent of the GNP in 1960 to 66 per 
cent by 1980. In addition to being a tool for constant social refonn, the expansion of 
the public sector was used to safeguard full employment. In the 1970s, expanding 
industrial sectors were less and less able to absorb labour shed by declining industries. 
Almost 90 per cent of job growth took place in public social services during this time 
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to take up the slack (HeclolMadsen: 1987, pp.165/166). "While the average share of 
public employees among OECD countries was about 20 per cent in 1980, more than 
one-third of working Swedes were employed in the public sector" (Premfors: 1991, 
p.85). 
Luif, furthermore, points out that "in addition to the huge sheltered sector, 
there was an ... encompassing regulation of the financial markets in the corporatist 
EFTA-countries" [translation by the author] (Luif: 1994, p.26). Achieved via the 
control of currency transactions these governments, including Austria and Sweden, 
were in a strong position to manage their national economy. While Austria chose to 
adopt a hard currency policy, the regulation of national financial markets allowed 
Sweden to pursue its policy of full employment via repeated devaluations. In 1977, it 
left the so-called Snake, a predecessor of the EMS, and devalued the Swedish Krona 
(SKr) by 10 per cent the following day, having already devalued in April 1977 by 6 
per cent. Another devaluation by 10 per cent followed on 14 September 1981. 
"Sweden's primary regime objective in the 1970s was to maintain domestic policy 
autonomy - and frequent adjustments ... were seen as an integral part of Sweden's full 
employment arsenal" (Moses: 1995, p.418). 
To conclude, "in linking intemationalliberalization with domestic 
compensation, the small European states respond to economic change with flexible 
policies of industrial adjustment" (Katzenstein: 1985, p.57). In order to be able to 
fulfil its role of "buffer" between international and national economy in this type of 
adjustment strategy, governments must be economically autonomous. Otherwise, their 
economic policy does not yield the desired results. The arrangements of "embedded 
liberalism" (Ruggie: 1982; see Chapter 1, section 5.1), combining international free 
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trade with national economic policy autonomy, provided the basis for this policy at 
the world level and were "crucial in making the Rehn-Meidner model work 
adequately" (Ryner: 1996, p.15). The same can be said with reference to 
"Austrokeynesianism" . 
1.2. The Austrian and Swedish political systems: 
1.2.1. The Austrian party system: 
The Austrian party system has long been dominated by two big parties, the Christian 
Democratic OVP and the SPC>. Between 1945 and 1966, they governed Austria 
together in a grand coalition, a situation which has been repeated since 1987. From 
1966 to 1970, the OVP formed a single government, between 1970 and 1983 it was 
the SPO's turn to do the same. Only between 1983 and 1986, there was a coalition 
government of one of the two big parties, the SPO, with the small Freiheitliche Partei 
Osterreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, FPO). The joint predominance of the C>VP and 
SPO is most clearly expressed in their combined share of the vote. Although this 
figure declined steadily from the early 1970s onwards, it was not before the general 
elections of 1994 that they lost their two-third majority (see Table No.4, Appendix). 
In 1986, the Griine Alternative (Green Alternative Party, GA) entered parliament as 
the fourth party and in 1993, five MPs left the FPC> to establish the Liberales Forum 
(Liberal Forum). 
The fact that the SPO formed a single party government from 1970 to 1983 
does not mean that it enjoyed a hegemonic position within the Austrian party system. 
Austria's federal structure always gave the OVP a governmental role in several of the 
Linder and, more importantly, the Austrian Economic and Social Partnership (ESP), 
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where interest associations are co-opted into policy-making, gave the GYP a strong 
influence via the Bundeswirtschaftskammer (Chamber of Commerce, BWK) and the 
Prasidentenkonferenz der Landwirtschaftskammern (Chamber of Agriculture, LK), 
the two interest associations it has dominated. 4 
1.2.2. The Swedish party system: 
The Swedish party system has been characterised by Social Democratic hegemony. 
"Between 1932 and 1976 Sweden was governed uninterruptedly for 44 years by a 
Social Democratic prime minister" (Bergstrom: 1991, p.8). Only between 1976 and 
1982 and between 1991 and 1994, was the SAP in opposition. There have 
traditionally been three parties on the right of the party system, i.e. the FP, the 
conservative MS and the CP, the former Agrarian Party. Additionally, in 1991, the 
Christian Democratic Party and the right-wing populist party New Democracy gained 
seats in parliament. While the former just managed to hang on in 1994, the latter's 
"exit was as abrupt as their entry had been three years earlier" (Madeley: 1995, 
p.425). These two parties do not feature highly in this thesis due to this short and 
unstable parliamentary success. On the left, there have additionally been the VP and, 
since 1988, the Miljopartiet de Grona (Green Party, GP). The latter dropped out of 
parliament in 1991, but was reelected in 1994. 
The Social Democratic hegemony has not been expressed in its share of the 
electoral votes. The SAP has generally gained 40 per cent and more, but it never 
received a decisive majority. except for 1940 (see Table No.3, Appendix). It often 
4 For a general discussion of the Austrian party system, see MUller: 1996b. For an overview up to 
1986/87 of various aspects of the Austrian party system such as changes within the system. changing 
issues. voting behaviour. party funding, etc., see PelinkaiPlasser: 1989. 
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fonned a minority government and relied on the tacit support of either the CP or VP. 
Castles points out that the split of the right into three parties has been as important for 
the SAP's dominant position as its own electoral strength. It "made it very difficult to 
find the necessary cohesion to offer a credible alternative to Social Democratic rule" 
(Castles: 1978, p.23; see also pp.131-142). More importantly, however, and similar to 
the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, Heclo and Madsen point out that 
"hegemony need not consist of unanimous or even majority support: it consists of the 
fact that almost everyone, knowingly or unknowingly, dances to the tune of the 
leading player" (HeclolMadsen: 1987, p.23). This has, firstly, been ensured via the 
SAP's immense organisational power in terms of members, active campaign workers 
and close links to the Landsorganisationen i Sverige (Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation, LO) and other mass membership organisations. Secondly, the SAP's 
long tradition of programmatic renewal, expressed in regular new programmes 
developed together with the LO, placed it in the driving seat of formulating the 
dominant frameworks of thought (Sainsbury: 1993, p.42). These new programmes 
were generally accompanied by a range of educational materials, study circles and 
local conferences with the aim of making people identify themselves with the Social 
Democratic project of constant social reform. At the end of the 1970s, about 1.5 
million workers participated in study circles organised by the SAP, LO or the 
Tj!nstemannens Centralorganisationen (Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees, TeO) (Heclo/Madsen: 1987, p.2S). At the level of ideas, "contemporary 
Swedes have been taught to comprehend their present as the result of a largely 
coherent sequence of Social Democratic plans and therefore have become inclined to 
look to the Social Democrats for workable future solutions" (HeclolMadsen; 1987. 
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p.44). Ad hoc measures of the past, thus, appear to have been a part of a grand 
strategy, which further cemented the SAP hegemony. 
It is frequently argued that we have experienced defreezing party systems. the 
emergence of new cleavages, new parties and a general change and instability in party 
systems since the 1970s. These tendencies were also noticed in the cases of Sweden 
and Austria (see e.g. Bergstrom: 1991, p.29 for Sweden, and Luther: 1992, p.93 for 
Austria), and the emergence of new parties in parliament seem to prove the point. 
Considering, however, that the SAP regained its traditional governmental role in the 
1994 Swedish elections and that the OVP and SPO grand coalition was not only 
renewed after the 1995 Austrian general elections, but also regained its two-third 
majority in parliament, it is still possible to speak about a considerable stability in the 
two party systems for the purpose of this thesis. 
1.2.3. Corporatism in Austria and Sweden: 
Austria and Sweden have peculiar political systems. Parallel to the party system, there 
is the organised co-option of interest associations in the policy-making process. This 
double structure is best described as corporatism. Lehmbruch's definition of 
corporatism contains the following three dimensions (Lehmbruch: 1982, pp.5/6). 
Firstly, recognition and control by the government: interest groups are co-opted into 
the decision-making process of the government, and particular groups are closely 
linked to particular parties and participate in policy fonnulation and implementation 
in their specific area. Secondly, the structure of the interest intennediation: interest 
associations in a corporatist system are hierarchically organised with compulsory 
membership and, enjoying a monopoly in their specific area, do not have to compete 
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with other associations. Finally, industrial relations are characterised by a strong 
concertation of labour and capital with the government at the national level. 
Corporatism is not used here as a political system of consensual policy-making 
opposed to the adversarial system of countries such as the USA. It is regarded as a 
description of political practices, a starting-point for providing a picture of the 
political systems of, and for an analysis of policy-making in, Austria and Sweden. It 
does not imply that there is no political conflict, be that between interest associations, 
within them or in their relations to political parties.5 As Heclo and Madsen 
demonstrate, Swedish policy-making is characterised by both consensus and conflict 
(Heclo/Madsen: 1987). 
1.2.3.1. Austria: the Economic and Social Partnership. 
Historically, the Austrian corporatist system was established after World War Two as 
a response to the experience of civil war in 1934, repression, defeat in war and foreign 
occupation (Katzenstein: 1985, p.188). Additionally, Marin makes clear that the 
success of corporatism after 1945 depended on its correspondence to the underlying 
socio-economic structure. The nationalised industry allowed for a certain control of 
the means of production, and the absence of a powerful financial and industrial 
bourgeoisie further added to the balance of power between capital and labour (Marin: 
1985, pp.121/122}.6 Austrian corporatism comes very close to Lehmbruch's ideal type 
definition. As for the first dimension, the four main interest associations, the so-called 
, LehmbruchlSchmitter: 1982 is an example of treating corporatism as a political system. Castles and 
Milner are examples of how consensus is considered to be one of the basic principles of Swedish 
~Iicy-making due to corporatist arrangements (Castles: 1978. pp.30131; Milner: 1989. p.84). 
The crucial role of the underlying Austrian socio-economic structure is often overlooked by accounts, 
which focus on the institutional set-up and the relation between interest associations and political 
parties (e.g. Talos: 1996). 
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"Sozialpartner" or social partners, i.e. the Arbeiterkammer (Chamber of Labour. AK), 
the BWK, the LK and the Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (Austrian Federation 
of Trade Unions, OGB), are co-opted into governmental decision-making through the 
key institution "Paritatische Kommission fUr Preis- und Lohnfragen" (Parity 
Commission). The social partners are closely linked to the government/party politics 
level through multiple activities of functionaries (personalunionl Amterkumulierung) 
and staff-sharing. Marin sums this up as follows: 
parties are (more or less) composed of associational segments (BUnde of 
employers, employees and agriculture) and leading positions are filled 
according to their strength in respective constituencies; associations are 
differentiated by political factions and their leadership is constituted according 
to their electoral strength within the chambers or the OGB (Marin: 1985, 
p.101). 
Lehmbruch adds that "many of ... [the social partners'] ... leaders sit in Parliament, 
occupying important party functions. Holders of ministerial port-folios for economic 
and social matters are recruited among them" (Lehmbruch: 1982, p.17). In general, 
the AK and the OOB are controlled by the SPO, while the OVP dominates the BWK 
and the LK (TaIos: 1996, p.1 08). 
Secondly, the three Chambers are hierarchically structured and membership is 
obligatory. They are strongly centralised bodies, which enjoy a monopoly in their 
sphere. Only the aOB is based on voluntary membership, but it is also highly 
centralised and the degree of unionisation is high in Austria with more than 60 per 
cent of blue- and white-collar workers (TaIos: 1996, p.1 05). 
In the third dimension of corporatism, the concertation of industrial relations 
takes place within the Parity Commission, which consists of members of the 
Chambers, the 60B and two members of government. It has three main functions 
103 
represented by three sub-committees. The price sub-committee used to regulate about 
one third of all prices until 1992, when its role was changed into competition policy. 
The wages sub-committee "decides on the timing of autonomous collective bargaining 
and ratifies its results, which are not valid without its consent" (Marin: 1985, p.l 08). 
Finally, the Economic and Social Advisory Board develops "concepts and proposals 
for decision-making in economic policy and middle-term planning based on scientific 
information" (Marin: 1985, pp.l 08/1 09). Moreover, the social partners have seats on 
the policy-making body and the governing board of the Osterreichische Nationalbank 
(Austrian National Bank, ANB), thereby co-determining Austria's monetary policy 
(Dlirfel et al: 1993, p.117). Overall, Austrian corporatism is an institutionalised 
corporatism, called "Wirtschafts- und Sozialpartnerschaft" or Economic and Social 
Partnership (ESP), and rests upon the voluntary co-operation of interest groups. 7 
To sum up, the policy of "Austrokeynesianism", managing an economy with a 
competitive sector, open to world free trade, a large export-oriented, but subsidised 
industrial public sector and a sheltered sector, protected against the pressures from 
outside, was based on a system of institutionalised corporatism which attributed clear 
policy functions to interest associations. "Essentially, it obliged the social partners to 
monitor incomes policy in a way that was consistent with a hard currency stance, in 
return for an obligation by the government to take fiscal action if full employment 
and/or business income was endangered" (WieserlKitzmantel: 1990, pp.434/435). 
7 For discussions about the ESP and its future. see Bischof/Pelinka: 1996. 
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J. 2. 3. 2. The Swedish Model: 
The Swedish corporatist system was established in the 1930s in response to the Great 
Depression. Its political basis, the alliance between farmers and workers, was formed 
in 1933 in a crisis agreement and its cementing of 1936 in the form of a formal 
coalition "paved the way to industrial peace in the 1938 Saltsjobaden agreement, 
concluded between the central organization of business and the labour movement" 
(Katzenstein: 1985, p.141, see also Esping-Andersen: 1985, pp.86/87). The unions 
acquiesced to the continuation of private control over property and capital markets, 
openness to the world economy, and offered industrial peace. In exchange, the 
employers accepted higher labour costs, a relatively expansive fiscal policy and 
growth of welfare services. In itself, Saltsjobaden represented the first of many peak 
level agreements, which would characterise the Swedish economy throughout its post-
war history. The SAP government supported the agreement through its commitment 
to full employment, its active manpower policy and the maintenance of a large public 
sector, which were crucial cornerstones of the ongoing co-operation between capital 
and labour. 
There are several explanations for the establishment of corporatism in Sweden. 
According to Korpi's "balance of class power model", Saltsjobaden was the result of a 
change in the distribution of power resources in society due to the SAP's coming to 
power. Labour could now not only muster its organisational strength through its 
unions and political party, it could also rely on its power in government in balancing 
capital's control over the means of production. Capital had to accept labour's strength 
and was forced into a general agreement (Korpi: 1978, pp.76-1 08 and pp.317-319; 
Korpi: 1983, pp.45-50). Swenson and Kurzer, however, argue that important sections 
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of capital played an active role in the process leading to Saltsjobaden. They point out 
that those sections of capital, which were exposed to international competition and 
found it difficult to match the pay offered in the sheltered construction sector, had 
strongly pressed in favour of centralised wage-bargaining. It was perceived as a 
method to keep sheltered sector pay under control. This section of capital was 
supported by farmers, who also suffered from high labour costs, by the trade unions in 
the internationally-oriented sector, where the discontent among the workers about 
lower wages in comparison to the construction sector had been rising, and the Social 
Democratic government. In short, large sections of capital were integrated in a 
centralising cross-class coalition, which eventually led to the Saltsjobaden agreement 
of 1938 (Swenson: 1991a; Kurzer: 1993, pp.26-31).8 This explanation implies two 
important points. Firstly, capital's support for corporatism was essential. When it 
withdrew in the 1980s, corporatism broke apart in Sweden (see below). Secondly, 
capital and labour may be internally divided into several fractions according to the 
organisation and orientation of production. Splits of this type also appeared in the 
debate about EC membership (see Chapter 4, section 3.1 and 3.2). 
As for the first dimension of Lehmbruch' s definition of corporatism, Lewin 
identifies five forms of interest associations' participation in government decision-
making and implementation (Lewin: 1994, pp.67/68). The first form is the 
representation on state commissions, set up by the government as an extension of the 
relatively small ministries. They have the task of preparing major social reforms and, 
• Rothstein locates the start of corporatism even in 1932, when a Liberal government with the strong 
support of the Moderate Party replaced the market economy in agriculture with a planned economy via 
the fonnation of a comprehensive co-operative to counter the crisis in dairy products. This new relation 
between interest organisation and party - the co-operative was closely aligned with the Agrarian Party -
was, then, transferred to the labour market, after the SAP had come to power in 1932 (Rothstein: 
1992). This can be regarded as a complementary explanation to the analysis provided by Swenson and 
Kurfer. 
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therefore, offer considerable influence on policy-making (HeclolMadsen: 1987, pp.12-
16). The consideration of the reports of such committees is a further form of 
participation. Thirdly, the peak organisations are represented on the lay boards of 
about 30 state agencies such as the Labour Market Board, the Occupational Safety 
Board, the National Board of Education, etc. The general policy guidelines are 
provided by the respective ministries, but the fine-tuning and implementation are the 
responsibility of these agencies (Interview No.64; Stockholm, 28/11/1996). "During 
the 1970s, one third of all the members on agency boards were representatives of 
organizations" (Lewin: 1994, p.67). Furthermore, interest associations participate in 
local government in tasks, as, for example, the trade unions in the administration of 
unemployment insurance. Finally, they participate through general agreements, of 
which the agreement in Saltsjobaden of 1938 was the first. 
There are strong links between interest associations and political parties. The 
party-union relations between the SAP and the LO have been institutionalised in 
various ways. "Besides collective affiliation ... [phased out between 1987 and 1990] 
... , organisational ties exist through overlapping membership of the LO leadership in 
the executive bodies of the party" (Sainsbury: 1991, p.40). Leaders of the TCO have 
frequently been members of the SAP (Bergstrom: 1991, p.8). There are also strong 
links between the CP and the Lantbrukamas Riksforbund (Federation of Swedish 
Farmers, LRF). At the end of the 1970s, about 65 per cent ofLRF members were 
members of the CP. This figure has decreased since then, but it is estimated to be still 
over 50 per cent. Between 20 and 25 per cent of LRF members are members of the 
MS (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 14/11/1996). "Large business interests and upper-
income groups traditionally have been associated with ... [the MS] .. ." 
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(HeclolMadsen: 1987, p.17). Their links to bourgeois parties are, however. less 
strong. They had often withdrawn from partisan politics, because they were quite 
satisfied with the Social Democratic government's economic policy (Swenson: 1991a. 
pp.536/537). In parliament, these links implied that between 1971 and 197935 per 
cent of MPs were members of the LO, 29 per cent of the TCO, and 15 per cent of the 
Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (The Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations, SACO), while 9 per cent were members of employers' 
associations (Gustafsson: 1986, p.4D). 
In the second dimension, the degree of unionisation is roughly 85 per cent of 
the total workforce9 and, thus, very high and the Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen 
(Confederation of Swedish Employers, SAF) "represents 40,000 firms in private 
industry, including all of the largest firms" (Ahlen: 1989, p.331). In contrast to 
Austria, however, there is no compulsory membership, more rank and file autonomy, 
and no individual peak trade union or employers' association enjoys a representational 
monopoly. The LO organises blue-collar workers and lower non-manuals and is with 
over 2 million members the main trade union. Nevertheless, the TCO with over one 
million members of white-collar employees and also the SACO, which mainly 
represents university-trained professionals, with roughly 350,000 members, enjoy an 
independent voice. lO On the employers' side, there are two big associations, which 
work as partners in the promotion of business, the Industriforbundet (The Federation 
of Swedish Industries, SI) and the SAF. The former "lobbies government on policies 
it sees affecting the growth and efficiency of industry, advises constituent finns and 
9 "Union membership peaked at about 86% of all employees in 1986, went down to about 81 % in 
1991, but is on its way up again amidst growing unemployment" (The Swedish Institute: 1994, p.2). 
10 For 1994, the Swedish Institute presents the following membership figures: LO - 2.2 million; TeO -
1,3 million; SACO - 370,000 (The Swedish Institute: 1994, p.:!). 
108 
trade associations on these matters, and works to get these messages put before the 
public, leaving collective bargaining to SAF" (Milner: 1989, p.87). Foretagama, the 
Federation of Private Enterprises, mainly represents small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, for which it fulfils the same function as the SI for its members. Within the 
various associations, there was a strong hierarchy and predominance of the central 
organisations over their affiliated unions or member associations. During the 1980s, 
however, this hierarchy was undermined and the principle of collective wage-
negotiations came under pressure (see section 2.2.3). Finally, the LRF represents 
agricultural interests. The fact that it organises farmers and the food processing 
industry at the same time makes it a powerful interest association (Milner: 1989, 
p.76). It is the only association, which enjoys a representational monopoly. 
Considering the third dimension of corporatism, unlike in Austria, the 
concertation of industrial relations has not been institutionalised. It became a regular 
feature of Swedish politics via the repetition of collective central wage-bargaining 
year after year. It was mainly established during the 1950s, and this not only due to 
the LO. In 1952 and 1956, it was the SAP's insistence on centralised bargaining, 
which pushed individual unions in LO line. From then onwards, the SAF-LO 
negotiations in the private sector provided the unchallenged guidance for other 
negotiations. This was to change in the late 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, in 1966, public 
employees were granted the right to bargain collectively and to strike, which opened 
another arena. Secondly, due to a rapid expansion of the service sector, white-collar 
unions. especially the TCO but also SACO, gained in importance. A new model was 
devised at the end of the 1960s by the SAF and LO together with the TCO, but this 
did not prevent the emergence of additional collective wage-bargaining rounds. 
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"Suddenly the whole structure of bargaining was exposed as much more complicated 
than the simple system dominated by the private sector and by negotiations between 
LO and SAF" (Ahlen: 1989, p.332). In the private sector, the PTK (the Federation of 
Salaried Employees in Industry and Services) was formed as a negotiation cartel by 
unions affiliated to the TCO and SACO. It bargained parallel to the LO-SAF 
negotiations. In the public sector, affiliated unions of all three major trade union 
organisations formed two negotiation cartels, one for state employees and one for 
local government employees. At the national level, their cartel faced the National 
Agency for Government Employers and, at the local government level, they 
negotiated with the Federation of County Councils and the Swedish Association of 
Municipal Councils. Although there was no central institution, which co-ordinated the 
negotiations similar to the wages sub-committee of the Parity Commission in Austria, 
the main trade union confederations LO, TCO and SACO enjoyed a strong position 
with reference to their affiliated unions until the early 1980s, as did the SAF towards 
its member federations (Milner: 1989, pp.86-91; The Swedish Institute: 1994). 
Overall, corporatism and the SAP hegemony within the party system provided 
the political structure for the economic policies of full employment, solidaristic 
wages, active manpower, large public sector and generous welfare provisions. 
Together, this is often referred to as the Swedish Model. A final component of this 
model is the emphasis on gender equality to be achieved via equality in the labour 
market and economic independence for women. Especially the rapidly expanding 
public sector absorbed female labour in the 1970s and 1980s (Eduards: 1991). 
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2. The impact of the processes of globalisation on Austria and Sweden: 
In Chapter 1, section 5, it was argued that the fonn of state has been restructured from 
the Keynesian to the neo-liberal night-watchman state in the Western World against 
the background of the transnationalisation of social relations. This section explores the 
impact of globalisation on Austria and Sweden. This does not cover all aspects of the 
impact, but it confmns that relations have changed and that, therefore, an analysis of 
Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC should be conducted against the 
background of globalisation. 
According to the characteristics of globalisation, the transnationalisation of 
finance and production, and the change in the economic paradigm from Keynesianism 
to neo-liberalism (see Chapter 1, section 2.2), three primary indicators can be 
identified. The first indicator relates to the transnationalisation of production. It has to 
be investigated whether there has been a change in the countries' production structure 
since the early 1970s and, if so, in what way. Considering the crucial role ofTNCs 
and FDI, the degree of the transnationalisation of production is assessed here, firstly, 
through the number ofTNCs and the scale of their activities in the production system 
of Austria and Sweden. The percentage of employment and turnover abroad indicates 
their general orientation. Secondly, changes in inward and outward FDI flows indicate 
an increasing or decreasing degree of transnationalisation. 
The transnationalisation of finance implies that a country's financial markets 
have been integrated into the world financial market. The clearest indicator for this is 
whether the two countries' financial markets have become deregulated and liberalised. 
since this has been identified as one of the components of the transnationalisation of 
finance. 
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Thirdly, the extent neo-liberalism has taken root in Austria and Sweden needs 
to be examined. This can be identified in the expression of a conflict between neo-
liberal and Keynesian ideas about issues such as deregulation, privatisation and cut-
backs in the welfare system, all points of the neo-liberal agenda. In order to ascertain 
the influence of neo-liberalism, a change should, however, also be noticed in the two 
countries' actual policies. In other words, it has to be investigated whether a shift from 
the interventionist welfare state in the direction of the neo-liberal night-watchman 
state has occurred. 
2.1. The impact of globalisation on Austria: 
2. 1. J. The transnationalisation of A ustrian production: 
Austria's post-war production structure has been predominantly characterised by 
small-scale industry. In 1992, out of the 2.19 million working population, 55 per cent 
were employed in small-sized companies with less than 100 employees and 28 per 
cent in medium-sized companies with less than 1000 employees. This is a relatively 
high percentage in an international comparison. In general, these companies 
contribute only between one and two thirds to the overall national employment 
(Breit/Rossl: 1992, p.191). 
Siegel identified 21 Austrian TNCs, but only one of them, Austrian Industries, 
lived up to international standards in 1990 (Siegel: 1992). It was formed as a state-
owned holding company in 1987, when the public industry sector was restructured, 
but the experiment to create an Austrian TNC of international significance failed in 
1992. Leading managers argue that this was due to a lack of international business 
spirit in Austria (Interview No.8; Vienna, 11/05/95), government officials point to 
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huge financial losses in the early 1990s (Interview No.7; Vienn~ 11105/95). The 21 
TNCs were mainly concentrated on Austria in their production structure, employing 
only 20 per cent of their workforce abroad (Siegel: 1992, p.167). In short~ the low 
number of TN Cs and their focus on Austria signals a low degree of 
transnationalisation of production. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Austria has been totally unaffected. 
Although still modest in overall terms, both inward and outward FDI rose during the 
second half of the 1980s. Outward FDI increased from US$ 66 million in 1985 to US$ 
1601 million in 1990, inward FDI from US$ 164 million to US$ 557 million during 
the same period (see Table No.5, Appendix). This tendency was underlined by the 
growth of the foreign private sector in Austria. Between 1970 and 1985, employment 
rose by 16 per cent in this sector, while eight per cent employment was lost in the 
national public sector and 25 per cent in the national private sector. The proportion of 
employment in the foreign private sector out of total employment is, consequently, 
high in an international comparison. With roughly 27 per cent, Austria occupied the 
third place behind Canada and Belgium-Luxembourg out of 17 OECD countries in the 
first half of the 1980s (Pichl: 1989, pp.l64/165). 
Overall, however, Austria is linked to the global economy mainly via the 
traditional route of exports and imports in goods. In 1990, outward FDI accounted for 
only 3.9 per cent of the export in goods and inward FDI for only 1.3 per cent of the 
import in goods despite the general increase in FDI, outlined above (Bellak: 1992, 
pp.31/32). Furthennore, the quantity of outward and inward FDI is small in 
comparison with the total domestic investment. For example, inward FDI made up 
only 4.4 per cent of domestic investment in 1990 (Bellak: 1992. pp.30/31). This is in 
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stark contrast to the Swedish situation, where outward FDI in 1989 was larger than the 
total domestic investment (see below). To conclude, the degree oftransnationalisation 
of production increased in the 1970s and 1980s only slowly_ Austria is still linked to 
the global economy via cross-border flows with an emphasis on trade. In short, 
globalisation has been felt as increasing intemationaIisation, not transnationalisation 
of production. 
2.1.2. The transnationalisation of Austrianfinance: 
The real power in the post-war Austrian financial system rested with the joint-stock 
commercial banks. They, and not the ANB, conducted the country's international 
financial activities (Kurzer: 1993, p.166). Public control over these banks and, 
thereby, over the financial system had been the result of pre-war developments. The 
government had nationalised several banks to rescue them from bankruptcy (Kurzer: 
1993, p.38). As a result, of the three most important joint-stock commercial banks, the 
Creditanstalt Bankverein and the Osterreichische Landerbank were in public 
ownership. Only the Osterreichische Kontrollbank was privately owned. The ANB 
was jointly owned and controlled by the government with 50 per cent of the shares 
and the social partners holding the other 50 per cent. In general, the financial system 
was oriented towards the domestic market. "Neither commercial banks nor specialized 
credit institutions were driven by international ambitions, nor were they at the 
forefront of financial innovations" (Kurzer: 1993, p.168). Integration into the world 
financial market was achieved in a different way. 
The Austrian preference for low inflation and a hard currency has to be seen in 
the light of Austria's monetary history since the 1920s (Darfel et al: 1987, p.116). 
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Having experienced hyperinflation between 1920 and 1922, a currency crisis in 1931 
and turbulent times directly after World War Two, a hard currency policy became a 
legal obligation for the ANB. Consequently, from 1971 onwards, but especially after 
1973, the final break-up of the Bretton Woods system, the AS was first pegged to a 
currency basket and, then, in 1977, solely to the OM as the only remaining strong 
currency within the basket. Austria preferred a hard currency and low inflation to 
monetary policy autonomy. When it became clear that the 1979 EMS had the goals of 
low inflation and stable exchange rates, Austria followed EC policy more closely. 
Austrian association with the EMS was rejected by the EC. Austria could not become 
a part of the Exchange Rate Mechanism as a non-EC member, while some EC 
members themselves did not participate in it (Interview No.16; Vienna, 18/05/1995). 
Nonetheless, the ANB decided to shadow the EMS autonomously and, in order to 
achieve credibility for its hard currency policy, openly declared the pegging of the AS 
to the OM in 1981. The aim was to have a monetary and exchange rate policy 
compatible with current and future policy goals of the EC. When the SEA included 
the free movement of capital, Austrian decision-makers followed. The gradual 
liberalisation of Austrian financial markets started in 1986 and "culminated in the 
abolition of the last exchange restrictions in November 1991" (Dorfel et al: 1993, 
p.118). In conclusion, Austria gave up an autonomous monetary policy by pegging the 
AS to the OM. It, thereby, voluntarily accepted restrictions of its national policy 
autonomy in the I 970s. Although international pressure through the processes of 
globalisation was felt in Austria (Interview No.16; Vienna. 18/05/1995), the 
integration of Austrian financial markets into the world financial market was the 
logical consequence of the hard currency policy adopted earlier. As argued in Chapter 
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1, section 5.3, states are not only forced to adapt to the global economy_ they also play 
active roles in the processes of globalisation. 
2.1.3. The restructuring of the Austrian state: 
The ideological debate between Keynesian and neo-liberal ideas started in Austria in 
1982 against the background of severe economic difficulties and unemployment 
"beginning to creep up to levels not seen for decades" (WieserlKitzmantel: 1990, 
p.436). The OVP adopted a neo-liberal strategy, which included demands for 
budgetary cuts, tax reform, flexibility, deregulation and privatisation. It was an 
attempt to offer an electorally successful alternative to the SPO's Keynesianism 
(Meth-CohnlMiiller: 1994, pp.l621163). Nevertheless, changes in the SPO' s 
economic policy could also be noticed, slightly later than the OVP but before both 
parties formed a coalition government in 1987. This was due to the devastating 
economic situation in general and the huge deficits of the public sector industries in 
1985 in particular. The Social Democrats had lost confidence in being able to manage 
the national economy. Moreover, the belief that a Social Democratic manager is 
morally better than a liberal capitalist one vanished in the wake of the scandals and 
mismanagement in the nationalised industries, exemplified by the financial debacle of 
the VOEST steel firm in 1985 due to financial speculations on the oil market 
(Interview No. 15; Vienna, 17/05/1995). In the government's economic report to 
parliament in 1985, Chancellor Fred Sinowatz (SPO) described Austrokeynesianism 
as a policy of "diving-through" (Durchtauchen). which could only be used in the short 
tenn. A departure from the budget deficit spending of the 1 970s was indicated (Seidel: 
1993. p.146). 
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This policy direction was reinforced by Franz Vranitzky. who became the new 
SPO Chancellor in 1986. He had been the deputy director of the Creditanstalt and the 
director of the Landerbank, the two large publicly-owned banks. and Finance Minister 
from 1983 onwards. He approached the economic problems as a business man, and 
his "team abandoned Kreisky's policy of relying on the nationalised industries, 
interventionist industrial policies, and stimulative fiscal deficits to secure full 
employment" (Schultz: 1992, p.189). Instead, together with the OVP as coalition 
partner since early 1987, "it now emphasised budget consolidation, profitability and 
privatisation for the public sector" (Lauber: 1992, p.157). The huge public sector, 
having originally been regarded as a government asset to obtain full employment, was 
now considered to be a burden on the economy. Subsidies for the public sector should, 
thus, be allocated according to the principle of efficiency, not in order to maintain full 
employment. "As early as 1985, Vranitzky declared that the SPO was quite open to 
the idea of privatizations and viewed this as a purely pragmatic matter" (Lauber: 
1996, p.136). The coalition agreement between the GVP and the SPG of 16 January 
1987 further spelled out that the open sector of the economy could no longer be alone 
responsible for structural adjustment. The new task is "to expose, step by step, more 
areas of the sheltered sector to international competition. The orientation towards 
regulation will have to give way to the direction towards the market ... " [translation by 
the author] (Arbeitstibereinkommen: 1987, p.652). In short, there has been a change at 
the ideological level: "a new dimension has emerged: the liberal belief in the greater 
efficiency of competition in the market place" (Gerlich: 1992. p.141). 
The change in economic ideas prepared the ground for political action. By the 
rnid-1980s, neo-liberalism had already become a part of the structure in the fonn of 
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intersubjective meanings through its adoption by more and more countries and 
international organisations. After additionally both governing parties had adopted neo-
liberal ideas in Austria, policies of this type appeared to be the only possible option in 
view of Austria's economic crisis. The new coalition government announced the 
consolidation of the budget through a period of austerity in 1987. This was not 
successful throughout the following years (Lauber: 1996, pp.137/138), but the 
intention to pursue austerity policies indicated a change in practical politics. 
Moreover, in general terms the state withdrew from the market. In 1987, the 
nationalised sector was restructured. Politicians left the Boards of Directors of 
companies, while managers from the private sector took over. It was their task to 
transform large parts of the nationalised industry into an efficient and competitive 
TNC labelled Austrian Industries. Non-competitive firms were closed down, people 
sent into early retirement or made redundant (Interview No.8; Vienna, 11105195). 
Austrian Industries was still owned by the state via the Osterreichische 
Industrieholding Aktiengesellschaft (OIAO) being the financial holding company. 
The way it was run, however, was according to market principles to avoid the 
necessity of future state subsidies. An additional privatisation programme of the SPO 
and OVP was at least partially implemented between 1987 and 1990. "Within the 
(>lAO, 30 per cent of shares in the OMV ... [oil industry] ... were floated in two 
tranches; the OIAO share in Siemens Austria was reduced to 25 per cent, and around 
60 smaller firms, with some 13,000 employees were sold in whole or in part ... ; by 
1989, the state share in the Landerbank and Creditanstalt was reduced to 51 per cent 
... " (Meth-CohnlMUller: 1994, p.168). 
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In the following years, the privatisation programme accelerated further. In 
1990, the SPO and OVP agreed on dropping the legal restraint on privatising more 
than 49 per cent and, when it became clear in 1992 that Austrian Industries had again 
accumulated huge losses, another restructuring of the public industry with further 
privatisations was on the agenda. Austrian Industries was abolished and its assets 
were transferred back into the OIAG in December 1993 with the task of privatising 
the majority of its parts (Meth-CohnlMiiller: 1994, pp.1741175). The once largest 
nationalised sector in Western Europe has been almost completely sold off. 
Finally, two tax reforms were carried out. "The tax reform of 1989 was one of 
the most sweeping in the history of the Second Republic; its main goal was to act on 
the supply side by considerably lowering income and corporate tax rates and by 
suppressing incentives to low risk/low yield forms of investment and savings" 
(Lauber: 1996, p.139). A second tax reform followed in 1994 and Austria became a 
country with extremely low business taxation. 
Overall, since the mid-1980s, Austria's production structure has been 
increasingly internationalised, the finance structure transnationalised and neo-
liberalism has replaced Keynesianism as the dominant economic policy paradigm. 
Once the frameworks of thought had been changed in such a way, austerity budgets, 
privatisation of the nationalised industries and tax reforms appeared to be the only 
viable options. 
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2.2. The impact of globalisation on Sweden: 
2.2. J. The transnationalisation of Swedish production: 
Sweden has fostered an impressive number of large TNCs. "These corporations 
account for the overwhelming part of domestic manufacturing production, 
employment and exports" (Braunerhjelm et al: 1996, p.2). For example, in 1986, the 
30 largest Swedish companies accounted for 48.9 per cent of the domestic Swedish 
employment in mining and manufacturing (Heum et al: 1993, Appendix 3). An 
increase in capital concentration and centralisation further indicates the importance of 
the Swedish TNCs for the Swedish economy as a whole. Between 1974 and 1985, the 
mean employment of the 30 largest companies varied between 22000 and 25000 
employees. From 1985 to 1990, this figure rose from 23443 to 33298 employees 
(Heum et al: 1993, Appendix 4). Olsen also identifies an increasing concentration in 
ownership and influence. Sweden has experienced a wave of mergers since the end of 
the 1960s and a trend towards cross-ownership since the late 1970s. As a result, four 
main ownership groups emerged in a dominant position in the Swedish production 
structure by the mid-1980s, i.e. the Wallenberg empire, the closely linked Volvo and 
Skanska spheres, and Industrivarden-Svenska Handelsbank (Olsen: 1991, pp.117-
119). In short, the Swedish production structure is dominated by mcs and is, 
consequently, extremely transnationalised. 
The degree of transnationalisation increased dramatically in the second half of 
the 1980s, when there was a drastic upturn in outward FDI. While inward FDI had 
only risen from US$ 396 million in 1985 to US$ 2328 million in 1990. outward FDI 
increased from US$ 1783 million to US$ 14136 million during the same period (see 
Table No.6, Appendix). This is even more dramatic. if one takes into account that hin 
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1989 for the first time ever, Sweden invested more abroad than at home~' (Kurzer: 
1993, p.133). The transnationalisation of Swedish production is also expressed in the 
change in the Swedish and foreign share ofTNC's employees and production. In 
1965, TNCs employed 33.9 per cent of their employees abroad, where they achieved 
25.9 per cent of their turnover. By 1990, the situation had drastically changed. 60.6 
per cent of the workforce was employed in the production abroad, accounting for 51.4 
per cent of the turnover. This increased emphasis on production abroad was especially 
apparent between 1986 and 1990. The percentage of employees abroad rose by 11.4 
per cent, i.e. 42.7 per cent of the overall increase between 1965 and 1990, and the 
percentage of turnover abroad by 9.1 per cent, i.e. 35.7 per cent of the overall increase 
between 1965 and 1990 (see Table No.ll, Appendix, own calculations). 11 
In sum, Sweden has experienced a high increase in the degree of the 
transnationalisation of its production structure since the late I 960s, but especially 
during the second half of the 1980s. In some instances, this even included the transfer 
of headquarters. Asea Brown Boveri moved to ZUrich/Switzerland and Tetra Pak and 
IKEA to locations in the Ee. 12 
2.2.2. The transnationalisation of Swedish finance: 
The Swedish post-war financial system was dominated by banks. They provided the 
long-term loans to industry, with which they maintained close links (Olsen: 1991, 
p.125). This did not, however, imply that banking capital led overall. At the outbreak 
II This infonnation relies on the dataset of the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research 
(IUI)/Stockholm. It is based on a questionnaire sent to all Swedish manufacturing enterprises with 
foreign affiliates approximately every fourth year since the 1 960s (8raunerhjelm et al: 1996. p.2 and 
Appendix). 
12 For a further evaluation of the transnationalisation of Swedish production. see Andersson et al: 1996. 
pp.27-47. 
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of World War Two, foreign exchange controls and other fonns of capital market 
regulations had been introduced, only to be strengthened during the 1950s. These 
regulations, including lending ceilings, liquidity ratios, cash ratios, investment ratios. 
bond issue control and interest rate regulations, were administered by the Riksb~ 
the Swedish Central Bank (Jonung: 1986, pp.l09-111; Kurzer: 1993, p.176). The 
Riksbank is directly responsible to the Swedish parliament. Six of its seven directors 
are elected by parliament, the seventh director and chainnan is appointed by the 
government. This institutional structure guaranteed the governing party, and by 
implication the SAP, a controlling influence over the bank and, in extension, the 
financial markets. In fact, "the Riksbank functioned as an agency affiliated with the 
Ministry of Finance" (Kurzer: 1993, p.175). Together with the pension funds, 
established in 1960, which gave the SAP some degree of credit steering and 
investment control capacity, the party's control over the Riksbank and the financial 
market regulations was a cornerstone of the full employment policy. The control of 
the financial markets separated the domestic from the international financial markets 
and provided the necessary economic autonomy for the counter-cyclical Keynesian 
economic policy. 
From 1974 onwards, but especially after the SAP had returned to power in 
1982, the financial market regulations were removed step by step. Amongst others, 
the liquidity ratio requirements for banks were abolished in 1983 and the ceiling on 
lending by banks removed in 1985 (Jonung: 1986, p.III). There are several reasons 
for the eventual deregulation of the financial markets. Firstly, against the background 
of the severe economic crisis, governments had run up a budget deficit of 13 per cent 
and a current account deficit of 3.7 per cent by 1982. In order to service these debts. 
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they had to devise new forms of finance, often via finance houses outside the 
regulated markets. Additionally, "the Swedish government was forced to start 
borrowing from abroad which contributed to a reduction in Sweden's financial 
isolation" (Jonung: 1986, p.113). The government's influence over monetary, credit 
and exchange rate policies started declining. Secondly, the regulations themselves had 
been an incentive to the formation of finance houses. They grew rapidly in numbers in 
the 1970s and 1980s. "Almost half of them were subsidiaries created by the large 
commercial banks in order to evade the restrictions imposed by the Riksbank" (Olsen: 
1991, p.128). 
The big TNCs also participated in this development. In order to reduce 
exchange-rate uncertainty after the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, but also to 
gain greater autonomy vis-a-vis the fmancial market regulations, TNCs like Volvo 
and Asea set up internal financial companies. From the early 1980s onwards, attempts 
were made to regulate these finance houses, but new ways of financing were 
developed with every new regulation, while the de facto control of Swedish banks was 
disturbed. Eventually, the government opted for deregulation (Notermans: 1993, 
pp.14S/146). It was considered to be better to abolish all regulations instead of having 
regulations which did not work (Interview No.37; Stockholm, 07/1111996). In 1986, 
foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Sweden and, three years later, the 
SAP government mad~ the final step and abolished foreign exchange controls. 
Overall, the deregulation of the financial markets deprived the SAP 
government to a large extent of its monetary and economic policy autonomy. The 
Swedish financial markets have become integrated into the world financial market. 
Nevertheless, although this was predominantly a response to outside pressure 
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(Jonung: 1986, p.116; Olsen: 1991, p.128), there was also a voluntary element to it. 
As it will be outlined below, in 1982, the SAP adopted a hard currency policy. The 
liberalisation of the financial markets increased the costs of pursuing a flexible 
exchange-rate and, thereby, gave more credibility to the policy of stable exchange 
rates and a hard currency. 
2.2.3. The restructuring of the Swedish state: 
A good empirical example of tensions between neo-liberal and Keynesian ideas was 
the question of the Employee Investment Funds (EIFs), also called wage-eamer funds. 
The Swedish economy had achieved high rates of economic growth under the 
condition of full employment until the late 1960s. Then, however, it became more and 
more difficult to channel labour from the declining to the dynamic sectors and the 
policy of full employment relied increasingly on the expansion of the public sector. 
Wildcat strikes endangered the internal unity of the labour movement and challenged 
central LO control, and the perception that Swedish companies enjoyed excessive 
profits made workers in dynamic sectors demand pay rises at the local level 
additionally to the centrally negotiated agreement. Inter-union rivalry between LO and 
TeO over wage increases further added to the pressure for higher wages. As a result, 
the solidaristic wage principle was undermined and wage drift made wage restraint 
impossible (Swenson: 1989, pp.144-1S0). 
These problems triggered a joint reform offensive by the SAP and LO. The 
three main elements were an active industrial policy by the state, the introduction of 
industrial democracy through co-determination, and collective share ownership of 
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industry via EIFs (Wilks: 1996, p.96). With reference to the first two aims. 
remarkable advances were made: 
An impressive series of pro-labour laws from 1972 - 1976 ... [were passed] ... , 
including minority representation on company boards, enhanced powers for 
safety stewards, much tighter rules on lay-offs and firings and, most 
importantly, the Codetermination Act of 1976, which ... [required] ... 
management to negotiate with unions over any corporate decisions that would 
affect the workforce (Pontusson: 1995, p.28). 
Nevertheless, the third component of the reform offensive, the EIFs ran into fierce 
opposition from employers and opposition parties. On the one hand, the LO attempted 
to re-establish wage restraint in the dynamic sectors in exchange for collective control 
over investment (Swenson: 1989, p.163). On the other hand, the EIFs were also 
perceived as a progressive step towards "transforming the traditional welfare state into 
an economic democracy" (Hec1o/Madsen: 1987, p.253). Especially the original plan, 
developed by Meidner in 1975, focused on the question of social power and workers' 
control over investment. When a slightly changed version was put before the SAP for 
adoption in 1978, "it was estimated that with average profits of 15 per cent it would 
take 25 years for labour to achieve over 50 per cent of the voting rights in a company" 
(Wilde: 1992, p.l 0). This objective, however, did not threaten particular capitalist 
interests, it threatened capitalism and its prerogative over investment and management 
decisions as such. Unsurprisingly, the EIFs "deeply antagonized employers in SAP, 
mobilizing and unifying the economic and political right to a degree highly unusual in 
Sweden" (Swenson: 1989, p.176). The SAF organised an ideological counter-
offensive. In 1982, it spent almost as much on anti-ElF propaganda than all five 
political parties together during this general election year. The Swedish public as a 
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whole was influenced by this offensive, and some of the largest demonstrations in 
modem Swedish history took place in Stockholm (BurkittlWhyman: 1994, p.25). 
The SAP's loss of power in 1976 prevented the establishment ofEIFs. After 
their return to power in 1982, the fund system was implemented, but only in a 
watered-down version and with little reference to workers' control over capital and 
decision-making (HeclolMadsen: 1987, p.282). None of the five regional funds was 
allowed to own above 8 per cent (6 per cent in 1988) of the total stock in any public 
company. They received finance only until 1990, of which two thirds stemmed from 
the payroll, not from a profit tax. Theoretically, together these funds could acquire as 
much as 50 per cent of the votes in corporations, but there was little co-ordination in 
practice towards this goal (Pontusson: 1992, p.210). Overall, the issue of the EIFs led 
to an increased class conflict and started the process towards the eventual break-up of 
the cross-class alliance, on which the Swedish Model had been based. 
Other ideological conflicts between neo-liberalism and Keynesianism evolved 
around the issues of privatisation, decentralisation and public sector growth. The SAP 
could not overlook the rising budget deficits and general economic crisis in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. While in opposition, it formulated a crisis programme in 1981, 
which became its guideline for economic policy, when it was back in government in 
1982. As a "third way" between traditional Keynesianism and neo-liberalism, the 
programme included both traditional policies and departures (Sainsbury: 1993, p.56). 
"The immediate aim of the 'third way' was to reverse the trend of industrial decline 
through a dramatic increase in net exports, profitability and fixed investments" 
(Ryner: 1994. p.392). A 16 per cent devaluation of the SKr was to ensure export-led 
growth and the recovery of the Swedish economy. This time. however. the 
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devaluation was the start of a new monetary policy, not the continuation of the p~ 
and "the Big Bang's yield was to be insured with a new commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate regime" (Moses: 1995, p.313). The SAP's crisis programme of 1981 
had spelled out the need for a restrictive fiscal and monetary policy and called for a 
new hard currency policy with the goal of getting inflation under control. Credibility 
for this new policy was not achieved by linking the SKr to the OM, but by the 
Riksbank's action in the market place. In 1985 and 1990, it did not float the currency 
to relieve the pressure building up on the Swedish reserves. "Instead, both times, it 
preferred to hike its overnight interest rates rather than devalue" (Moses: 1995, p.318). 
The liberalisation of the financial markets gave further credibility to the hard currency 
policy, since it made a flexible exchange-rate policy more expensive. 
Two tax reforms lowering the marginal rates of income tax implied "an 
acceptance that high marginal taxation reduces incentives to save and work" 
(Stephens: 1996, p.44). First, in 1981, the SAP still in opposition participated in a 
compromise on tax reforms together with the CP and FP, which lowered the marginal 
rates of national income tax in general and for the highest rates from 85 per cent to 50 
per cent. Then, in another drastic reform, national income tax was abolished for 
around 85 per cent of the taxpayers in 1990/91. These reforms, the cuts of which were 
higher for the well-off than for the poorly paid groups, "imply a departure from earlier 
SAP tax policies, which emphasised income taxation as a key instrument of 
redistribution" (Sainsbury: 1991, p.37). Nonetheless, this did hardly result in an 
overall tax decline, since other taxes were increased to finance these cuts. 
A similar "third way" strategy was adopted towards the public sector. ~~To 
defend the basic accomplishments of the ~ Swedish model' against the spectre of 
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radical privatisation it was deemed necessary to adopt a two-pronged strategy: to halt 
the growth of the public sector and to decentralise its organisation and management" 
(Premfors: 1991, p.91). One way of reducing the budget deficit was to control the 
payroll cost in the public sector. The government attempted to stop the linkage 
between pay rises in the public with pay rises in the private sector. In 1983, the Metal 
Workers' Union, affiliated to the LO, had accepted a separate deal with the 
engineering employers. They received salary increases above average but had to 
renounce their automatic pay drift compensation clause. 13 Instead of opposing this 
breach of the centralised solidaristic wage negotiations, the government supported this 
move with the result, that all unions had lost their compensation clauses by 1986. The 
way was open for increasing pay differentiation between the private and the public 
sector (Swenson: 1991b, pp.383-387). The reform of the public sector further led to 
the political and administrative decentralisation from the state sector to local 
government. "Decentralisation-cum-efficiency" replaced the "decentralisation-cum-
participation" principle from the 1970s (Premfors: 1991, p.92). State and local 
government companies had to adhere to newly introduced profitability criteria derived 
from the private sector. Overall, the SAP succeeded in stopping the growth of the 
public sector relative to the economy as a whole. 
Some initiatives were taken in the area of privatisation. Private management 
principles were introduced in relation to state commercial agencies such as the electric 
power board in 1987 (Lane: 1994, p.186). The SAP did not, however, accept neo-
liberal demands for vast privatisations. Where privatisation was carried out, new 
13 The engineering employers wanted to pay higher salaries in order to attract more highly qualified 
workers. important for the maintenance of international competitiveness. The compensation clause 
guaranteed workers in one industrial sector automatic adjustment to higher pay raises obtained in other 
sectors. 
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shares were issued, but the government did not give up control over public 
corporations (Sainsbury: 1993, p.56). A change in this policy only came after the 
SAP's 1991 electoral defeat. "Now for the frrst time privatization as a fundamental 
policy alternative was launched in the sense of sell-off' (Lane: 1994, p.188). 
The original success of the "third way" strategy was impressive. Sweden, at 
less than 2 per cent, maintained one of the lowest unemployment rates of the OECD 
countries and a 13 per cent budget deficit was transformed into a 1 per cent surplus. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the economy faced the same problems as at 
the beginning of the 1980s. "The growth rate was sluggish, wage increases outstripped 
those of international competitors, the current-account deficit began to grow again, 
and inflation was on the rise" (Sainsbury: 1991, p.39). As it turned out, while the 
macroeconomic balance had been restored, the structural problems of the Swedish 
economy had not been solved. Consequently, "productivity growth increased only 
slightly between 1982 and 1990 to an average annual increase of 1 percent" (Ryner: 
1994, p.396). Moreover, while unemployment had successfully been checked, 
inflation had not been brought under control by the one-sided adoption of a hard 
currency regime. At an average of 8.6 per cent, it was significantly higher than the 
German rate of3 per cent (Notermans: 1993, p.139; see also GIyn: 1995, pp.51-53). 
The abolition of foreign exchange controls in 1989 was one way of importing price 
stability from the outside. Nonetheless, even further measures were necessary in order 
to achieve wage moderation and, thereby, avoid inflation. "In February 1990, the 
government put forward a drastic action programme which among other things 
included a statutory pay freeze and a ban on strikes" (Bergstrom: 1991, p.1S). This 
was defeated in parliament due to an outcry by the rank and file of trade unions. After 
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a new currency crisis in October 1990, the governmenL this time successfully. put 
forward another emergency package, including among other measures a partial 
privatisation of the Swedish state sector (e.g. the telecommunications system and the 
electricity network) and a cut in the level of sickness benefits (Luif: 1996, p.215). It 
was further concluded that a general expansive fiscal policy in order to counter rising 
unemployment was no longer possible. "Social Democrats eventually saw no other 
way than to abandon their central policy goal ... [of full employment] ... and institute a 
policy regime which consciously created unemployment in order to restore price 
stability" (N otermans: 1993, p.148). 
According to Wilks, the change in economic policy was due to a change in 
capital's strategy. "What undermined the model was the rejection of the 50 year old 
historical compromise by Swedish business" (Wilks: 1996, p.94). The export-oriented 
capital fraction dominated over the home-market-oriented fraction in the mid-1970s 
and its members took over key leadership positions in the employers' associations 
(Olsen: 1991, p.l31)!4 When Curt Nicolin became the SAF's new chairman in 1976, 
the association did not only change its policies towards neo-liberalism but also the 
nature of its activities. The SAF attempted "to asswne leadership in defining the terms 
of political discourse, not only at the level of policy, but also at the level of popular 
culture" (Ryner: 1996, p.20). In other words, the SAF started transforming itself from 
a wage-bargaining institution into an ideologically-motivated think tank, which 
offered the platform for "organic intellectuals" to spread their neo-liberal message. It 
14 According to Olsen, the home-market-oriented industries include those sectors, which almost 
exclusively rely on domestic resources and/or are largely dependent upon the domestic market to sell 
their products and/or are highly labour-intensive, which makes them dependent on the domestic labour 
force. The competition by the newly industrialised countries and the economic crisis of the 1970s had 
triggered the decline of home-market-oriented industries such as iron. timber, etc., while export-
oriented industries, especially the metalworking and engineering sectors. became predominant (Olsen: 
I QQ I. pr. 128-131 ). 
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"expanded into the political are~ where it ventured into 'the marketing of 
capitalism' by establishing a range of publishing houses and by organising campaigns 
aimed at selected target groups to promote pro-capitalist ideology, particularly 
amongst the young" (Wbyman/Burkitt: 1993, p.607). The SAF's efforts were at first 
directed against the EIFs. Then, the attack went against the solidaristic wage policy, 
corporatism and the welfare state. 15 Central wage negotiations could temporarily be 
restored in the years after the separate deal between the engineering employers and the 
Metal Workers' Union in 1983, but eventually SAF as a whole left the system: 
Under pressure from engineering finns and other foes of centralized 
bargaining, the SAF simply closed down its negotiations and statistics 
departments in the spring of 1990. The following winter, it withdrew from the 
system of corporatist representation on government bodies (Pontusson: 1995, 
p.39).16 
Since 1993, negotiations have been carried out at the sector level between the SAF's 
member associations and individual trade unions (The Swedish Institute: 1994, p.2). 
Simultaneously, as outlined above, Swedish mcs directed their investment abroad 
and the economic structure changed drastically. The advance by Swedish capital, thus, 
consisted of two parallel offensives. On the one hand, it mobilised ideologically via 
the SAF trying to influence the frameworks of thought towards neo-liberalism; on the 
other hand, it applied structural pressure by shifting production units abroad. 
Nevertheless, the offensive by capital is only one part of the story. The SAP 
also contributed to it. The Swedish "third way" never really represented a viable 
IS For a detailed outline of the SAF' s new strategy and activities, see Olsen: 1991. pp.lll-ll6. 
16 Not all of the SAF's member associations were in favour of terminating central wage-bargaining. 
Companies in the sales, hotel and restaurant, clothing and grocery sectors, for example. wanted to 
continue SAF-LO negotiations, but it was the powerful Verkstadsindustrier. the Association of 
Swedish Engineering Employers, representing all big Swedish TNCs, which pressed for industry-level 
bargaining. "In practice, this meant Sweden's large export companies - Volvo. Saab-Scania, Asea, etc. 
- almost single-handedly brought about the shift in Swedish bargaining patterns ..... (Ahlen: 1989. 
p.llS). 
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alternative to Keynesian and neo-liberal economic policies. By accepting some 
principles of neo-liberalism, the seeds were sown for the demise of the Swedish 
Model. "Combined, the fixed exchange rate strategies and liberalized capital markets 
undermined what little monetary autonomy might have remained in the hands of ... 
[Swedish] ... policy-makers" (Moses: 1995, p.342). When the economic crisis in 
1989/90 hit Sweden, it had to adapt to the global economy, concentrating on price 
stability via austerity measures in order to avoid the flight of capital. By opening itself 
up to international capital through the deregulation of foreign exchange controls, the 
pursuit of a full employment policy was foreclosed. For the same reason, capital flight 
by Swedish TNCs could not be controlled. 
Similarly, by supporting export-oriented employers and unions in their quest 
for different inter-sectorial wage levels, the eventual collapse of the total system of 
centralised wage bargaining had been prepared. The result was not only a conflict 
between SAP and LO, but also LO-internal conflict between the Municipal Workers' 
Union and the Metal Workers' Union undermining labour unity (Sainsbury: 1991, 
p.41). By introducing efficiency as the main principle in the public sector, this sector's 
original role of achieving full employment and the democratisation of society had 
been abandoned. Finally, it was a state commission called by the SAP government, 
which considered in 1983 the use of lay boards such as the Labour Market Board in 
the implementation of policy. "It proposed that many of the lay boards be dismantled 
and suggested that interest organisations should play an advisory rather than decision-
making role in public agencies" (Micheletti: 1991, p.153). The LO and TCO opposed 
this, but the SACO and SAF received the conclusions positively with the latter putting 
it into practice and leaving the lay boards. As a consequence, the corporatist system 
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has been in dissolution ever since. "Even one of the traditional forums for dialogue 
among opposing political actors, the state commissions, is losing its status" 
(Micheletti: 1991, p.154). In short, the reforms of the various parts of the Swedish 
Model eventually implied its demise. 
The "third way" with its neo-liberal ingredients was not the only option 
available to the SAP after its return to power in 1982. To adopt the "third way" and to 
reject the alternative of EIFs was a conscious political decision. Moreover, as Glyn 
outlines, the substitution of price stability for the full employment policy at the 
beginning of the 1990s was not a necessity. The expansion of employment was still 
possible despite the structural changes since the early 1970s, provided the entailed 
costs are "explicitly counted and willingly shouldered by the mass of wage and salary 
earners" (Glyn: 1995, p.55). The actual decisions taken by the SAP in both instances 
were partly a response to structural changes associated with globalisation, including 
the establishment of neo-liberalism as a part of the structure in the form of 
intersubjective meanings, and to the SAP's neo-liberal offensive, which gained in 
strength and conviction within the neo-liberal structure. As it was outlined in Chapter 
1, section 4, ideas used as political weapons by actors are especially strong in those 
circumstances, in which they correspond to the ideas of the structure. In other words, a 
change in the dominant frameworks of thought had made the EIFs and a full 
employment policy look unrealistic, while first the "third way" and then the tum to 
price stability and low inflation appeared to be a successful strategy. 
These decisions were, however, also partly due to the SAP-internal ideological 
changes. As indicated earlier, states do not only adapt to globalisation, they also bring 
it about voluntarily. From 1976 onwards. the SAP leadership had only half-heartedly 
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supported the LO-initiative ofEIFs. Additionally, after its electoral defeat of the sanle 
year, it had formed its own research unit under Kjell OlofFeldt, the later Finance 
Minister. The team around Feldt consisted of young people shaped by the experience 
of the recession in the 1970s. Especially the OECD was a crucial influence on how to 
cope with it. Gunnar Lund, Michael Solman and Leif Pagarotzky, all people close to 
Feldt, had been working there in the early 1980s and been put into contact with neo-
liberal ideas (Interview No.68; Stockholm, 02112/1996). "Feldt and his advisors were 
determined to give priority to private-sector growth, profits and market forces" 
(Pontusson: 1995, p.35).1t was this group, which formulated the "third way" strategy 
and put it into practise after 1982. The LO, on the other hand, was significantly 
weakened. "Intellectual authority had passed from its researchers to the policy unit of 
the party" (Pontusson: 1995, p.28). 
To conclude this section, in both Austria and Sweden, the three indicators of 
globalisation, i.e. changes in the production structure, the fmance structure and the 
dominant frameworks of thought, can be noticed. Production has been increasingly 
internationalised in Austria and transnationalised in Sweden, the fmancial markets 
have been deregulated in both countries and are, thus, integrated into the world 
financial market, and a shift took place from Keynesianism to neo-liberal economics 
in theory and in practice, moving both countries towards the neo-liberal night-
watchman state. Consequently, the accessions to the EC have to be analysed against 
the background of structural change. In Chapter 1, section 3, neo-Gramscianism has 
been introduced as a theory capable of explaining structural change. In the following 
section, the neo-Gramscian concepts are operationalised in relation to the Austrian 
and Swedish political and economic systems and the impact of globalisation. This 
134 
provides the basis for the empirical analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to 
the EC in Chapters 3 and 4. 
3. A neo-Gramscian theory of European integration: 
3.1. A theoretical alternative: 
A neo-Gramscian approach to the analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the 
EC, firstly, does not argue that the two countries became members of the EC simply 
because of the effects of globalisation. Direct causal relationships are not ascertained. 
Rather, it is argued that there must have been a majority alliance of Austrian and 
Swedish social forces in favour ofEC membership. Secondly, considering the EC's 
drive towards free trade and a neo-liberal economic policy in the second half of the 
1980s and the early 1990s, embodied in the Internal Market programme and the 
Maastricht convergence criteria (see Introduction, section 2.1), these alliances must 
have been in favour of this type of economic policy. Thirdly, the investigation has to 
start by looking at social forces as the key actors. In order to identify them, one needs 
to turn to the sphere of production. As argued in Chapter 1, section 3, although several 
distinctions can be made, here the focus is on the difference between the national and 
transnational organisation of production to facilitate the identification of different 
social forces. 
Additionally, the geographical orientation as expressed in the trading patterns 
of companies has to be taken into account as a factor relevant for the formation of 
collective actors. When considering capitalist fractions, Holman suggests a fourfold 
classification: 
1. Import-competing producers of tradable goods for the domestic market; 
2. Import-competing producers of tradable goods for the European market; 
3. Export-competing producers of tradable goods for the world market; 
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4. Globally operating fmancial institutions (Holman: 1992, p.16). 
These categories do not necessarily exhaust all possibilities. For example, considering 
the distinction between national and transnational production, globally operating 
TNCs are a further group. Nevertheless, this is of no concern here, because the focus 
is on the configuration of social forces at the national level. It implies, however, that 
the social forces based on national production can be divided into nationally-oriented 
social forces, engendered by national production that produces for the domestic 
market, and internationally-oriented social forces, stemming from national production 
that produces for the export, be it for the European or the world market. Globally 
operating TNCs and financial institutions are part of the transnational social forces. 
Transnational social forces, be they capital or labour, are likely to be in favour 
of a neo-liberal, deregulatory economic policy (see Chapter 1, section 5.4) and thus, 
EC membership, because they favour a world without borders and national 
regulations, representing barriers for their business. They are probably supported by 
internationally-oriented social forces, for which borders also constitute barriers for 
their exports. The Internal Market represents a bigger "home market" for Austrian and 
Swedish export companies based on national production. 17 Nationally-oriented capital 
and labour, on the other hand, are likely to oppose membership, because they may 
depend on state protectionism, while the Internal Market endangers them through 
increased competition. 
17 It is theoretically possible that a conflict occurs between transnational and internationally-oriented 
social forces. if the latter depend on state support for their exports. However, the tum in both countries 
to neo-liberalism and the concomitant abolition of export support schemes makes this unlikely. For 
example. Austria's nationalised industry used to be subsidised and. therefore, supported in its export 
efTorts. This stopped with its privatisation and the tum towards efficiency and competitiveness in the 
market place. In Sweden. the government boosted exports via devaluations. Since the adoption of a 
hard currency policy in the 1 980s. this support has also ceased to exist. 
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The Austrian and Swedish states have to be dealt with, although not as unitary 
actors. Due to the internationalisation of the state (see Chapter 1. section 5.3). the 
Austrian and Swedish ministries and other state agencies have to be treated according 
to their place in the global mode of social relations of production. Thus, officials of 
those ministries and institutions linked to transnational production and finance (e.g. 
finance ministry, central bank) have to be viewed differently from those dealing with 
merely national problems (e.g. labour ministry). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the production structure is not sufficient in order 
to identify and explain the emergence of a successful alliance of social forces. It only 
shows the range of potential collective actors and points to likely alliances. 
Additionally, in accordance with the neo-Gramscian dialectic view of structure and 
superstructure, it has to be investigated, which "organic intellectuals" of which social 
group managed to form a hegemonic project, which allowed the successful 
establishment of a historic bloc in favour of EC membership. In other words, the 
analysis has to go beyond mere economic issues and needs to include the other ideas, 
which were part of the successful historic bloc's content. Furthermore, it has to be 
asked whether there was a rival historic bloc with a rival hegemonic project and, if so, 
why it did not succeed. 
Unlike state-centric approaches (see Chapter 1, section 1.2 -1.4), neo-
Gramscianism focuses on social forces, not on governments. It is the struggle between 
social forces, which determines the agenda-setting process, not intergovernmental 
negotiations. In the cases of Sweden's and Austria's accession to the EC, 
consequently. the intra-country struggle leading to application has to be dealt with 
first (see Chapter 3). Whether the negotiation results are eventually enacted, then, 
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depends on the ratification process. This is the second period of struggle ancL with 
reference to the 1995 EC enlargement, the struggles in the run-up to the referenda in 
both countries are the second focus (see Chapter 4). The negotiations themselves are 
of secondary importance. On the one hancL the negotiation agenda is the result of the 
struggle leading to application; on the other, the negotiations are conducted in view of 
the pending referendum. In other words, the negotiation agenda includes those 
demands, which various class fractions of the alliance made their preconditions for 
support, and the negotiators have to achieve satisfactory results in those areas, which 
the population considers to be the most crucial ones. Otherwise, a pro-membership 
result in the referenda would be very unlikely. Hence, while not neglecting the 
negotiations (see Chapter 4, section 1.3), they are only the link between the original 
decision to apply and the final decision in the referendum whether or not to accept the 
negotiation results. 
3.2. The Austrian political system and socialforces: 
The relevant social forces are identified in the sphere of production. Considering the 
Austrian production structure as outlined in this Chapter, there are intemationally-
oriented social forces engendered by the export industry, a small fraction of 
transnational social forces from foreign TNCs and nationally-orientecl social forces of 
the sheltered sector. 
An analysis of the Austrian accession to the EC requires that both political 
parties and interest associations are taken into account. Nevertheless, it is not 
sufficient to treat the social partners and political parties as key actors. They must be 
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treated as institutions, in which social forces struggle to establish their particular 
interests and ideas as those generally accepted. 
3.2.1. Social partners: 
Within the social partners, i.e. the BWK, the LK, the AK and the 6GB, those social 
forces, which are linked to the nationally-oriented industry, have to be distinguished 
from those sections which are linked to the internationally-oriented industry. The 
trade unions are mainly organised according to the industrial principle, i.e. employees 
belong to national unions determined by the economic sector within which they work. 
Consequently, the individual unions as parts of the AK and 6GB can be analysed with 
relation to their particular economic sector, whether it is export-oriented or produces 
for the domestic market. The BWK. is divided into six sectors at the national level, the 
"Gewerbe" sector (family business, crafts), the trade sector, the industry sector, the 
sector for money, credit and insurance, the transport sector and the tourism sector. 
With the exception of the internationally-oriented industry sector and the sector for 
money, credit and insurance, they do not correspond to the separation of nationally-
and internationally-oriented economic sectors and, therefore, do not serve as an 
analytical unit. In other words, both internationally- and nationally-oriented social 
forces must be expected in these sectors. Nonetheless, there are some employers' 
associations. which can be clearly identified as, for example, the intemationally-
oriented Association of the Austrian Textile Industry. The LK is more likely to be a 
homogeneous, nationally-oriented actor as the whole agricultural sector was protected 
against foreign competition. 
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There are two institutional exceptions in the area of interest associations. 
Firstly, the Vereinigung Osterreichischer Industrieller (Federation of Austrian 
Industrialists; Val) can be treated as a homogeneous organisation, as it represents the 
interests of internationally-oriented capital consisting of Austrian export-companies 
and transnational capital of the foreign TNCs, i.e. two fractions of capital, which are 
likely to have the same position on EC membership. In 1979, in structural terms, the 
VOl was "of rather limited importance since it represents private and, hence, small 
and medium industries only; almost all important industrial firms belong to the public 
sector" (Lehmbruch: 1979, p.159). This has since changed. Between 1979 and 1988, 
public ownership, calculated according to the percentage of employees in Austria's 
100 largest firms, declined by about 15 per cent, while private ownership, be it 
national or foreign, increased by approximately 14.5 per cent (Karazman-
MorawetzlPleschiutschnig: 1991, p.382; own calculations). This trend towards private 
ownership accelerated further from 1989 onwards due to the ongoing process of 
privatisation. Being privati sed, these companies are now eligible for Val membership 
and, indeed, some have already joined (Interview No.18; Vienna, 22/05/1995). The 
Val has, thus, become a powerful actor in structural terms. 
Secondly, the Verband Osterreichischer Banken und Bankiers (Federation of 
Austrian Banks and Bankers; VOB) represents the big Austrian commercial banks and 
some small private banks, which all operate on the international markets. Again, the 
VOB represents such a coherent section of capital that it can be treated as a 
homogeneous organisation. The VOl and the VOB should not, thereby, be viewed as 
social actors in their own right. but rather as potential organisational expressions of a 
class force, whose structural power transcends that of any individual actor. Both 
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organisations are based on voluntary membership, but are at the same time part of the 
ESP. In practice, they represent the sector of industry and the sector for money, credit 
and insurance within the BWK. They consequently enjoy excellent access to the 
policy-making system. 
3.2.2. Political parties: 
It is difficult to distinguish internationally- and nationally-oriented social forces 
within parties, since they are the expression of social forces and not related to 
particular economic sectors. The two big parties in Austria can, however, be divided 
according to their internal leagues and the possible different ideological outlook of 
these leagues. Conflicts between classes and fractions of classes are not only 
expressed by different organisations and/or orientations of economic sectors, but also 
by different ideologies, which are related to different organisations of production. The 
QVP "consists of three BOnde (leagues); the Business League (Wirtschaftsbund, 
QWB), the Farmers' League (Bauernbund, OBB) and the League of Blue and White 
Collar Workers (Arbeiter- und Angestelltenbund, OAAB)" (Lehmbruch: 1979, p.179). 
As the party membership is indirect via membership in one of the leagues, the loyalty 
of many members is mainly directed towards the latter, and the OVP is threatened 
with fractionalisation. The rivalry between the leagues is enhanced by their 
ideological differences, "especially between ... [the ~YP's] ... social and liberal 
wings, as represented particularly in the QAAB and the QWB respectively ... : despite 
greater emphasis under the new grand coalition governments since 1986 upon 
deregulation and the market, ideological dissent within the Catholic-conservative 
Lager has if anything intensified" (Luther: 1992. p.62). It is no surprise that under 
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these circumstances an unequivocal stance on EC membership may be difficult to 
forge. The SPO is also divided into leagues, but they do not playa big role within the 
party. "Not even together do the three socialist interest organisations exercise control 
over the party" (Muller: 1996b, p.78). Nevertheless, it has to be investigated at the 
ideological level whether there was a group opposed to the free market minded team 
around the Chancellor Vranitzky. 
It is more difficult to operationalise small parties from a neo-Gramscian 
perspective. Because they are so small, they have to be treated as the institutional 
expression of a particular fraction of social forces instead of an institutional 
framework, within which social forces struggle for dominance. The ideological 
outlook of the party may give the clearest indicator of the social forces represented. 
The FPO has two opposing directions, a liberal oriented towards the free market 
economy and a nationalist based on its origin, the old German-national Lager with ex-
Nazis as its members. Many members and functionaries maintain close links with 
extreme right-wing circles (Luther: 1991a, pp.254-259). Which direction has been 
dominant changed from time to time. It is important to know for the purpose of this 
thesis that in the 1970s and especially in the early 1980s, the liberal, market-oriented 
view dominated over the nationalist tradition. This has changed slowly but 
significantly since 1986 and the arrival of Haider as the new party chairman. The anti-
immigration policy expressed in the slogan "Austria first" has featured widely in the 
party's public appeal ever since. Its electoral success, however, must also be credited 
to its relentless criticism of Austria's corporatist arrangement for being undemocratic 
and corrupt. This helped the FPO to attract many protest voters, unsatisfied with the 
unchanging and rigid institutional structure (Riedlsperger: 1992). In 1993. when five 
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MPs left the FPO parliamentary fraction and formed the Liberal Forum, the liberal 
part of the party had largely abandoned the FPO in protest against its nationalist 
outlook. 
The GA places great emphasis on the environment. The capitalist economy is 
regarded as the cause of environmental disaster. In order to achieve an ecological 
modernisation of the capitalist production system, it is maintained that the primacy of 
politics over economics has to be established and new aims need to be developed in 
opposition to the logic of growth. This should be complemented with a focus on the 
redistribution of wealth. The democratisation of all aspects of society is a further point 
of the GA agenda, to be accomplished partly via the decentralisation of the decision-
making process to the local level (Dachs: 1991, pp.269-273). On the basis of this 
programme, the GA can be regarded as representing social forces opposed to the neo-
liberal logic with its strong focus on economic growth through efficiency and 
competition. 
Finally, national institutions also need to be taken into account by relating the 
various elements to their place in the global mode of production. Officials of those 
ministries and institutions linked to global production and finance (e.g. the 
Chancellor's Office, the Ministry of Finance, the ANB) have to be viewed differently 
from those dealing with merely national problems (e.g. the Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture). 
3.3. The Swedish political system and socialforces: 
According to Sweden's production structure, a strong group of transnational social 
forces can be expected due to the TNes. A group of national social forces mainly to 
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be found in the large public sector is also likely. Internationally-oriented social forces 
playa secondary role. 
3.3.1. Social partners: 
The trade unions in Sweden are characterised by an early dominance of industrial 
unionism. Especially the La, but also the TCO is primarily organised according to 
this principle. These trade unions can, consequently, be analysed according to whether 
the production in their economic sector is organised on a transnational or national 
basis. The unions affiliated to the SACO are structured according to the craft 
principle. Nevertheless, even in this case, it is possible to distinguish unions 
representing workers of national sectors from unions in transnational sectors. In some 
cases, individual unions may represent national and transnational social forces. In this 
case, the unit of the individual union has to be divided further into the various sections 
of the workers, the union represents. The member associations of the SAF and SI are 
also predominantly organised according to different economic sectors, and it can, 
therefore, be distinguished between national and transnational associations. 
3.3.2. Political parties: 
Only the SAP is big enough to detect different groups of social forces within it. There 
are no internal institutional structures similar to the Austrian leagues, but it has to be 
investigated, whether a group has formed in opposition to the rising neo-liberal wing 
since the early 1980s and, if so, whether this had an impact during the debate on Ee 
membership. The VP mainly attracts workers from the public sector. especially in the 
health service, education and welfare (Petersson: 1994, p.I44). It has often been 
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claimed that the VP is a middle-class party supported by white-collar workers. but it 
has always, and recently even more so, extended its appeal to blue-collar workers 
(Interview No.38; Stockholm, 08111/1996). The party favours redistributive policies 
and opposes neo-liberal economics. It therefore mainly represents parts of those social 
forces, which are in favour of maintaining the Swedish Model with its strong 
emphasis on full employment, generous welfare provisions and a large public sector. 
The GP gives the highest priority to environmental questions to which economic 
policy must be subordinated. It argues that "an economy based on ecocycles must be 
introduced, meaning that finite natural resources will not be exhausted and natural 
assets will not be consumed faster than they are renewed" (The Swedish Institute: 
1996, p.3). A neo-liberal economic policy based on economic growth is rejected, 
redistribution policies are advocated. Overall, the party represents social forces 
opposed to neo-liberalism and in favour of a radical change in economic policies. 
The MS has pursued a consistent defence of neo-liberal economic policies, 
which was also reflected in government policies between 1991 and 1994, when it 
headed a four-party coalition. The FP, although always with a certain emphasis on the 
necessity of social policies accompanying free market forces, has supported the MS in 
this drive and both parties formulated a joint economic programme in April 1991. It 
included a strong emphasis on the promotion of a market economy, tax reductions, 
slimming of the public sector, privatisation and a more flexible and cost effective 
labour market (Taylor: 1991, pp.5/6). Both parties, thus, represent foremost 
transnational social forces of capital. The CP, although with less than 10 per cent of 
the electoral vote only a small party, does exhibit internal divisions. The agricultural 
wing is grouped around the LRF, while the environmentalist wing is rooted in the 
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party's Youth League (The Swedish Institute: 1996, p.2). Its endorsement ofa free 
market economy is, consequently, less clear-cut. Social justice and measures to 
improve the environment also feature highly on its agenda (Taylor: 1991, p.6). As for 
the social forces, it represents agricultural interests and here in general the smaller 
farmers in the North of Sweden and forestry farmers in the South, and 
environmentally-concerned social groups. While all the parties with the exception of 
the SAP can be treated as more or less homogeneous actors in the debate on EC 
membership, this party-internal division of the CP has to be kept in mind. 
Similarly to Austria, a distinction has to be made between national institutions 
according to their relation to the global economy. On the one hand, there is the Prime 
Minister's Office and the Ministries of Finance, of Trade and of Industry, but also the 
Riksbank, which in general deal with international issues. On the other, the Ministries 
of Labour and of Social Affairs mainly deal with national issues and are, therefore, 
more closely attached to the national production sector. 
4. Conclusion: 
Overall, the Austrian and Swedish economic-political systems as introduced in section 
1 of this Chapter have to be seen as institutional structures within which social forces 
operate and try to make their ideas and interests into the general Austrian and Swedish 
ideas and interests. It is not argued here that other policy-making theories are unable 
to treat parties and social partners in such a way. Neo-Gramscianism, however, has 
the advantage that it provides a clearer method to identify the relevant actors by 
pointing to the sphere of production. Moreover, the analysis of particular events and 
actors is linked to the surrounding structure via an overall theoretical framework. 
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To have different groups of social forces within parties and/or social partners 
does not mean that there has actually been a split over the question of EC 
membership. It only points to possible divisions, which have to be examined. By the 
same token, to have identified a single ideological outlook of a party does not mean 
that internal splits are impossible. Only empirical analysis gives the final answer 
about which social forces were in favour and which opposed accession to the EC. 
Consequently, in the following Chapters, firstly, the struggles within the countries 
leading to application are analysed (Chapter 3) and secondly, the contests about the 
referenda investigated (Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 3: The Austrian and Swedish struggles for application. 
After the analysis of the impact of globalisation on Austria and Sweden and the 
operationalisation of the neo-Gramscian concepts in Chapter 2, it is now possible to 
tum to the examination of the processes in both countries, which led to their 
application to the EC. As it was outlined in the Introduction, section 3.1, the FT As 
between the EC and Austria and Sweden, coming into force in January 1973, had been 
satisfactory for the majority of forces in both countries. This was to change in 1985 
with the Internal Market initiative by the EC. The Internal Market, removing internal 
trade barriers between the member states, implied higher barriers to countries from the 
outside, because EC companies gained a competitive advantage over them due to the 
bigger "home market" and increased border controls towards the outside. Austrian and 
Swedish products would, therefore, be disadvantaged on the Internal Market and the 
achievements of the FT As be questioned (Luif: 1988, p.167). Both countries, 
consequently, had to respond. 
Nevertheless, although a response was required, this did not imply that 
membership was the only option. Far-reaching participation in the Internal Market 
short of full membership could also have been a course of action (Traxler: 1992, 
pp.200-203). In fact, forces opposed to membership argued along this line in both 
countries (see below). Hence, in contrast to intergovernmental analyses (see Chapter 
I, section 1.2), application to the EC was not the result of economic necessity, but the 
outcome of an open-ended struggle between different social forces. 
The first section of this Chapter deals with the struggle over the decision on 
application in Austria. the second investigates the situation in Sweden. The conclusion 
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compares both cases. While the final decision was the same in both countries. the way 
it came about was quite different. This was at least partly due to the different 
production structure in both countries (see Chapter 2, section 2). The transnational 
social forces of capital in Sweden could respond to the Internal Market initiative 
through the transfer of production units to the EC, whereas internationally-oriented 
capital in Austria had to rely on a political strategy with the goal of eventual 
membership. 
1« The struggle between social forces leading to the Austriao application to the EC; 
In general, it is widely seen that the Internal Market initiative by the EC in 1985 
leading to the Single European Act in 1987 was the starting-point of the discussion in 
Austria (Kramer: 1996, p.171; Leitner: 1993, p.87; Luif: 1994, pp.21122; Schneider: 
1990, pp. 85/86; Schultz: 1992, p.187; and Traxler: 1992, p.204).1 As outlined in 
Chapter 2, section 2.1.1, Austria is linked to the global economy predominantly via 
trade. A break-up in the shares of main areas of trade shows that this link is 
concentrated at the regional European level. Austria's share of exports and imports 
with the EC has steadily risen over the years and reached 68.6 per cent of imports and 
65.2 per cent of exports in 1990 (see Table No. 12, Appendix). Although less 
important for Austria's link with the global economy, the distribution ofFDI 
represents a similar picture. 48 per cent of outward FDI went to the EC in 1988 - 1990 
I Schaller differs here slightly. He argues that the debate over European integration had been reopened 
at the end of the 1970s by OVP members concerned with foreign policy (Schaller: 1994a., p.47). 
Nevertheless, this has to be separated from the discussion triggered by the Internal Market programme. 
As Schaller says himself, the criticism by the OVP politicians was about the general direction of the 
Austrian foreign policy as conducted by the sPa Chancellor Kreisky, not about the fonn of European 
integration. They demanded a strengthening of European co-operation instead of the concern with 
Third World issues and the Middle East. The OVP motion on Europe in parliament on 16th December 
1985 has to be seen in this light. It demanded far-reaching integration without formal membership in 
the EC (Schneider: 1990. p.196; OVP: 1985. pp.23S-237). 
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and 79.4 per cent of inward FDI came from the EC in 1989/1990 (see Tables No.7 and 
9, Appendix). Additionally, 80 per cent of the tourists and 90 per cent of jobs abroad 
were with the EC (WieserlKitzmantel: 1990, p.445). In this situation, it was realised 
that Austria had to respond quickly to the Internal Market initiative in one way or 
another. 
This section looks fIrst at the initiation of the debate and the fonnation of a 
pro-EC hegemonic project. Part 2 outlines the fonnation of a historic bloc in favour of 
application on the basis of this project. An analysis of those forces opposed to 
application and a discussion why they were unable to fonn a successful counter-
hegemonic bloc concludes this section. 
1.1. Initiating the debate: the VOl and the formation of a hegemonic project. 
The main actor initiating the discussion about full membership was the VOl. It 
represents the exporting sector of the Austrian economy and foreign TNCs operating 
in Austria (see Chapter 2, section 3.2.1) and was, thus, deeply concerned about 
possible new barriers. From 1985 to the beginning of 1987, the VOl pursued a 
cautious course of action. The careful preparation of its eventual statement in favour 
of full membership allowed the VOl to point again and again to the "scientific" basis 
of its position (Kunnert: 1993, p.86). On 14 May 1987, it published a statement and 
asked the government "to do everything possible for Austria to become a full member 
of the EC as soon as possible" [translation by the author] (VOl: 1987a, p.42). Only 
membership, it was argued, would guarantee participation, including co-decision 
making power, in the dynamic integration process of the EC (VOl: 1987a, p.32). The 
Internal Market would, moreover, require the dismantling of Austria's sheltered 
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sectors, thereby bringing about restructuring and increased competitiveness (Val: 
1987a, p.38). In spring 1989, the Val prepared the so-called Austro-Cecchini report. 
in which the economic benefits ofEC membership as opposed to non-membership 
were outlined (Val: 1989). 
Although the main drive was of a neo-liberal economic nature, the Val soon 
realised that Austria's neutrality could be the main argument against EC membership. 
Hence, in 1987, it commissioned an investigation by Hummer and Schweitzer, two 
experts in international law, which came to the conclusion that EC membership and 
neutrality were compatible (Hummer/Schweitzer: 1987).2 Two more publications 
covering the economic and the constitutional aspects of membership followed soon in 
1988 (Breuss/Stankovsky: 1988; Ohlinger: 1988). The goal of these publications, 
supported by media statements and brochures, was to establish a basis for discussion 
on membership, which had not existed before (Interview No.18; Vienna, 22/05/1995). 
This did not directly lead to the eventual application. Nevertheless, it changed the 
frameworks of thought in such a way that EC membership could be discussed and 
appeared to be a possible course of action to both the political elite and the wider 
public in response to the Internal Market programme. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
section 4, ideas as a part of the structure do not only constrain or reinforce actors' 
strategies, they may also be changed by agency. 
Finally, the Val made EC membership a question of Austrian identity. The 
quest for accession was "also the expression of a clear commitment to the West and to 
1 Members of the VOl pointed out that the result of this research had not been predetennined or 
foreseeable and that they would have accepted the contrary outcome too (Schaller: 1994a, p.72). 
Nonetheless, considering that Schweitzer had already written in 1977 that membership and neutrality 
were compatible (Schaller: 19948, p.4S) and that both authors had voiced the same opinion at the 
Europe-Hearing of the OVP's youth organisation in March 1985 (Schaller: 1994a. p.54). these claims 
sound rather hollow. 
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the basic values of the Free World" [translation by the author] (VOl: 1987b, p.495). 
The VOl had perceived the receptiveness of the Austrian population for a 
confinnation of their national identity, which had been shaken up during the 
international outrage about the national socialist past of its new President Kurt 
Waldheim in 1986. 
In addition to this public campaign, the VOl used all its political channels to 
achieve an application to the EC for full membership. It raised the question within the 
ESP and used its close connections with the political sphere. The economic wing of 
the 6vp was lobbied as were individual ministers including the Foreign Minister 
Alois Mock, and close contacts to the Economic Ministry and the Foreign Ministry 
were maintained (Interview No.18; Vienna, 22/05/1995). Taking all this into account, 
it becomes clear that the officials of the v61 can be viewed as "organic intellectuals" 
of internationally-oriented capital. Stemming from the same industrial sectors, they 
supplied their members with infonnation. Further, they used the v61 as an 
institutional platfonn in order to fonnulate for their social group a pro-membership 
hegemonic project, which went beyond mere economic issues by including neutrality, 
constitutional problems and the question of Austrian identity. 
Some argue that it was more the GVP itself, which took the initiative, and here 
especially the Foreign Minister and GVP chainnan (Parteiobman) Mock (Interview 
No.12; Vienna, 12/05/1995).3 Partly due to the GVP, the new coalition government of 
sp6 and 6vp stated in its government declaration on 16 of January 1987 that 
"participation in the further development of the process of European integration is of 
primary importance to Austria" [translation by the author] (Arbeitstibereinkommen: 
) The OVP youth organisation demanded in the summer of 1985 to set membership as a long-term 
target (Schaller: I 994a, p. 54). Th is shou Id not, however. be overrated. as the youth organ isat ion does 
not enjoy a powerful position within the OVP (MUller: 1996b: pp.76177). 
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1987, p.652). This, however, did not necessarily signify EC membership, as the 
unilateral adoption of all new EC legislation (autonomer Nachvollzug) and the so-
called global approach, consisting of participation in the Internal Market short of full 
membership, were debated as alternative options. It was not before I December 1987 
that Mock spoke about the possibility of full membership in a presentation to the 
cabinet: if full participation in the Internal Market was only possible via membership, 
"the option of EC membership, in consideration of the requirements of permanent 
neutrality, should not be excluded for the future" [translation by the author] (Mock: 
1987, p.28). Then, in January 1988, the OVP leadership decided at its annual meeting 
in Maria Plain to pursue membership while respecting Austria's neutrality as its 
official party policy (OVP: 1988, p.245). In the party's manifesto of April 1988, it 
was argued that membership implied a dynamic push towards the necessary 
restructuring measures of the Austrian economy. To discontinue the liberalisation 
drive by remaining outside the EC, on the other hand, would lead to stagnation and 
recession, a decrease in competitiveness and higher unemployment (Schneider: 1990, 
pp.203/204). 
The economic wing, the OWB, and the agricultural wing, the OBB, were the 
most active parts in the OVP integration debate. While the former played a crucial 
role in the coming about of the decision at Maria Plain, its members being often 
members of the VOl at the same time or having close ties with it (Interview No.25; 
Vienna, 26/06/1996), the latter was still very sceptical about EC membership despite 
the leadership decision (Leitner: 1993, p.l 03). In a resolution, the OBB demanded 
financial restructuring help, a transition period for the adaptation to the agricultural 
regulations in the EC and participation of the Austrian agricultural and forestry sectors 
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in the Internal Market regardless of membership or non-membership (Osterreichischer 
Bauernbund: 1988, pp.273-275). Progress was slow until October 1988, when the 
OVP chairman Mock offered the farmers a party agreement on Europe, which 
included financial restructuring help. The treaty was finalised at the annual OVP 
meeting at Maria Plain in January 1989 (Osterreichischer Bauernbund: 1989, p.285) 
and the GVP was, finally, united in favour of membership. 
The Landeshauptmannerkonferenz's (Conference of Land Governors) decision 
of November 1987 to follow the VOl and demand full membership 
(Landeshauptmannerkonferenz: 1987, p.514) played an important role in the GVP-
internal debate. In contrast to Germany or Switzerland, the Lander hardly enjoy any 
power in the Austrian constitution (Luther: 1991 b). Nevertheless, it is the extra-
constitutional governors' conference via which the Lander exert significant influence. 
Each governor enjoys a strong position within hislher respective party, "which will 
not normally enact legislation at federal level against the will of their Land party 
organisations" (Muller: 1992, p.125). Within the governors' conference, it had been 
the OVP governor of the Land Salzburg, pressed by the export-oriented industry of his 
Land - between 70 and 75 per cent of the exports of Salzburg go to the EC - who had 
taken the initiative (Laireiter et al: 1994, p.77). Similar pressure to demand full 
membership was applied on the GVP governors of the Western Lander Oberosterreich 
and Vorarlberg by their export-oriented industries (Schaller: 1994a, p.74).4 It was 
4 There is a slight East-West divide noticeable in Austria. The Eastern Lander were less urgent in their 
demand for full membership and the sPO governor of Burgenland demanded the simultaneous 
relaxation of the trade with the East. Considering that their exports are not relying on the access to the 
EC to such a large extent as the ones of the Western Ltlnder - the nationalised industry was mainly 
located in the East and only 43.4 per cent of its exports went to the EC, while the same figure for 
Austria as a whole was 60.1 per cent in 1986 - this was not a surprise (Luif: 1988, pp.178/ 179). 
Nonetheless, the Eastern governors supported the quest for membership, which was restated by the 
governors' conference in April 1988 (Landcshauptmannerkonferenz: 1988, p.SIS) 
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these governors, who spoke out in favour of membership at Maria Plain and the 
governor Martin Purtscher ofVorarlberg was appointed head of the GVP's 
Commission on Europe (Schneider: 1990, p.20 I). 
Overall, the OVP soon followed the VOl in demanding EC membership, but 
had to take into account its hesitant agricultural wing. The OVP is not an individual 
actor (see Chapter 2, section 3.2.2), and it has to be conclude that the forces for 
membership originated in the economic wing of the OVP, and from the OVP 
governors of the Western Lander, who were pressed by their predominantly export-
oriented industries. 
The FPO also played a role in putting membership on the agenda. It had 
always been in favour of Austria's participation in European integration, but it was 
not before 1985 that it adopted a clear position on this question in its party manifesto, 
the so-called "Salzburger Programm" (Frischenschlager: 1989, p.437). On the proviso 
that Austria retained its status of neutrality, EC membership was deemed to be 
possible and necessary (FPO: 1985, p.321). Only this would guarantee participation in 
the economic dynamic of European integration and co-decision making in the EC 
institutions. Moreover, the adoption ofEC legislation was regarded as a method to get 
rid of Austria's highly regulated and protected sectors (Interview No.26; Vienna, 
25/04/1996). Unhappy about the hesitating position of the government coalition, the 
FPO put forward a fonnal motion in parliament in November 1987, in which the start 
of negotiations on membership was demanded (FPO: 1987, p.328). 
Overall, however, the role of the FPO should not be overestimated. It had 
barely gained 5 per cent of the votes in the general elections of 1983 (see Table No.4. 
Appendix). As the junior partner in the coalition government with the SPO from 1983 
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- 1986, the focus on integration represented a contrast to the more globally-oriented 
SPO foreign policy and the Social Democratic welfare state (Interview No.34; Vienn~ 
10/0511996). According to Frischenschlager, FPC> Defence Minister at the time, this 
had, however, no impact on government policy due to the hesitating SPC> 
(Frischenschlager: 1989, p.439). The FPC>, pursuing a liberal economic policy since 
the 1970s, mainly represented the old middle classes and, more importantly, some 
industrialists. While the VOl supported the FPC> with financial donations for this 
reason (Interview No.34; Vienna, 10/0511996), internationally-oriented capital 
concentrated its efforts on the more influential C>VP and BWK in order to achieve full 
membership. 
1.2. The formation of a pro-EC historic bloc: 
1.2.1. The position of capital: 
The VOB supported the VOl's initiative from 1987 onwards. It used its influence 
within the B WK and, simultaneously, tried to bypass the SEP through lobbying the 
Finance Ministry directly. Moreover, individual member banks used their links to the 
government in order to lobby for membership application (Interview No.3; Vienna, 
09/05/95; Interview No.6; Vienna, 10/05/1995). 
The B WK demanded membership of the EC at its annual general conference 
on 9 December 1987. If this was not achieved, it was argued, full participation in the 
Internal Market would not be guaranteed (BWK: 1987, p.458).s Membership of the 
EC was regarded as a good way of restructuring the sheltered sector. The fight against 
unemployment was deemed necessary, but this should be done via a prospering 
S This position was reiterated one year later in the BWK's "Memorandum zur Vorbereitung 
Osterreichs alaf den Europlischen Binncnmarkt" of December 1988 (BWK 1988) 
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economy through private initiatives in a free market economy, not through Keynesian 
budget deficit spending, be that at the national or European level (Interview No.5; 
Vienna, 10/05/1995). 
The decision, however, was not as clear cut as it may seem at frrst sight and it 
was no surprise that it came after the VOL On the one hand, the capital fractions 
linked to the export sector, for example the textile industry, had demanded EC 
membership even earlier (Kunnert: 1993, p.91). The textile industry had suffered 
under the "pas siver Veredelungsverkehr" (passive across the border processing) 
regulations of the EC, which stated that textile products, processed in countries such 
as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia etc. enjoying special bilateral arrangements with the EC, 
could be reimported tax-free into the EC, provided the original material was ofEC 
origin. Consequently, producers in the EC used material, originating from within the 
EC, for having it processed in these countries instead of material from non-EC 
countries such as Austria to which the tax-free regulation did not apply 
(Bundessektion Industrie: 1989, pp.29/30). In order to underline the urgency of their 
demand for full membership, which would solve this problem at once, some textile 
employers even threatened to transfer production units to EC countries such as 
Germany and Italy (Interview, No.24; Vienna, 24/04/1996). Moreover, globalisation 
had affected textiles more than other sectors since the early 1970s. Thus, the access to 
a bigger "home market" was a vital question (Interview, No.22; Vienna, 23/04/1996). 
On the other hand, capital fractions linked to the nationally-oriented, protected 
industrial sectors were very hesitant. Especially the biggest parts of the food 
processing industry such as dairy factories, mills, and the sectors linked to meat. cattle 
and grain production, which had worked in a completely sheltered and regulated 
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market with guaranteed prices, supply and markets, were raising their voices against 
application to the EC (Interview No.5; Vienna, 10/05/1995; Interview No.19; Vienna 
23/05/1995). Moreover, the trade and transport sector, having achieved its profit from 
the import and export of goods, was not happy about a possible membership, where 
foreign companies could directly penetrate the Austrian market (Interview No.I8; 
Vienna, 22/05/1995). In the end, the social forces linked to the export sector won over 
their opponents; firstly, because the latter were badly organised, as for example the 
mill owners (Interview No.1 2; Vienna, 12/05/1995); secondly, because the industry 
sector enjoys a near-dominant position within the BWK due to its larger financial 
contribution and the capability to employ more staff to carry out research (Interview 
No.24; Vienna, 24/04/1996); and thirdly, because some people in the sheltered sectors 
accepted the argument that, overall, the Austrian economy would benefit from 
accession and that a restructuring of the sheltered sectors was necessary in order to 
regain competitiveness (Interview No.5; Vienna, 10/05/1995). Thus even in the 
BWK's "Gewerbe" sector (family business, crafts), where most of the sceptic forces 
were organised, there was no majority against membership (Interview No.21; Vienna, 
23/04/1996). 
J. 2. 2. The position of labour: 
The debate within the AK and 6GB took longer, but went along similar lines. It was 
the textile union, arguing in a similar way to the employers in this industry, which was 
the driving force within the 6GB. Its President Harald Ettl was the Head of the OOB 
Integration Committee set up in late 1987 (Interview No.22; Vienn~ 23/04/1996). 
This committee, made up of members of the 6GB and the individual trade unions. 
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had the task of preparing reports on the question of European integration for the OGB 
conference in Linz on 11 and 12 July 1988. Considering the internal difficulties, it 
was no surprise that this conference did not result in a clear pro or contra membership. 
The report spoke about "(full) participation in the Internal Market", "offensive 
advance in integration policy", a "rapprochement between Austria and the European 
market" and "association" (OGB: 1988a). OGB President Verzetnitsch, in his 
concluding address to the conference, did not exclude accession to the EC under 
certain conditions at a later stage, but pointed out that the focus should be on 
European integration beyond the areas of the EC and EFTA (Verzetnitsch: 1988, 
p.269). Overall, it was argued that, due to economic imperatives, full participation in 
the Internal Market should be the aim. As membership seemed to be the EC's 
precondition for full participation, Austria's accession to the EC could not be 
excluded (OOB-Rednerdienst: 1988a, p.7). 
The Europa-Memorandum of December 1988 by the OGB laid out the 
conditions for its support for membership. Most importantly, Austria's neutral status 
must be maintained (OOB: 1988b, pp.2/3), the economic benefits must be used to 
improve the income, employment and welfare of the general population with a 
commitment to full employment as the priority of the economic and social policy, the 
decision-making in social policy must remain at the national level (OOB: 1988b, p.3), 
and the right for the OOB and AK to participate in all spheres of the decision-making 
process related to European integration and Austria's possible EC membership must 
be guaranteed (OOB: 1988b, p.4). Additionally, the OOB put forward demands to 
ensure that Austria's economy was prepared for further European integration 
regardless of becoming a member or not. Amongst others, these included an economic 
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policy of supporting further the transnationalisation of Austria's industry, 
improvements of, and investments in, the infrastructure, liberalisation of the crafts 
regulations, and a strengthening of education and professional training (OGB: 1988b. 
pp.S/6). Under these conditions, Verzetnitsch identified a majority within the OGB in 
favour of accession to the EC (DGB-Rednerdienst: 1988b, p.4). The DGB's position 
was echoed in the "Europa Stellungnahme" of January 1989 by the AK. If full 
participation in the Internal Market could only be achieved via membership, the AK 
would agree on accession. The preconditions mentioned above must, however, be 
accepted and the wider political and foreign policy dimensions carefully considered. 
Austria's neutrality should not be compromised (AK: 1989, p.6). 
The results of the inter-ministerial "Working Group for European Integration", 
established by the new coalition government of SPO and GVP in February 1987 had 
been crucial for both associations. Together with representatives of all ministries and 
the Austrian Lander, the social partners participated in the evaluation of the 
consequences of the various options for Austria. Implicitly, the working group argued 
in favour of membership during the presentation of its results in June 1988. 
Participation in the Internal Market would cause no problems for Austria. This, 
however, implied an automatic adoption of EC legislation, which was not satisfactory 
to a country unable to participate in the shaping and passing of this legislation, and 
there was no guarantee that the EC accepted this kind of participation (Leitner: 1993, 
p.93). Consequently, full participation in the Internal Market was only considered to 
be possible via membership, and this position was reiterated by the aGB and the AK. 
Overall. and in contrast to the enthusiastic positions by the VOl and BWK, the 
employee associations, while accepting the necessity of participating in the new 
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economic dynamic of European integration, pointed to the possible negative effects of 
membership and, consequently, outlined some preconditions of their support. 
This conditional support for application by the 6GB and the AK was mainly a 
decision by the leading officials in both organisations (Interview No.1; Vienna, 
08/05/95). During high-ranking talks within the institutions of the ESP, it had become 
clear that the trade unionists did not have an alternative way to offer the same increase 
in general welfare, as EC membership, put forward by capital, promised to yield. 
Against the background of global restructuring and Austria's difficult economic 
situation, the opening of the sheltered sectors seemed to be the only way forward and 
EC membership was the best way of bringing this about. In other words, the trade 
union representatives agreed that membership was necessary for the revival of the 
Austrian economy, as were privatisation, tax reforms and a new focus on efficiency 
(Interview No.13; Vienna, 12/05/1995). Globalisation and the limitations of state 
autonomy were accepted as economic facts, and national Keynesian solutions were 
ruled out as impossible in this new international environment (Interview No.1; 
Vienna, 08/05/1995). Experts such as Heinz Zourek of the AK realised the problems 
for the sheltered Austrian sectors in case of accession, but pointed out that this would 
lead to lower prices for consumers and for inputs of the export-oriented industries and, 
thereby, improve the overall economic situation (Zourek: 1989, p.189). Once the Cold 
War had come to an end in 1989, the 6GB leaders additionally had to take into 
account the prospect of new competitors in Eastern Europe. Therefore, these high-
ranking officials accepted the bid for membership while focusing on a ')ust" 
distribution of the expected welfare gains (Interview No.13; Vienna, 12105/1995). 
161 
Moreover, both the 6GB and the AK. strongly emphasised the importance of a 
European social dimension in addition to economic integration and demanded that the 
Austrian government worked towards this in case of membership (6GB: 1988b, p.2; 
AK.: 1989, p.5). The opinion of Jaques Delors, President of the European 
Commission, that a European social dimension was a necessary complementary part 
of the Internal Market helped leading Austrian trade unionists in their support for 
membership (Interview No.22; Vienna, 23/04/1996). In view of the loss of national 
policy autonomy due to globalisation, exemplified by the French failure of Keynesian 
policies between 1981 and 1983, the EC with its social dimension, it was pointed out, 
offered some compensation at the European level and provided better possibilities for 
the control of TNCs (Vogler: 1991, p.179). 
At first, opposition arose across all industrial sectors against this position. 
Nevertheless, the trade unions linked to the exporting sector soon offered their 
support, while the trade unions of the sheltered sector remained opposed. Thus, 
industrial unions such as the Textile, the Chemical and the Metal Workers' Unions 
supported participation in the internal market, while Rail, Postal and Public Workers' 
Unions, but also construction and wood workers opposed such a move (Schaller: 
1994a, p. 94). Amongst the opponents within the labour movement, the Gewerkschaft 
der Privatangestellten (White Collar Workers' Union, GPA)6 was never positive about 
EC membership. Especially the sheltered and regulated areas of transport companies 
and food processing industry opposed accession, feared to lead to job losses, and 
infonnation material in this sense was published by the GPA (Interview No.35: 
Vienna~ 14/05/1996). The executive board of the Food Processing Union accepted the 
6 The GPA is the strongest individual union within the OOB. It represents the white-collar workers in 
industry. crafts. money and credit. trade. social insurances. insurances. agriculture and forestry. 
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arguments that, firstly, the maintenance of the sheltered position was unfair on the 
consumers, who had to pay for it via high prices and secondly, that the GAIT 
Uruguay round would lead to further free trade and, therefore, undennine the sheltered 
sector anyway. Consequently, it did not oppose membership but demanded financial 
restructuring help for the food processing industry before accession and the setting-up 
of so-called "work-foundations" with the goal to retrain workers, who had lost their 
job in the course of restructuring (Interview No.20; Vienn~ 22/04/1996). 
Nevertheless, in a conference on the EC by the extended executive board in March 
1988, dissenting voices were raised. Representatives of the tinned food and the 
tobacco industries opposed membership arguing that this would push Austrian 
products out of the market in their sectors and lead to job cuts (Food Processing Trade 
Union: 1988~ p.8). Additionally, representatives of the dairy and sugar industries 
rejected restructuring of their sectors via the closing down of production units. Some 
employers misused the EC argument, it was pointed out, for their rationalisation 
programmes, which could be avoided. Furthermore, fanners should be paid less for 
their agricultural products by the food processing industry in order to lower consumer 
prices (Food Processing Trade Union: 1988b, comments by Kollege Huber, Kollege 
Krcal and Kollege Uhl). Additionally, while the Fraktion Sozialistischer 
Gewerkschafter (Socialist Trade Unionists), a league within the sPa, dominates the 
Food Processing Trade Union, there is a small minority of trade unionists closely 
related to the Austrian Communist Party. 7 The so-called Gewerkschaftlicher 
Linksblock strongly came out against membership. It would result in lower food 
quality standards and increasing power of European TNCs, which opposed a 
7 With 0.73 per cent of the electoral vote in 1986 (Schneider: 1990. p.2.tS). the Austrian Communist 
Party is not significant enough to be dealt with in more detail in this thesis. 
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European social dimension and favoured job cuts in the restructuring process of the 
industry (Oewerkschaftlicher Linksblock: 1989). 
Eventually, the pro-EC decision triumphed within the OOB, but a long 
campaign until 1992 was needed in order to convince the members and work council 
officials at the company level (Interview No.1; Vienna, 08/0511995). Objections and 
doubts were removed by the central organisation through the promise of financial 
restructwing help and retraining programmes (Interview No.22; Vienna, 23/04/1996). 
1.2.3. The position of the agricultural sector: 
Apart from some limited exports to the EC in the area of cattle, agriculture was a 
totally nationally-oriented sector. Austrian production prices were higher than in the 
EC partly due to a different agricultural structure based on small and middle-sized 
farms with a strong emphasis on ecological factors in contrast to large-scale 
agricultural production in the EC focusing on efficiency. Furthermore, Austrian 
farmers had to cope with weaknesses in the related food processing industry (Kunnert: 
1993, pp.82/83). Overall, it was feared that many farmers would be made bankrupt. 
Unsurprisingly, leading officials of the Austrian agricultural complex such as the 
President of the LK Alois Derfler and the Agricultural Minister Josef Riegler, both 
members of the GVP, rejected full membership throughout 1987 (Kunnert: 1993, 
pp.80/81). A turning-point was the GVP's decision in January 1988 to demand full 
membership. Riegler and Derfler are likely to have bowed to pressure from the 
economic wing of their party (Schaller: 1994a, p.l 00). 
Similarly important was the presence at Maria Plain of the President of the 
Raiffeisenverband Dr. Kleiss, member of the GVP and the OBB. The 
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Raiffeisenverband, originally a network of local self-help organisations of fanners. 
has developed into a huge industrial enterprise with a market-dominating position in 
the agricultural supply and processing industry and, even more important. a financial 
sector with international links. Dr. Kleiss agreed that membership was absolutely 
necessary and arranged a positive statement by the Raiffeisenverband in the wake of 
the QVP's decision (Interview No.28; Vienna, 03/05/1996). Especially the financial 
sector of the Raiffeisenverband, i.e. internationally-oriented social forces, sought to 
gain unhindered access to European financial markets and, therefore, strongly 
supported membership (Krammer: 1991, p.372). As the presidential conference of the 
LK consists of representatives of the Land organisations and the Raiffeisenverband, 
the latter's positive opinion on membership was crucial in the internal decision of the 
LK (Interview No.28; Vienna, 03/05/1996). 
From this point onwards, the political elite of the LK supported the EC 
application. It was argued that the situation of farmers would get tough anyway due to 
the GAIT negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Switzerland was cited as an example 
of having to restructure its agriCUltural sector despite its decision against closer ties 
with the Community. Moreover, Austrian farmers would have to accept the EC 
guidelines in any case, if they wanted to export to the EC. Membership would 
guarantee the right of co-decision making in drawing up these guidelines (Interview 
No.17; Vienna, 18/05/95). The LK's "Memorandum zur Europiischen Integration" of 
February 1989 supported membership, but demanded financial help before and during 
membership in order to maintain Austria' s agricultural structure and environmental 
standards (LK: 1989). A transition period for the agricultural sector in the adaptation 
to EC regulations and restructuring help for the closely attached food processing 
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sector were asked for (Interview No.28; Vienna, 03/05/1996). Many farmers. 
however, disagreed with the LK's positive opinion and felt that they were passed over 
or even sacrificed by their political leadership (Leitner: 1993, p.l 06). This resistance 
could not completely be overcome despite an intensive campaign of hundreds of 
information meetings organised by the LK throughout the country (Interview No.17; 
Vienna, 18/05/1995). 
Eventually, in March 1989, the social partners supported application to the EC 
in their joint declaration "Osterreich und die Europaische Integration", as only 
membership would guarantee full participation in the Internal Market 
(Sozialpartnerstellungnahme: 1989, p.ll). The increased competition and economies 
of scale in the Internal Market would lead to higher economic growth. Provided this 
was accompanied by certain political measures, higher levels of living standards, a 
reduction in unemployment and the creation of new jobs would result. Considering 
the loss of national economic policy autonomy due to the world-wide liberalisation in 
the trade of goods and services, Austria would have to restructure parts of its industry 
anyway. Rather than implying a further loss of national sovereignty, the EC offered in 
this situation some kind of compensation, as the ''the loss of autonomy can be 
balanced through possibilities of co-shaping and co-decision making at the 
international level" [translation by the author] (Sozialpartnerstellungnahme: 1989, 
p.9). 
J. 2. 4. The SpO's slow turn towards application: 
The joint declaration of the social partners was crucial for the opinion of the 
governing parties. In particular the sPO waited for the decision of the OGB and the 
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AK (Interview No.1; Vienna, 08/05/1995). The process leading to the pro-
membership decision of 3 April 1989, when the national committee voted with a clear 
majority of 50 to 4 in favour of membership, was even more painstaking than the one 
of the ~YP. In 1986, the first Vranitzky government came into office. Its new foreign 
minister for six month until the grand coalition was Peter lankowitsch (SPO), who 
had already spoken up in favour of a closer relationship with the EC up to a quasi-
membership at the end of 1985 (Leitner: 1993, p.IOl). The rationale behind this move 
was of an economic nature. The economic wing of the party around Chancellor 
Vranitzky, Finance Minister Lacina, Harald Ettl and Brigitte Ederer were convinced 
that it was necessary to guarantee Austria's full participation in the Internal Market, as 
this was likely to lead to new barriers for non-member countries. Some within the 
party even looked to the EC as a way of restructuring Austria's sheltered sectors, 
which was very difficult to achieve without pressure from outside (Interview No.32; 
Vienna, 08/05/1996). Nevertheless, the global approach was the primary aim at this 
time, as it was for the ~YP. In the wake of the OVP's move towards full membership 
in 1988 and the results of the "Working Group for European Integration" in the 
summer of the same year, concluding that full participation in the Internal Market was 
only possible via membership, accession to the EC was carefully considered as an 
option by this group (Leitner: 1993, p.1 0 I). 
On the other hand opposition grew within the party. Many linked their 
criticism of membership to a critique of capitalism in general, echoing the position of 
large sections of the party in the I 960s (see Introduction, section 3.2). Especially the 
socially disadvantaged and female party members argued that the capitalist dominated 
EC would threaten the social achievements in Austria. They were represented by Hans 
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Hatzl, member of the city council in Vienna, and by Herbert Suko, President of the 
AK in the Land Salzburg (Interview No.32; Vienna, 08/05/1996). Another, even more 
important group, divided into two sub-groups, rallied around the principle of 
neutrality. The fIrst sub-group rejected the notion that membership and neutrality were 
compatible. The second, of which the former Foreign Minister Lanc was a member, 
argued that the EC had not been integrated deeply enough yet in order to raise the 
issue of neutrality. Nevertheless, as the EC had the general goal of developing into a 
political union, which may include a common foreign and security policy noticeable 
in the discussions in the late 1980s, it was not clear whether the EC would develop in 
a direction, where Austria as a member would have to drop its neutrality. 
Consequently, this group suggested to wait and observe whether future EC 
development questioned neutrality (Interview No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996). 
In view of this opposition, Vranitzky waited before he gave a clear sign for 
membership and stated at the SPO congress on Europe in October 1988 that neutrality 
would never be questioned or negotiated for the sake of membership (Vranitzky: 
1988, pp.1791180). Then, the official report by the intemationallaw office in the 
Foreign Ministry about the question of the compatibility of EC membership and 
neutrality was published in November. It concluded that "Austria's EC membership 
under the viewpoint of retaining the status of neutrality would be in principal 
possible" [translation by the author] (Volkerrechtsbtiro: 1988, p.40), provided some 
clarifications were made with reference to Art. 223 and 224 of the EEC Treaty, 
ensuring the right to use them for maintaining neutrality, and that Austria's status of 
neutrality was written into the application for membership. This strengthened the pro-
EC cwnp within the SPO - the idea that membership was compatible with neutrality 
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was easier to sell than the opposite (Interview No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996) - and was 
the basis of its clear victory in the national committee, mentioned above. Only Hatzl. 
Lanc and two leading functionaries of SPO youth organisations voted against the 
motion put forward by Vranitzky (Schneider: 1990, p.215). Membership was, 
however, linked to several conditions. In his presentation to the national committee. 
Vranitzky outlined the requirements for his party's support: neutrality was not 
negotiable, Austrian social and environmental standards had to be maintained, special 
provisions were needed for the agriCUltural sector in order to soften the impact of 
accession and a solution of the transit problem was required before the establishment 
of the Internal Market in 1992 (Vranitzky: 1989, pp.l94-198). 
Overall, the pro-EC position was qualified and the conditions of the SPQ 
became part of the government's report to Parliament on 17 April 1989 (Leitner: 
1993, pp.95/96) and also of the party agreement between SPO and QVP of26 June 
1989 (Parteienvereinbarung: 1989). In the end, it was thanks to the SPO' s insistence 
that the principle of neutrality was written into the official application to the EC in 
July 1989 and that, therefore, the QVP Foreign Minister Mock could appease Soviet 
criticism by pointing to this. In sum, it was the economic wing within the SPO, led by 
the Chancellor Vranitzky, which moved the SPO towards a pro-EC position, but it had 
to overcome fierce opposition, especially rallying around the principle of neutrality. 
The clear success of the pro-EC group was partly due to the lack of an alternative 
concept by the opponents, which went beyond the issue of neutrality (Interview 
No.23; Vienna. 24/04/1996). 
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J. 2. 5. State institutions linked to the global economy: 
The Finance Ministry, linked to global fmance via its concern for Austria's 
international credit rating, strongly supported EC membership. Austerity and a 
consolidated budget were regarded as necessary in times of free capital movement in 
order to maintain a good credit rating on the international financial markets. 
Membership was considered to be a good way of attaining these objectives. The 
positive stance was strengthened after the Treaty of Maastricht, which implied that 
member states had to draw up convergence criteria plans with a strong focus on 
austerity. This allowed the transfer of responsibility for harsh decisions to Brussels 
(Interview No.7; Vienna, 11105/95). 
The ANB, also linked to global fmance and in favour of EC membership, kept 
itself out of the discussion in order to avoid the Austrian hard currency policy 
becoming an object of the debate. Nonetheless, it supported the historic bloc in favour 
of EC membership through its actions. It shadowed the EMS policy and started 
liberalising its financial markets, when the EC members had decided on this move in 
1986, in order to have a monetary and exchange rate policy compatible with present 
and future goals of the EC. Moreover, it acquired the status of Other-Holder, i.e. the 
right to hold and use official ECUs, and published an official daily exchange-rate for 
the ECU (DOrfel et al: 1993, pp.121 /122; Interview No.16; Vienna, 18/05/1995). 
Finally, the Economic Ministry strongly pressed the point that EC membership 
was a good method of achieving higher efficiency via stronger competition in the 
Internal Marke~ forcing Austria's protected sectors to restructure themselves 
(Interview No.1 0; Vienn~ 12105/95). 
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To sum up, the initiative was taken by "organic intellectuals" of the 
internationally-oriented social forces of capital. They formed an alliance with the 
social forces of labour also attached to this sector, and were supported by the 
ministries and institutions linked to the global economy. Their main arguments were 
of an economic nature. However, by dealing with other issues such as neutrality too, it 
was possible to formulate a hegemonic project in favour of EC membership, which 
went beyond mere economic interests and led to the control over the two governing 
parties and the social partners. Nevertheless, in order to attract other social forces and 
obtain at least the acquiescence of nationally-oriented social forces, concessions such 
as the maintenance of neutrality, social and environmental standards, special 
provisions for agriculture and financial restructuring help for disadvantaged industrial 
sectors had to be made. 
The discourse of membership demonstrates two things. Firstly, the arguments 
of all pro-EC forces were underwritten by neo-liberal ideas, e.g. that efficiency via 
higher competition, to be achieved through membership and participation in the 
Internal Market, guaranteed a healthy economy, which would eventually lead to the 
creation of more wealth and jobs. EC membership was realised as a continuation of 
the change in economic policy at the national level, being especially crucial for the 
opening up of the sheltered sectors to international competition. Trade unionists may 
have pointed to the importance of a social dimension at the European level. but they 
did not challenge the neo-liberallogic as such. Secondly, the reference to 
globalisation as making this neo-liberal policy necessary shows that globalisation has 
not only acquired an existence at the material level through the transnationalisation of 
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production and fmance, but also at the level of ideas. Structural change encompasses 
both changes at the structural and the superstructural level. 
1.3. Forces against membership: 
1.3.1. Nationally-oriented capital and labour: 
Both capital and labour related to the protected sector rejected membership. This 
included mainly the food processing industry, customs' officials, transport companies 
and the agricultural sector. It is interesting to note that some of the employers and 
trade unions in these sectors worked together in individual instances and tried to 
influence their respective Chamber. They raised their voices of opposition whenever 
they could, but were eventually outnumbered (Interview No.19; Vienna, 23/05/1995). 
Their position was weakened internally, since not all sectors within the food 
processing industry were negatively affected. While there were severe problems for 
dairy companies, mills and the sugar industry, the so-called "protocol II" industries, 
i.e. industries affected by the special bilateral agreements between Austria and the EC 
of 1972, such as breweries, soft drinks companies and cattle exporters could expect 
gains from accession (Food Processing Trade Union: 1988a, p.6). Consequently, they 
were less inclined towards a negative position. A small section of the social forces of 
capital in the food processing industry, moreover, sided with the majority, arguing 
that a restructuring of the protected industrial sector was necessary anyway. They 
even threatened to transfer production units to Eastern European countries in case of 
non-membership (Interview No.1; Vienna. 08/05/1995). 
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1.3.2. Political parties against application: 
The GA was the only significant party, which opposed membership from the very 
beginning. In March 1987, the leader of the GA fraction in parliament Freda Blau-
Meissner rejected the view that neutrality was compatible with membership. Instead, 
membership would endanger Austrian independence and role as mediator between 
East and West, last but not least through the further sell-out of the Austrian economy 
(Blau-Meissner: 1987, pp.345/346). In February 1989, the party published a detailed 
manifesto on Europe. The Internal Market programme was accused of merely aiming 
at the economic-industrial expansion. Its liberalisation would not only make reforms 
in environmental and social standards impossible, but put already achieved standards 
under threat without solving the problem of unemployment. Additionally, it 
complained about the Ee's democratic deficit and perceived military component. In 
this situation, instead of applying to the Ee, Austria should, on the one hand, pursue a 
strategy of international co-operation with the goal of an improved environment, 
social justice, democratic renewal and international peace. Next to the Ee, these 
efforts should also incorporate central Europe and the European neutrals. On the other 
hand, Austria had to concentrate on reforms at the national level, which would have a 
stronger impact on the Ee than Austria could ever hope to achieve as a member (GA: 
1989, pp.348-352). Shortly before the decision in parliament, the GA supported the 
newly founded initiative "Kritische Europainformationen" (Critical Europe 
Information) in its organisation of a bus tour through Austria, having the aim of 
disseminating information against application (Interview No.27; Vienna, 02105/1996). 
Nevertheless, the decision on application was merely taken in parliament in June 
1989, and there the GA fraction was the only one, which voted against application. 
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With roughly 5 per cent of the votes in the 1986 general elections (see Table No.4, 
Appendix) and eight MPs, this was a lost battle from the beginning. 
1.3.3. Resistance in the extra-institutional environment: 
After the social partners and the two governing parties had decided on application, 
implying a majority for application within parliament, there was only the extra-
institutional environment left for mobilising resistance to the EC membership course. 
In 1988, first publications appeared, which criticised the argument that membership 
was a natural necessity and pointed to alternative strategies. Morawetz outlined the 
undemocratic nature of the EC and the predominant structural position of lobby 
groups by "big capital" within it. Labour could only loose in this situation, with 
reference to its influence in general and the obtained social standards in particular 
(Morawetz: 1988). Scherb, while acknowledging the objective tendency in the 
economy towards transnationalisation, rejected the one-sided orientation towards the 
EC. As an alternative, she urged a diversified transnationalisation strategy and 
retention of the status of an independent neutral able to mediate between East and 
West (Scherb: 1988, pp.69/70). Althaler et al similarly regretted the one-sided 
orientation towards EC membership and pointed to a range of alternative strategies 
such as a further development of the 1972 FT As or association. As these strategies 
promised similar economic gains, membership would be everything but a must for 
Austria (Althaler et al: 1988, pp.44/45). These publications helped EC opponents to 
formulate their arguments (Schaller: 1994a, pp.112/113). 
In November 1988, the hInitiative Osterreich und Europa" was established 
with the former Foreign Minister Lanc (SPO) as one of its most prominent co-
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founders. It was a loose association of individuals including fonner ambassadors 
(Bielka, Thalberg) and university professors (e.g. Hagen, Pelinka and Weinzierl) 
(Leitner: 1993, p.l 07). Similarly to the pUblications, mentioned above, its aim was to 
initiate a broad public debate on EC membership in general and the question of its 
compatibility with neutrality in particular (Interview No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996). 
Together with the "Institut fUr Staats- und Politikwissenschaft", it organised a 
symposium "Osterreich - EG - Europa" on 30 and 31 January, 1989, of which the 
presentations were published in the Osterreichische Zeitschrift jar 
Politikwissenschajt, Vol.18/3 (1989). Amongst others, Lanc argued that a European 
Economic Area combined with a diversified intemationalisation strategy was 
economically sufficient (Lanc: 1989, p.257). Bielka pointed out that the process of 
transnationalisation including the take-over of Austrian companies by foreign TNCs 
had already been undermining Austria's independence. Membership would increase 
this tendency and threaten neutrality. Moreover, membership would imply 
participation in the EPC and, therefore, question Austria's role as a neutral mediator 
in international politics (Bielka: 1989, p.259). Thalberg suggested to observe first the 
further internal development of the EC, before a decision on application was taken 
(Thalberg: 1989, p.264). More than 100 similar public information meetings were 
organised allover Austria (Interview No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996). 
This intensified public debate was not without consequences. Shortly before 
the parliamentary debate on application at the end of June 1989, several 
demonstrations took place, which demanded that application to Brussels should not be 
8 
made (Schaller: 1994a, p.247). 
IAn open letter to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister together with a list ofsignarures. demanding 
not to send a letter of application. because the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
move had not developed far enough. \Vas printed in Profit. No.26 (1989), p.S). 
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1.3.4. Reasonsfor the failure of the anti-EC groups: 
Overall, there were a range of social forces opposing membership, but it turned out to 
be impossible for them to form a successful alliance against application. Firstly, they 
did not have a clear common agenda apart from their opposition to membership. For 
example, within the "Initiative Osterreich und Europa", membership was rejected 
because of neutrality, social, environmental, agricultural, regional, and democratic-
political considerations without arranging these points in a coherent programme 
(Leitner: 1993, p.l 07). The attempt by the GA to organise an anti-Ee campaign 
before the Land elections of spring 1989 was rejected by the "Initiative Osterreich und 
Europa" (Schaller: I 994a, p.1 SO) as was the attempt to form a new party. According 
to Lanc, the opponents were generally focusing on small and local issues which 
affected them directly such as the anti-transit movements in some Lander or some 
local SPO or OVP mayors, who feared for their re-election. The GA was considered 
to be merely a sectoral party. For the successful establishment of a new party, 
however, a comprehensive programme would have been necessary. More importantly, 
it had never been the aim of the Initiative to form an anti-Ee movement in the first 
place. It wanted to start a public debate on the pros and cons of Ee membership and, 
consequently, had always invited pro-Ee speakers to its conferences, too. When this 
target had been achieved, the Initiative was dissolved in 1991 (Interview No.23; 
Vienna, 24/04/1996). In short, neither the GA nor the "Initiative Osterreich und 
Europa" could provide the platform for "organic intellectuals". 
Additionally, there was no support from ministries, linked to national 
problems, such as the Agriculture Ministry, the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs 
and the Ministry for the Nationalised Industry (Interview No.14; Vienna, 17/05/1995). 
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As all decisions were taken on a consensus basis within the cabinet, the Agriculture 
Minister could theoretically have vetoed the decision on application (Interview No.25; 
Vienna, 25/04/1996). In practice, however, because of internal pressure within the 
avp, this extreme version of opposition was unlikely. The Agriculture Minister 
together with the aBB and the LK., however, made it for the pro-application forces 
very difficult and successfully demanded many concessions (Interview No.36; 
Vienna, 15/05/1996). The Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs did not oppose the 
quest for membership either. The necessity of application was accepted considering 
the overall economic gains membership promised to yield. Job losses would have to 
be dealt with, as a restructuring process of the protected sectors was on the agenda in 
any case, and the Austrian work and social standards even had to be raised to 
Community levels in some areas (Interview No.1; Vienna, 08/05/1995). Eventually, 
the ministry only demanded that Austria's participation in the structural funds of the 
EC and a transition period with reference to women's nightwork were part of the 
negotiation position (Interview No.30; Vienna, 06/05/1996). At first sight, one would 
assume that the Austrian Ministry for the Nationalised Industry fiercely opposed EC 
membership, as a large public sector was hardly compatible with the liberalisation 
drive of the Internal Market accompanied by a wave of privatisation across the EC. 
Nevertheless, considering that privatisation and the restructuring of the Austrian 
nationalised industry had already been accepted and started in 1987 (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.1.3), membership offered a good way of continuing this process and was, 
therefore, welcomed rather than opposed (Interview No.31; Vienna, 07/05/1996). 
Furthermore, the opposing social forces were outside the corporatist system 
and in a nlinority position within parliament. Once they had lost the struggle within 
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the governing parties and the social partners, there was no institution left, which 
would have allowed them to influence policy-making. 
Lastly, the importance of the change in ideas from a Keynesian to a neo-
liberal, deregulatory economic policy, part of the process of globalisation, should not 
be forgotten. This contributed to a situation, in which nationally-oriented social forces 
of capital and labour found it impossible to consider alternatives to participation in the 
Internal Market, despite the obvious disadvantages for their sectors. Similarly, a 
critique of this new type of economic policy and the suggestions of alternative 
development strategies as presented by the GA and individual intellectuals had little 
chance to be accepted by a wider audience in this ideological environment. 
To conclude, social forces linked to the national, protected industrial sector 
opposed EC membership. Nonetheless, the breaking of the ranks by some social 
forces of capital, the lack of uniformity in the issues prioritised to oppose 
membership, the unsupportive attitude by ministries linked to national problems and 
the exclusion from the corporatist policy-making institutions prevented these social 
forces from forming a successful historic bloc against membership. Alternatives to 
membership based on a different economic policy were more or less precluded in a 
structural environment, which was partly constituted by neo-liberalism in the form of 
intersubjective meanings. As it is demonstrated in the next Chapter, however, the 
referendum on membership five years later would give these social forces a second 
chance. 
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2. Sweden and Social Democratic hegemony: the struggle postponed. 
The new dynamics of the EC in the mid-1980s triggered a rethinking of Sweden's 
integration policy (Luif: 1996, p.204). In contrast to Austria, however, membership 
was not discussed as an option, since the governing SAP had repeatedly made it clear 
that neutrality prevented such a step, before it suddenly announced its intention to 
apply to the EC in October 1990. Nevertheless, the different positions between 
various social forces can also be detected at this stage. 
In the first part of this section, the positions of labour and capital, but also of 
the agricultural sector are outlined. The second part looks at general government 
policy, which also represents the SAP's position, up to the dramatic turnaround in 
October 1990, before the positions of the other political parties are dealt with in the 
third part. The fourth and final part analyses the change in the SAP's position on 
membership. 
2.}. Labour, capital and agriculture: membership is not on the agenda. 
2.}.}. The position o/labour: 
There was not much discussion about the 1985 Internal Market initiative within the 
LO until 1987/1988. The Swedish Model was considered to be beyond problems 
(Interview No.46; Stockholm, 13/1111996; Interview No.56; Stockholm, 2111111996). 
Nonetheless, from 1987 onwards, the unions of the transnational production sector 
started to point out that some kind of response was necessary (Interview No.46; 
Stockholm, 13/11/1996). Especially the Metal Workers' Union, representing a sector 
which is characterised by the big TNCs such as Ericsson, Electrolux and Volvo and 
which exports more than 50 per cent of its products, became aware of the possible 
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negative impact of an EC Internal Market on the economic perfonnance of and, 
thereby, the employment in, its sector. The TNCs had made this clear in discussions 
with local union branches, which, in tum, demanded some action from their central 
organisation. The central union, then, used its close contacts with the SAP and pressed 
for an initiative. This contributed, at least partially, to the eventual government bill on 
"Sweden and West European Integration" of December 1987, which outlined the new 
approach (see below) (Interview No.66; Stockholm, 29/1111996). 
In 1987/88, first ideas about the new relationship between Sweden and the EC 
were mainly aired by the peak organisation LO and the affiliated Metal Workers' 
Union.9 It was stressed that the Internal Market programme was going to affect 
Sweden and that, therefore, a response was required: 
Whatever we in Sweden may think about all this, we will be affected by what 
is now happening. All other considerations aside, it has to do with the 
coordination of a market with about 320 million inhabitants. Half our total 
exports go to these countries (Molin: 1988, p.l 0). 
Although increased co-operation with the EC was deemed to be necessary in this 
situation, all contributors agreed on the fact that membership was not on the agenda 
for Swedish trade unions. It was important "to keep national self-detennination in 
certain important economic, social and security policies" (Dahlstrom: 1987, p.6). 
Additionally, it was made clear "that Sweden's nonalignment policy should, of 
course, remain in place" (Molin: 1988, p.ll). Participation in the EMS in order to 
obtain a hard currency policy was the furthest suggestion with respect to integration 
(Olsson: 1988a, p.6). Closer co-operation was to be achieved via the fonnation and 
strengthening of common EFTA-positions (Dahlstrom: 1987. p.7) and via active 
9 GOsta DahlstrOm worked as an economist at the LO. Jan Olsson (Olsson: 1988a) was a researcher 
previously employed by the Metal Workers' Union, Hans Olsson (Olsson: 1988b) was the Head of the 
Research Department at the Metal Workers' Union. and Rune Molin was the Vice Chairman of LO. 
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participation in the discussions within the European Trade Union Confederation . 
(ETUC) and the Council of Nordic Trade Unions (Olsson: 1988~ p.6; Molin: 1988, 
p.ll ). 
These contributions in favour of closer co-operation though not integration 
with the EC showed already at this point arguments, which became so important on 
the pro-EC side of the labour movement later in the debate on membership (see 
Chapter 4, section 3.1). Firstly, the failure of the Keynesian, "old Social Democratic" 
way in France between 1981 and 1983 was pointed out. The labour movement, 
consequently, would require a European vision beyond the national level (Olsson: 
1988a, p.S; Olsson: 1988b, p.8). Secondly, it was argued that a greater degree of 
international trade union co-operation was necessary to counter the co-operation by 
TN Cs and the concentration of international capital, which was especially represented 
in Europe through the emergence of Eurocapitalism (Olsson: 1988~ p.6; Olsson: 
1988b, p.9). Moreover, European co-operation would be necessary in order to 
strengthen Europe's competitiveness vis-a-vis the USA and Japan and, thereby, secure 
Europe's economic well-being (Olsson: 1988b, p.9; Molin: 1988, p.l0). Other 
transnational problems such as pollution, employment and peace would also require 
transnational solutions and, therefore, international co-operation (Olsson: 1988~ p.S). 
Great emphasis was, furthermore, put on the necessity of a continuing development of 
the social dimension complementing the Internal Market (Molin: 1988, p.ll). While a 
transnational, European level was identified as the crucial level of policy-making, 
Swedish achievements were not discarded. Rather, it was pointed out that Sweden 
could contribute positively to European co-operation. "For example, full employment, 
the social welfare safety net and the pivotal role of strong trade unions in the structure 
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of Swedish society are of interest in a broader European perspective" (Olsson: 1988a. 
p.6). Finally, problematic areas of co-operation were identified. The higher Swedish 
work safety and work environment regulations should not be compromised 
(Dahlstrom: 1987, p.5). 
In 1988, the LO Committee on relations with the EC was established. It 
consisted of about 30 members. Each affiliated union was represented by one member 
except for the Municipal Workers' Union, which had two representatives; the other 
members came from the central organisation (Interview No.57; Stockholm, 21111196). 
By 1988, it had been clear that participation in the Internal Market was crucial for the 
Swedish economic development and export, and the Committee, consequently, 
supported unanimously closer co-operation short of full membership and the eventual 
EEA. Full membership, however, was only discussed after the SAP decision. It has to 
be noted that the Committee was not a decision-making body, but an expert group to 
give advice to the LO (Interview No.59; Stockholm, 26/1111996). Issues such as 
labour laws, health and safety regulations related to the adaptation to EC law under an 
EEA-type agreement had been the main concern (Interview No.58; Stockholm, 
2611111996). 
The TCO sensed as early as 1986 that the Internal Market programme implied 
threats to the Swedish economy. Nevertheless, the EEA and not membership appeared 
to be the solution and was never regarded as a mere stepping-stone to full 
membership. The SAP's turnaround in October 1990 came as a total surprise to the 
union (Interview No.40; Stockholm, 1111111996).10 
10 "In June 1990, the chainnan ofTCO ... maintained that a Swedish EC membership would be 
possible" (Luif: 1996. p.212). This should not, however, be exaggerated. It represented the view of an 
individual, although an important one, not the general position of the TCO as such. 
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The SACO hardly engaged in the debate. The relations with the EC were 
considered to be an issue of foreign policy, not a trade union matter. It only responded 
with studies about the effects of membership, after the SAP had announced its 
decision (Interview No.41; Stockholm, 1111111996). Nonetheless, the first trade union 
to demand membership was the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers in May 
1990, an affiliate of the SACO (Luif: 1996, p.112). Its members often occupy high 
positions within the transnational private sector industry and, therefore, represent 
producer interests. They argued that in case of non-membership many jobs would be 
lost and followed the line of the SAP in general (see below) (Interview No.41; 
Stockholm, 1111111996). Overall, the influence of this particular union should not be 
overestimated. As the SACO in general, it has no direct links with political parties 
and, therefore, was not crucial for the SAP position. It does, however, indicate that 
transnational labour was behind the move towards closer co-operation and, eventually, 
integration with the EC. 
To sum up the position of trade unions up to October 1990, it was 
transnational sector unions which first raised the demand for a response to the Internal 
Market programme in 1987, a demand which was in general accepted by both 
transnational and national labour in 1988. From then onwards, especially the LO 
discussed the possible impact resulting from participation in the Internal Market short 
of membership. Membership itself, however, was not on the agenda except for the 
SACO affiliate the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers, and this not before 
May 1990. II Finally, it must be noted that some parts of the labour movement in the 
public sector feared the possible negative impact of closer ties with the EC on the 
II It is often alleged in the literature that a change towards a pro-membership position within the trade 
unions contributed to the SAP's turnaround in 1990 (e.g. lemeck: 1993. p.34; Miles: 1996, p.64). The 
empirical evidence presented here does not corroborate this position. 
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Swedish Model and welfare system even before membership was on the agenda 
(HamiltonlStAlvant: 1989, p.20). This line of division within the trade unions became 
sharper after the SAP's decision to apply for membership (see Chapter 4, section 3.1). 
2.1.2. The position of capital: 
Initially, the Internal Market programme did not capture the attention of Swedish 
capital. Peter Wallenberg for example, President of the SI, was still focusing on the 
USA in 1986 (Interview No.52; Stockholm, 15/1111996). This complacency has to be 
seen against the background of the FTAs and the stagflation of European economies. 
Especially middle-sized companies preferred expanding in the USA to investing in the 
EC (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 15/1111996). In 1987, the picture changed. 
Wallenberg spoke out openly in favour of membership in December and other 
business leaders also made this point via formal and informal political channels 
(Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/1111996). Resistance from within the association, 
however, ensured that the exact form of co-operation was excluded from the official 
document (Luif: 1988, p.191). 
The SI and SAF were careful in their support for membership in order not to 
force the trade unions into a no-position. Membership was perceived as the ultimate 
goal at the time, but it was considered impossible, since the SAP had stated its 
incompatibility with the policy of neutrality. It was, instead, argued that everything 
should be done to ensure that Swedish companies would be able to compete on equal 
terms with their EC counterparts in the Internal Market. How this was achieved, was 
considered to be 8 political question and, thus, the responsibility of the government 
(Interview No.43; Stockholm, 1211 1/1996). The SI feared the loss of markets and 
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companies, which transferred production units and sometimes even their headquarters 
to the EC. Membership was raised in informal discussions with politicians of the 
government before 1989 as the best remedy of this danger, but the pressure was not 
very strong. It was clear that the SAP had to make the eventual decision (Interview 
No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996). 
In sum, and in contrast to Austria, there was no institution of capital, within 
which "organic intellectuals" formulated a pro-membership hegemonic project. Even 
the Verkstadsindustrier, the Association of Swedish Engineering Employers including 
the big mcs, so active in the campaign against central wage-bargaining in the early 
1980s (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3), accepted the Social Democratic hegemony and 
did not initiate a strong campaign towards membership. European integration was 
realised as an issue as important as the wage-formation question with regard to the 
international competitiveness of Swedish engineering industry, but, as it was stated by 
the association, it did not have the capacity to pursue all problems at the same time 
(Interview No.67; Stockholm, 29/1111996). 
The relative political inactivity should not, however, be interpreted as 
inactivity as such. Swedish industry did react towards the Internal Market initiative. 
Swedish mcs realised that they must be part of the Internal Market due to possible 
discriminations and in order to be geographically closer to the consumers of their 
products. As outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.2.1, there had been a drastic rise in 
outward FDI between 1985 and 1990 (see Table No.6, Appendix). This increase in 
FDI went predominantly to the EC. Whereas between 1982 and 1985 only 29.9 per 
cent of outward FDI went to EC countries, the average share between 1988 and 1990 
had risen to 62.1 per cent (see Table No.8, Appendix). This apparent strategy of 
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gaining access to the Internal Market via the transfer of production units to the EC and 
their acquisition within it, is further highlighted by a comparison of the development 
of FDI in the EC with FDI in the USA. Between 1982 and 1986, as shown in Figure 1. 
Swedish FDI in the EC and in the USA developed in a parallel way. Nevertheless, 
"from 1987, the growth of Swedish FDI in the ... [EC] ... has been spectacular, 
whereas FDI in the United States remains more or less constant" 
(BraunerhjelmJOxelheim: 1996, p.l 02). 
Figure 1: Accumulated Swedish FDI in the EC and the USA, 1982-92: deflated by the 
GDP implicit price index (1984 = 100), annual data (Braunerhjelrnl Oxelheim: 1996, 
p.l02): 
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While there were other factors for the increased Swedish FDI in the EC, there is a 
strong indication that "a major cause for this shift was uncertainty about a future 
Swedish ... [EC] ... membership and a fear of Fortress Europe ... " (Braunerhjelm/ 
Oxelheim: 1996, p.114). 
Increased investment abroad did not complement but substitute expansion at 
home, indicating a shift of production to the EC: 
The negative relationship between foreign production and home country 
exports, the weakening of parent R&D, the lack of perceptible technology 
transfers homeward from affiliate R&D and the retreat of productivity at home 
as intra-finn exports shifted towards intennediates and productivity surged in 
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the EC affiliates, are manifestations which strongly suggest that restructuring 
by Swedish ... [TNCs] ... during the late 1980s accentuated the decline of 
industry within Sweden (Andersson et al: 1996, p.126). 
Especially in the knowledge-intensive industries, except for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, investment at home was substituted by FDI (Andersson et al: 1996. 
p.13S; BraunerhjelmlOxelheim: 1996, p.114). Overall, and in comparison with other 
countries outside the EC, Swedish companies were the most aggressive ones in the 
relocation of production (Interview No.6S; Stockholm, 28/1111996). 
A report on the consequences of the EC Internal Market programme for the 
Swedish economy in general and the Swedish Manufacturing Industry in particular, 
commissioned in February 1987 by the SI, had already spelled out the possible need 
for Swedish companies to transfer production units to the EC. It was made clear that 
the changes in the economic structure due to the Internal Market did not only have an 
impact on trade in goods and services. The focus also had to be on long-term 
structural implications (Ohlsson: 1988, pp.12/13). For example, participation in the 
EC's R&D policy, the education and training programmes and special support 
schemes for small- and medium-sized companies was considered to be crucial for the 
structural renewal of the Swedish economy (Ohlsson: 1988, pp.34-44). The same 
argument was put forward for the importance of access to the efficient EC capital 
markets (Ohlsson: 1988, pp.44-S0) and skilled labour of the Internal Market (Ohlsson: 
1988, pp.SO-S3). The report concluded that "it had become clear from the above that 
Swedish membership of the EC would significantly increase our national prosperity. 
This is due to the fact that the structural renewal of industry would be stimulated and 
exports would acquire a more knowledge-intensive character" (Ohlsson: 1988, 
pp.S4/55). 
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All other options short of membership would, instead, imply that the full 
expansion potential of Sweden's most competitive manufactures could not be 
exploited, which might cause a declining standard of living as the price to be paid for 
continuing full employment. In short, while membership was not demanded, it was 
implicitly suggested as the best option. This was underlined with the open threat of 
transferring production units to the EC. The report pointed out that in the run-up to 
1992, companies had to safeguard their market position even before 1992 in order to 
reap the full benefits of the Internal Market. Necessary actions may include company 
acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures and other strategic investments in the EC 
(Ohlsson: 1988, p.1S). The threat was even more direct in the case of the government 
procurement market within the EC (equipment for transport, water supply, energy 
production and distribution, and telecommunications). "The strategic decisions large 
companies will have to make during this period will tend to shift their production base 
into the EC" (Ohlsson: 1988, p.33). Eventually, the high level of FDI in the EC 
became a political statement, since no country can afford to loose its capital 
(Interview No.67; Stockholm, 29/1111996). 
2.1.3. The position of the agricultural sector: 
The internal debate of the LRF started in 1988/89. It was realised that EC membership 
would come sooner or later. Consequently a competitiveness study was commissioned 
in order to evaluate the opportunities of Swedish farmers within the EC. The 
overvalued SKr and too high a cost level due to taxation were identified as problems. 
Apart from that, however, the level of education, skill, technology and productivity in 
Sweden implied that Swedish agriculture was competitive with the most advanced 
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agricultural nations such as Britain and the Netherlands, provided that Swedish 
farmers enjoyed the same competition conditions as their British and Dutch 
counterparts. Equal conditions, however, could only be obtained via membership 
(Interview No.50; Stockholm, 1411111996). 
Simultaneously, the regulated agricultural market in Sweden itself had come 
under criticism. It had been established in 1932 in a deal between the CP, then the 
Agrarian Party, and the SAP. The former accepted unemployment benefit in exchange 
for a guaranteed higher price per litre milk, an arrangement which had also been 
accepted by the other parties later on. During the 1980s, however, the Liberal Party 
left the party consensus and demanded deregulation and the introduction of market 
principles. When the SAP also started to move in this direction, following their active 
restructuring philosophy of sacrificing declining sectors and transferring free labour to 
expanding sectors via an active labour market policy, the LRF recognised that 
deregulation was on the agenda. It responded with a twofold strategy. On the one 
hand, it accepted deregulation but asked for a five-year transition period; on the other, 
it strongly argued in favour ofEC membership. The EC's Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP) suddenly did not only offer a larger market but also higher subsidies 
than the deregulated Swedish market (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 15/11/1996). 
In 1990, the Swedish parliament passed a law on agricultural reform. "A major 
feature of the new policy was to subject the agricultural sector to the free play of 
market forces" (The Swedish Institute: 1995, p.2). In practice, this meant that all 
subsidies were supposed to be phased out between 1991 and 1994. In June of the same 
year, the LRF adopted a decision in favour of membership, which should be reiterated 
each following year (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 14/11/1996). It cannot be said that 
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this decision influenced the SAP. The LRF did not politically lobby parties at this 
time due to the taboo of discussing neutrality, and it had no formal ties with the Social 
Democrats (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 1411111996). With reference to the CP's 
position on the EC, however, the LRF played a crucial role in the years to come (see 
Chapter 4, section 3.3.3). 
2.2. Close economic co-operation without membership: the SAP maintains its 
traditional position: 
The first response to EC-internal discussions about the Internal Market had been the 
so-called Luxembourg Declaration between the EC and EFTA, which included a 
commitment to intensified EC-EFT A relations and the eventual creation of a 
European Economic Space (Gstohl: 1996, pp.49-51). Nevertheless, by 1987/1988, the 
EFTA-countries realised that the process was slow, inadequate and costly, while the 
EC itself had moved rapidly towards the completion of the Internal Market with the 
signing of the SEA in 1986. In an address to a meeting of Swedish ambassadors to 
Western Europe, Anita Gradin, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Trade, described the 
situation as follows: 
What concerns us, however, is that co-operation is progressing too slowly and 
is too narrow in scope. So far the EC-EFT A negotiations have mainly focused 
on the free movement of goods, while the other three freedoms have virtually 
lain fallow as far as the EFTA countries are concerned. And in the mean time, 
as I have said, the pace of internal EC co-operation has been constantly 
accelerating (Gradin: 1988b, p.248). 
Against the background of this development, the SAP government decided at the end 
of 1987 to start a new initiative. This was partly due to pressure by the employer 
associations and transnational sector trade unions, which feared the negative impact of 
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the Internal Market on their sectors, but it also reflected the SAP's historically 
positive attitude towards big business. "What is good for Volvo, is good for Sweden" 
has never been just a saying (Interview No.52; Stockholm, 15/11/1996). This new 
policy was oriented according to two basic principles: 
The Government's policy is oriented towards ensuring that Swedish 
companies will continue to be able to compete on the EC market on equal 
terms with other West European firms. Second, the Government' s positio~ as 
in the past, is that membership is not compatible with our policy of neutrality 
(Gradin: 1987, p.30 1).12 
The new approach, first outlined in the government's bill on "Sweden and West 
European Integration" of December 1987, included a three-fold strategy: "We shall 
further develop the Nordic co-operation, we shall strengthen EFTA at the same time 
as we extend and deepen the co-operation with the EC as far as this is compatible 
with our policy of neutrality" (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 1987, p.S). It 
was acknowledged that the deepening of the co-operation with the EC mainly implied 
the harmonisation of regulations via the adaptation to the Community's existing rules 
(Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 1987, pp.28/29). 
In spring 1988, the government set up a complex institutional structure based 
on this bill. Firstly, a Cabinet Committee on European Affairs was established 
consisting of the Prime Minister, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for Foreign Trade, 
of Finance and of Industry. This Cabinet Committee was part of the wider Council for 
European Affairs, which additionally included high-ranking representatives of 
Swedish business and trade unions, the Governor of the Bank of Sweden and the 
Chancellor of the Swedish Universities. More than 20 working groups were 
12 This position was reiterated in official government declarations and statements by ministers and the 
Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson throughout 1988 and 1989 (e.g. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
1987. pp.16. 26; Gradin: 19888, p.218; Gradin: 1988b. p.246; Swedish Government: 19888, 
pp.2~3!224; Carlsson: 1988. p.230; Carlsson: 1989. pp.137/138). 
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established, which involved all ministries except for the Ministry of Defence. Where it 
was considered to be necessary, advisory groups consisting of interest associations' 
representatives were attached. Vlf Dinkelspiel was designated as Chief Negotiator for 
the negotiations with EFTA and the EC (Swedish Government: 1988b). The main 
goal of these government committees and commissions was to achieve harmonisation 
with EC rules wherever possible (Jacobsson: 1990, p.16). 
At the international level, Sweden worked for a revival of the multilateral EC-
EFTA relations. There are strong indicators that the Swedish and Norwegian Social 
Democratic governments devised in late 1988, together with Delors, the President of 
the EC Commission, the initiative leading to the EEA. It offered the EC to concentrate 
on deepening by avoiding the issue of enlargement and the Nordic EFT A countries 
participation in the Internal Market without membership (Gstohl: 1996, p.56; 
Interview No.52; Stockholm, 15/1111996) (see Chapter 4, section 1.1). Overall, the 
SAP response to the Internal Market initiative resembled the global approach, one of 
the two alternatives to membership discussed in Austria. The Swedish government did 
not adopt the name, because it had already been rejected in Austria, when the 
approach was outlined in Sweden (Interview No.61; Vienna, 26/1111996). 
The government's position showed great similarities with the points raised by 
LO representatives. Firstly, closer co-operation with the EC must not involve the 
deterioration of the environment, weakened worker protection or poorer product 
safety (Gradin: 1987, p.302). According to Gradin, "we wish to maintain our level of 
aspiration as regards workplace safety and health and environmental standards" 
(Gradin: 1990a, p.222). Secondly, increased importance should be attached to the 
development of a social dimension (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 1987. p.6: 
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Swedish Government: 1988a, p.225). Prime Minister Carlsson emphasised that "we 
shall work together for a policy which secures full employment and social security 
within the framework of a free labour market" (Carlsson: 1988, p.231). Gradin 
admitted that there was, for example, slow progress within the EC towards employee 
participation, but she pointed to Delors' initiative of January 1989 towards a new form 
of "social dialogue" between the Union of Industries of the EC (UNlCE) and ETUC 
as a positive sign in this area (Gradin: 1989, p.273). Thirdly, international co-
operation of governments and trade unions would be required in order to overview 
mcs' activities (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 1987, pp.13/14; Gradin: 
1988b, p.251). "Since national economies are already integrated, there needs to be 
political and trade union coordination if welfare objectives are to be safeguarded" 
(Gradin: 1989, p.272). International problems such as pollution, moreover, required 
international solutions (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 1987, p.14). In short, 
while membership was not on the agenda, the arguments, so important in the section 
of the SAP favouring membership later on (see Chapter 4, section 3.3.2), can already 
be identified at this stage. 
In sum, between 1987 and the announcement of application in October 1990, 
the SAP pursued a traditional way of co-operation with the EC: co-operation should 
be as close as possible in order to guarantee the competitiveness of Swedish 
companies, but short of membership to secure Sweden's policy of neutrality and 
sovereignty. While closer economic co-operation was desired, the Swedish Model 
with its developed public sector and generous welfare system was not to be 
compromised. On the contrary. it was considered to be a possible positive 
contribution to West European co-operation. As Carlsson argued ... the fact that some 
193 
EC countries do not have the same well-developed public sector as we do. or that they 
do not pursue a general welfare policy, does not mean that we should adjust and adapt 
to them. And future co-operation will not require this either" (Carlsson: 1989. 140). 
2.3. The political parties in the shadow of Social Democratic hegemony: 
In spring 1988, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Riksdag discussed the 
Government bill "Sweden and West European Integration". In contrast to the bilL 
membership was not excluded as a possibility for all times, but the four party 
comprise of SAP, FP, MS and CP made clear that it was not a matter for the "now" 
forthcoming negotiations with the EC. Co-operation with the EC should be deepened 
and widened as long as this was compatible with neutrality. Harmonisation in the 
areas of environment and work protection was rejected (Luif: 1988, p.190). 
2.3. J. The position of the MS and FP: 
This compromise, more or less along the government's position, further demonstrated 
the SAP's hegemonic position within Sweden. The MS had traditionally been in 
favour of close alignment with the EC. It had demanded membership in its Action 
Programme of November 1984 (Luif: 1988, p.188.), but in May 1987, Carl Bildt, the 
party chairman, spelled out why membership was not on the agenda: "neutrality 
politics requires us to abstain from taking part in binding foreign policy cooperation" 
(quoted in HamiltonlStAlvant: 1989, p.l5). Thus, the MS followed the official SAP 
line in foreign policy. The closest possible relation with the EC short of membership 
was, consequently, the aim and the EEA initiative by Delors in 1989 was deemed to 
be a marvellous opportunity. Nevertheless, this policy was not necessarily a matter of 
194 
conviction. It was rather a careful strategy by Bildt not to lock the SAP in a no-
position, similar to SAF's and the SI's strategy towards the trade unions (Interview 
No.Sl; Stockholm, IS/1111996). 
The FP similarly perceived that the eventual decision for membership had to 
come from the hegemonic SAP and, therefore, did not demand membership openly 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. It also favoured the closest 
possible relation to the EC short of membership. Some people in the MS but also the 
FP had argued even before 1989 that membership was compatible with neutrality, but 
the parties did not officially adopt this position. The SAP had often used such 
statements to accuse its opponents of being not trustworthy in foreign policy and of 
neglecting the Swedish "holy grail" of neutrality. As the majority of the population 
held neutrality in a similar high esteem, this was an electorally impossible position 
(Interview No.SS; Stockholm, 19/1111996; Andren: 1991, p.7S; Luif: 1996, p.141). 
This position, however, changed immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989. Bengt Westerberg, the FP chairman, stated that "my conclusion as 
a Social Liberal and internationalist ... is that it is desirable for Sweden, without 
abandoning its neutrality policy, to become a full-fledged member of the European 
Community before the end of this century" (quoted in Lindmarker: 1991, p.3). This 
was not only the result of economic concerns, but also the expression of a strong 
internationalist direction of the FP, which favoured the creation of peace via 
international co-operation (Interview No.SS; Stockholm, 19/1111996). In May 1990, 
Westerberg was even more precise and demanded that Sweden should apply for 
membership during the parliamentary period of 1991-1994. "Only by joining the EC 
could Sweden participate in EC decision-making" (Luif: 1996, p.211). Bildt and the 
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MS followed immediately with the same demand. The MS had already been 
extremely unhappy with the process of the EEA negotiations in January 1990. It had 
realised that the EEA would never provide Sweden with co-decision making powers. 
Hence, Sweden would eventually have to choose between membership or remaining 
outside the EC and, thereby, endanger the Swedish ruCs' position forcing them to 
become European. From this point onwards, the EEA was merely seen as a stepping-
stone towards eventual full membership (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 15/1111996). 
Additionally, together with the FP, the MS demanded a study whether 
membership was possible and whether it was compatible with neutrality. This study 
"brought new ideas into the debate" (Luif: 1996, p.207). Neutral Ireland was pointed 
out as an example. The EC could, alternatively, accept Sweden without a neutrality 
reservation, provided there was an informal decision by the EC heads of state to 
acquiesce in Sweden's foreign policy status. Simultaneously, Sweden could adopt a 
more pragmatic definition of neutrality. Eventually, security may even require 
membership one day. To conclude, the change in the European security environment 
removed all hesitations of the MS and FP to demand application for membership. The 
final decision, however, still remained with the SAP. 
2.3.2. The position o/the CP: 
The CP was also part of the party compromise in spring 1988. It totally accepted the 
SAP's position that membership was incompatible with neutrality. The Internal 
Market programme had only initiated a debate about an EEA-type solution and the 
party compromise promised exactly this (Interview No.42; Stockholm, 11/11/1996). 
Furthermore. the CP uapparentJy wishing to emphasize an all-European perspective. 
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has criticized the EC among other things for maintaining high tariff walls and has 
focused its attention on alternative European organizations such as the CSCE ... 
[Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] ... and the ECE (the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe)" (Lindmarker: 1991, p.6). Representing 
environmental and agricultural interests, it, fmally, supported the maintenance of a 
self-supplying system and environmental and food standards, which it regarded as 
being endangered by EC membership (Luif: 1988, pp.189/190). On the basis of this 
position, the party reacted angrily towards the FP and MS suggestion in May 1990 to 
apply for membership. "According to the Center Party interpretation, the Moderates 
and Liberals wished to weaken Sweden's position in the upcoming ... [EEA] ... 
negotiations" (Lindmarker: 1991, p.6). 
2.3.3. The position o/the VP and GP: 
Both the VP and the GP fiercely opposed membership and even closer co-operation 
with the EC along the lines of the EEA. They rejected the party compromise of spring 
1988 and were to maintain their position right through to the referendum in 1994. The 
VP regarded "the EC as a capitalist organization, finnly tied to the Western military 
alliance. Close Swedish links with the EC are therefore incompatible with Swedish 
neutrality and with the task of ensuring social justice in Swedish society" (Viklund: 
1989, p.41). The main arguments against membership or closer co-operation with the 
EC were the implied threat to Sweden's welfare system and its objective of full 
employment, the democratic deficit at the EC level and the threat to Sweden's 
parlianlentary sovereignty (Interview No.38: Stockholm, 08/11/1996). "As 
alternatives to Swedish EC membership or far-reaching adaptation to EC practices. 
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the VP made such suggestions as greater Nordic cooperation, broadening the 
membership of EFTA and expanding the Council of Europe into' a real European 
Parliament '" (Lindmarker: 1991, p.7). In short, national sovereignty should be 
preserved as much as possible to pursue an independent economic policy with the 
goal of full employment (Interview No.38; Stockholm, 08/1111996). 
The OP for its part rejected close co-operation with the EC because of (1) the 
latter's lower environmental standards - Sweden had higher standards especially in the 
chemical sector - (2) the EC's democratic deficit - the GP favoured the 
decentralisation of decision-making to the 10ca1level over the regulation by 
supranational institutions in Brussels - (3) neutrality, which was considered to be not 
merely a Cold War concept and (4) the EC's fortress character to countries outside the 
EC; a tendency, which the party saw enhanced via the internal removal of trade 
barriers (Interview No.45; Stockholm, 1211111996; Interview No.70; Stockholm, 
03/12/1996). "At the root of this argument is a hostility to the philosophy of growth" 
(Lindmarker: 1991, p.7), which was thought to be incompatible with an 
environmentally-friendly and sustainable way of life. The "no" to a closer relation 
with the EC, however, was not of a nationalist nature. Instead, the GP looked for some 
kind of flexible international co-operation beyond the EC and a security regime based 
on the CSCE, of which the tasks included threats beyond the military sphere such as 
pollution (Interview No.70; Stockholm, 03/1211996). In 1990, the party launched the 
newspaper "Critical EU Facts", which provided information about the EC and became 
later the newspaper of the group "No to the EU" before and during the referendum 
campaign (Interview No.45; Stockholm, 1211111996). Overall. "the reasons for both 
parties' anti- ... [EC] ... stances converged and were based around similar concerns for 
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Swedish independence, solidarity with the Third World and scepticism over the future 
democratic control of the ... [EC] '" structures" (Widfeldt: 1996, p.113). It should also 
be noted that especially the VP had already pointed at this stage of the debate to the 
possible negative impact of membership on the Swedish Model; an argument, which 
was to become important in the later debate on membership (see Chapter 4, section 3). 
2.4. The SAP's 1990 turn-around: 
The SAP announcement of its intention to apply for membership in parliament on 26 
October 1990 came as a surprise and shock to the other parties, trade unions and 
employers' associations. It was one point of an economic crisis package and read as 
follows: 
Swedish membership of the EC with continued adherence to Sweden's policy 
of neutrality is in our national interest ... ; the Government is seeking a new 
parliamentary decision on European policy which defines more clearly and in 
more positive terms Sweden's ambitions of becoming a member of the 
European Communities (Swedish Government: 1990, p.306). 
In the literature, several reasons are identified for the turnaround. Firstly, the 
traditional economic argument states that Sweden had to be a member because of its 
trade dependence on the EC. Secondly, the severe economic crisis, which hit Sweden 
in early 1990, convinced SAP-leaders that Sweden could not any longer afford to stay 
outside (Miles: 1996, p.63). Thirdly, according to Miles, "the most influential factor 
in changing Swedish policy was governmental frustration at the slowness of the ... 
EEA negotiations and the limitations of any future EEA agreement" (Miles: 1996, 
p.64). The fact that the EFTA countries could only influence the decision-shaping but 
not the decision-making led them into a dilemma: "the more extensive the substance 
of the economic integration offered to them in the Luxembourg and EEA processes. 
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the more national legislative autonomy they had to renounce and the more important it 
became to gain some influence in the decision-making process" (Gstohl: 1996, p.61). 
In short, accession implied the trading of sovereignty for voice. Moreover, the change 
in the international security structure after the fall of the Berlin Wall is identified as a 
reason. The end of the Cold War increased the freedom of action of neutral countries 
such as Sweden and, "suddenly, neutrality was more a hindrance for international 
influence than an asset" (Pedersen: 1994, p.124). Finally, electoral reasons may have 
played a role. "Polls taken in May 1990 indicated a clear majority in favour, with only 
21 per cent opposed to membership and 20 per cent undecided" (Huldt: 1994, p.119). 
The SAP performed badly in polls and was put under pressure by the FP and MS, 
which indicated their intention to make application an issue of the 1991 general 
elections campaign. 
The first argument about trade dependence, although relevant, is of secondary 
importance, considering that the transnationalisation of production has increasingly 
become Sweden's main link with the global economy (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1). 
In contrast to Austria, trade is far less important for the Swedish organisation of 
production. Moreover, although imports from the EC increased from 48.2 per cent in 
1981 to 55.2 per cent in 1990 and exports to the EC rose from 45.7 per cent to 54.2 
per cent during the same period (see Table No.13, Appendix), this change in trade 
flows was rather undramatic and does not indicate why a drastic turnaround was 
suddenly required in October 1990. The security argument is dealt with in Chapter 5, 
section 3 in more detail, but it can be stated here that, while it was a necessary 
background condition to allow the SAP to change its course, it did not push the SAP 
towards application. 
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The point about dissatisfaction with the lack of influence on policy-making in 
the EEA treaty has some validity. Delors had twice rejected joint decision-making in 
January and April 1990 (Luif: 1996, pp.155-157) and intervie\vees cited it as one of 
the reasons (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 1211111996; Interview No.52; 15/11/1996). 
At the same time, it should not be overestimated in significance. Although there had 
been discussions between EC and EFTA representatives beforehand, the formal 
negotiations did not commence before 20 June 1990 and were concluded on 22 
October 1991. Consequently, the exact position with reference to co-decision making 
could not have been known in October 1990. In a report to parliament about the EEA 
process in January 1990 and a statement to the Council of Europe's Committee of 
Ministers in May 1990, Gradin did not voice any concern about a possible lack of 
decision-making influence (Gradin: 1990a and 1990b). In an address to a youth 
seminar on Europe in September 1990, she pointed to the problem that the EC wanted 
to retain decision-making autonomy while the EFTA countries sought some kind of 
participation, but still concluded optimistically: "I am convinced that, given political 
good will and a little inventiveness, it will be possible to reconcile these two aims" 
(Gradin: 1990c, p.266). This was not the expression of deep disappointment making a 
policy change necessary. 
The same limited importance can be attributed to the argument that the SAP 
changed its policy for electoral reasons. Undoubtedly, its rating in polls was low and 
the general elections of 1991 loomed large on the horizon. To jump on the EC 
bandwagon must have been tempting in order to tap the voters, who were in a large 
majority in favour of membership against the background of a Europe-euphoria after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nonetheless, the possible electoral gain had to be 
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counterbalanced by a possible rift through the party, which actually happened during 
the referendum campaign (see Chapter 4, section 3.3.2). 
This leaves the Swedish economic crisis in the changed international structures 
occasioned by globalisation as the last possible reason for application. A tentative 
reconstruction of the SAP-internal process leading to the announcement on 
application may help to clarify the relevance of this factor. The SAP members were 
surprised about the turnaround. There had neither been an internal party debate,13 nor 
a clear position within the party leadership. 14 The first crucial point was most likely 
the economic crisis in February 1990 and the defeat of the government's crisis 
package in parliament (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). Although a reformed SAP 
government took office shortly afterwards, this must have left a strong impression. 
The SAP had lost its self-confidence to be able to regulate the Swedish economy. The 
believe that there was a "third way" between old-style Keynesianism and conservative 
neo-liberalism vanished. As early as 1986, the Finance Ministry had warned that the 
economy was going to overheat. It failed, however, to convince the other ministers 
and the Prime Minister that it was necessary to cool the economy via, for example, 
higher interest rates. The consequence was the crash in the late 1980s, early 1990 
which required the February crisis package. Being aware of its inability to control the 
economy, the Finance Ministry strongly pushed for membership within the 
Il SAP sources deny the charge that there had been no debate. Apparently, Ingvar Carlsson attempted 
to start a debate on application at the annual party conference in September 1990, but when he arrived 
15 minutes late. the debate was already over. Party members had just not been interested (Interview 
No.48; Stockholm, 14/11/1996). It is also pointed to two articles by Carlsson in the daily newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter on 27 May and 5 July 1990, written with the alleged intention of slowly moving the 
position. Both articles, however, did not lead to a widespread response (Interview No.52; Stockholm. 
15/11/1996). 
14 In his introduction to a parliamentary debate on Europe on 10 October 1996, Sten Andersson, the 
Minister for foreign AfTairs~ stated that "in a more long-tenn perspective, the question of membership 
may become relevant" (Andersson: 1990, p.95). Then, however, he added five reasons why this was 
too early for the moment. "They had to do with Swedish unity. the time process, the security situation, 
the negotiating situation and the Ee's discussion of a political union" (Lindmarker: 1991. p.S). 
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government (Interview No.49.; Stockholm, 14/1111996; Interview No.60; Stockholm 
26/1111996), probably from March onwards. By summer 1990, it is likely that the 
decision was taken. 
The eventual timing was due to the renewed pressure on the SKr and the 
rumours about an imminent currency devaluation in October (Interview No.52; 
Stockholm, 1511111996; Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/1111996). The longer-term 
reasons were the ongoing capital flight of Swedish TNCs to the EC, the government's 
loss of economic credibility and rising unemployment (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 
12/1111996). Application was the attempt to refer a "sound" economic policy to 
supranational restrictions and to have a scapegoat for harsh domestic policy measures 
(Interview No.49; Stockholm, 1411111996). It was a way of regaining economic 
credibility and stability, budgetary discipline and a structural reform of the economy. 
The official position was that Sweden's austerity policy was the result of a sovereign 
national decision. Nevertheless, there is some truth in the point that application was 
regarded as a way of introducing greater discipline (Interview No.68; Stockholm, 
02/12/1996). 
The idea of application emerged as a joint effort of the Finance Ministry and 
the Prime Ministers' Office (Interview No.68; Stockholm, 02/1211996). This was 
supported by the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Agriculture. The 
Ministries of Labour and of Social Affairs were sceptical, because they feared that 
membership would restrict the policy-making autonomy in their sectors (Interview 
No.49; Stockholm, 14/11/1996). They were not, however, asked for their opinion 
before the announcement in parliament on 26 October 1990 (Interview No.68; 
Stockholm. 0211211996). To conclude, the turnaround of the SAP was the result of a 
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perception that the economic problems could only be dealt with through application to 
the EC. It was taken by very few people within the SAP leadership and government. It 
did not express the opinion of the SAP as a party and the later divisions within the 
party should prove this. 
The MS and FP, but also the employers' associations reacted positively. They 
had pressed for application since May 1990. The GP and VP, unsurprisingly, opposed 
application and voted against it in parliament on 12 December 1990. For the SAP and 
trade unions, it was the start of the internal debates. They had been totally surprised 
and there was some disenchantment within the LO that it had not been consulted 
beforehand, as it used to be the case in such drastic decisions as application (Interview 
No.46; Stockholm, 13/1111996). The CP faced the biggest problems. As everybody 
else, the party had been surprised by the SAP's decision and it was unhappy that there 
was no time for an internal party debate. In November 1990, an extended party 
committee meeting was convened to debate application. It had already become clear at 
this point that there was a majority in favour of application within the party executive 
and parliamentary group, while a majority of the members opposed it. Even within the 
party leadership, however, the situation was not clear-cut. The CP representative 
voted in favour of the party compromise on application in the parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Committee on 22 November 1990, but a proper discussion of this move within 
the leadership is doubtful (Interview No.42; Stockholm, 1111111996). 
The parliamentary decision of 12 December 1990 was based on this 
compromise which stated: 
Sweden should strive to become a member of the European Community, while 
maintaining its neutrality policy. Only as an EC member can our country fully 
participate in, and influence. European Community cooperation. After an 
overall assessment of foreign and security policy aspects. and after 
consultation in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. the government 
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~hould be in a position to submit a Swedish application for membership. In the 
Judgment of the Committee, this can occur during 1991 (quoted in 
Lindmarker: 1991, p.S). 
In the parliamentary vote on this report, 287 members of the SAP, MS, FP and CP 
voted in favour, the 40 members of the Green and the Left Party against (Luif: 1996, 
p.217). On 1 July 1991, Prime Minister Carlsson submitted the application to the EC 
in Brussels. 
3. Conclusion: 
In Austria, a historic bloc in favour of application and membership was firmly 
established by June 1989. The hegemonic project, devised by organic intellectuals of 
internationally-oriented capital located in the VOl, was based on economic neo-
liberalism and the idea that neutrality was compatible with membership. It provided 
the basis for an alliance of internationally-oriented capital and labour, which gained 
control of the two governing parties and the social partners. Similarly, in Sweden, 
transnational social forces of capital and labour demanded a closer relationship with 
the EC and Internal Market initiative. Nevertheless, it was the SAP's decision that 
membership was incompatible with neutrality, which prevented any debate on 
membership between 1987 and 1990. This hegemony was expressed in the SAP's 
predominant position in parliament, its leading role in defining the public discourse, 
but also in the acceptance by the opposition parties and employers' associations that it 
was the SAP, which ultimately determined whether membership was possible. 
Consequently. transnational capital represented by the SL SAF, the MS and FP 
acquiesced to the EEA-type solution as the next best option until more was possible. 
When the SAP eventually decided on application in October 1990, there had been 
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neither time nor effort to form an alliance of social forces. Of course, the 
representatives of transnational capital immediately supported the move, but there had 
been no discussions within the labour movement be that within the SAP or the various 
trade unions. The real struggle was still to come. 
Another significant difference was the lack of an institution in Sweden, similar 
to the Austrian VOl, which provided the platform for "organic intellectuals" to form a 
pro-membership bloc. The reason, here too, must at least partly be sought in the 
SAP's hegemonic position. It was difficult to mount a challenge to the predominant 
view that membership was incompatible with neutrality. Nevertheless, this does not 
suffice as an explanation. The discussion of the restructuring of the Swedish state in 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.3 demonstrated that capital had succeeded in undermining the 
Swedish Model in an organised, long-term effort led by the SAF. A similar project 
could theoretically have been started with reference to EC membership. The Swedish 
production structure provides an additional factor, why this did not happen. In contrast 
to Austria, dominated by small- and medium-sized firms, Sweden had been 
characterised by large lNCs. While Austria had participated in globalisation mainly 
through exports and imports of goods and services, Swedish lNCs played an active 
part in the transnationalisation of production. These lNCs simply did not have to 
bother with mounting a political challenge to the SAP's anti-membership course. 
They had the structural option to transfer investment and production units to the EC 
and, thereby, counter possible threats of exclusion. The deregulation of the financial 
markets from 1985 onwards and the abolition of exchange controls in 1989 had 
removed the last barriers against this strategy.'s The TNCs' continuing rising FDI to 
IS It is correctly pointed out that the abolition of exchange rate controls did not affect the amount of 
outgoing FDI by Swedish TNCs. They had always been in a privileged position and. although 
regulations were in place. outward and inward FDI had been allowed to flow freely (Intervie\\' No 17; 
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the EC in 1989 and 1990 showed that they were not convinced about the viability of 
the SAP's EEA-strategy. Eventually, this was one of the major reasons why the SAP 
decided on application. The flight of capital was no longer sustainable. Austrian 
internationally-oriented capital, on the other hand, did not have this option at its 
disposal due to its domestic production structure. A carefully prepared and carried out 
political strategy was, therefore, the only possibility to achieve application. 
A third difference was the position of the agricultural sector. Whereas 
membership was largely opposed in Austria despite its leadership's positive position, 
agriculture was one of the first in Sweden to demand application. This, again, can be 
explained by the different production structure. The agricultural sector in Austria was 
heavily protected against the EC and world markets and, therefore, nationally-
oriented. Membership implied deregulation and restructuring. In Sweden, on the other 
hand, the 1990 agricultural reform signified that the whole sector was going to be 
deregulated and restructured in any case due to the phasing-out of all subsidies and the 
concomitant lowering of the price level to world market prices. In this situation, 
membership and the adjustment to the CAP implied more subsidies and higher prices 
for Swedish farmers. Consequently, while they were not really internationally-
oriented, they could be regarded as European-oriented social forces as a result of the 
particular production structure in their sector and the CAP. 
The similarities of the two cases should not, however, be overlooked because 
of these differences. In both countries, transnational and/or intemationally-oriented 
social forces were the driving force behind the bid for application in Austria and close 
co-operation in Sweden. In Austria. the pro-EC forces were supported by those 
Stockholm. 7111/1996). Nonetheless. it should also be noted that. while in place. these controls 
pennitted the government. at least in theory. to stop capital flight. To abolish controls was, thus. a 
conscious decision to drop this option. 
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national institutions, which were liked to the global economy, most notably the 
Finance Ministry, the Economic Ministry and the ANB. Within the cabinet in 
Sweden, the Cabinet Committee on European Affairs, established in spring 1988. 
consisted of the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for Foreign 
Trade, of Finance and of Industry. In other words, the ministries linked to the global 
economy were also at the centre of decision-making in Sweden, while ministries such 
as the Ministries of Labour and of Social Affairs, which deal with national problems. 
were excluded. Furthermore, when membership came on the agenda, at least in the 
inner cabinet circle, it was the Finance Ministry together with the Prime Ministers' 
Office, which had initiated the move and were the driving force towards application. 
In short, despite their different strategies, transnational and/or internationally-oriented 
capital and labour together with the national institutions linked to the global economy 
pressed for closer co-operation and/or integration with the EC in both countries during 
the process leading to application. 
The formation of opposition to application and, thereby, EC membership was 
slow in both countries. In Sweden, without a decision on application, there was, of 
course, nothing to mobilise against. Even in Austria, however, anti-EC forces took 
until the second half of 1988, early 1989, before first coherent movements had been 
formed. By then, it had been almost too late to influence the decision making process 
within the social partners and governing parties. Nevertheless, the struggles around 
the referenda to be discussed in the next Chapter, gave these forces a second chance. 
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Chapter 4; Another chance; the struggles around the referenda in Austria and 
Sweden. 
In Austria, the social forces in favour of membership had formed a coherent historic 
bloc and won a first major struggle in bringing about application. Nevertheless, this 
did not imply membership. "Total revisions" of the constitution need to be put before 
the population in a referendum according to Article 44. The outcome is binding for 
the decision-makers. "Austria's accession to the ... [EC] ... in 1995 implied a 'total 
revision' of the constitution and thus required a referendum ... (MUller: 1996a, p.25). 
Consequently, the social forces against the EC were offered a second chance to 
prevent membership. 
By contrast, there had been no big debate in Sweden. It was the SAP's 
decision in October 1990, which led to application. At about the same time, it was 
decided to put the final decision on membership before the population. "Although 
referendums in Sweden are technically only advisory, the political parties agreed in 
advance to honor the outcome of the EC vote, regardless of their own views on the EC 
issue" (Berg: 1994, p.2). During the following years, a debate started and groups for 
and against membership were formed. The referendum, thus, offered the opportunity 
to reject accession to the EC in Sweden, too. 
This chapter predominantly deals with the debates before the referendum in 
the two countries. Section 2 looks at the strengthening of the Austrian historic bloc in 
favour of membership and the opposed social forces' attempt to muster a majority 
against the EC. The formation of alliances of social forces in Sweden is the concern of 
section 3. Section 4 concludes the chapter with a comparison of the two countries. 
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Before, however, section 1 provides the background by examining briefly the impact 
of the EEA and the Maastricht Treaty. It also presents a short overview of the 
negotiations and discusses their position within the whole process of accession. 
1. From the EEA via Maastricht and membership negotiations to the referenda: 
1.1. The EEA: a stepping-stone towards membership. 
In 1988/89, the Commission of the EC had the completion of the Internal Market, not 
enlargement as its first priority. It was, however, realised that the EC had to offer the 
EFTA countries some kind of participation in the Internal Market. In January 1989, 
Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, took the initiative and proposed a 
strengthening of the ties between the EC and the EFT A countries. "He suggested 
looking for 'a new, more structured partnership with common decision-making and 
administrative institutions' on the basis of the 'two pillars' of the EC and a 
strengthened EFTA" (Gstohl: 1996, p.55). The new treaty for a EEA was supposed to 
allow the EFTA countries participation in the economic gains of the Internal Market 
short of membership. Thus, the aspiration of the pro-EC forces in Austria for an early 
start of membership negotiations was not met by the EC, but there was little else to do 
at this stage than to participate in the EEA talks. In Sweden, Delors' initiative was 
well received. It exactly corresponded to the SAP's position on Europe and indeed, as 
it was pointed out in Chapter 3, section 2.2, there were strong hints that the Swedish 
Social Democrats co-masterminded the new approach. Formal negotiations were 
opened in June 1990, dragged on until 22 October 1991, and were finally signed in 
Oporto on 2 May 1992, after some revisions had been made in order to satisfy the 
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ECJ's rejection of a separate EEA Court. Eventually, the EEA came into force on I 
January 1994.1 
The results of the treaty confinned the conviction of the pro-EC Austrian 
forces that full participation in the Internal Market was only possible via membership. 
Firstly , EFTA countries did not obtain co-decision making powers. "The EC will 
retain its institutional autonomy. EFTA countries can only influence the legislative 
process during the decision-shaping stage" (Laursen: 1993, p.125). They had no right 
to initiate legislation, only a collective EFTA opt-out of new legislation was possible, 
they gained merely restricted access to EC committees, and the common rules of the 
EEA were those of the Community's acquis (Gstohl: 1994, pp.358/359). Additionally, 
an EFT A Surveillance Authority and Court of Justice were set up and EEA law gained 
primacy over national law. In short, EFTA countries lost some degree of national 
sovereignty without gaining a say at the supranational level. 
Furthennore, the EEA also implied significant economic losses in comparison 
with membership.2 Full participation in the Internal Market was not obtained, and 
since the EEA was no customs union, border controls remained in place and 
certificates of origin were still required (Woschnagg: 1994, p.7). The Common 
Commercial Policy, the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policy, Euratom and 
direct and indirect taxation were not part of the EEA Treaty either (Gstohl: 1996, 
p.58). In the Austrian case, it was particularly damaging that the problem of the 
"passiver Veredelungsverkehr" (passive across the border processing) - this issue had 
become even more important since the association agreements between the EC and 
I For a detailed account of the EEA negotiations. see Luif: 1996. pp.151-168 and Norberg et al: 1993. 
rp·53-69. 
It is sometimes incorrectly argued that the step from the EEA to membership implied only small 
additional economic gains (e.g. GstOhl: 1994, p.334). 
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Eastern European countries - so dear to the export-oriented Austrian sectors (see 
Chapter 3, section 1.2.1) was not settled. The discriminations led to a decrease in 
Austrian exports by 5 per cent in 1993 (Interview No.18; Vienna, 22/05/1995), which 
amounted to more than one per cent of the Austrian GOP (VOl: 1994, pp.29/30). 
Thus, it is not surprising that the sectors affected such as the textile industry 
(Interview No.24; Vienna, 24/04/1996) continued pressing for membership, and that 
the VOl (Interview No.1 8; Vienna, 22/05/1995; VOl: 1991; VOl: 1992) and the BWK 
(BWK: 1992, pp.468/469) regarded the EEA only as a transitionary stage towards fujI 
membership. In any case, by deciding on application in June 1989 despite the Oelors 
initiative of January in the same year, this had always been the position of the 
Austrian bloc in favour of EC membership and was, therefore, also supported by the 
OGB and the AK (Interview No.1; Vienna, 08/05/1995). 
In Sweden too, by the time the EEA Treaty had been signed, it was only 
considered to be a transitionary arrangement. Vif Oinkeispiel, the Swedish Minister 
for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, made this clear in a parliamentary briefmg 
on the EEA agreement on 24 October 1991. "As far as Sweden is concerned", he 
stated, "it will very appreciably strengthen our cooperation with the EC and is thus an 
important step towards Swedish membership of the Community" (Oinkelspiel: 1991, 
p.269). The lack of political co-decision making power was deplored and economic 
disadvantages were pointed out. The LRF was unhappy about the exclusion of the 
agricultural sector (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 14/1111996), while the SI rejected 
the remaining border controls and the exclusion of public procurement. Sweden had 
several companies in this sector and the EEA did not allow them to participate in the 
Internal Market (Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996). The SI calculated that 
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membership would imply savings of close to 0.5 per cent of GDP in comparison to 
the EEA, because it "abolishes border formalities, certificates of origin, prepayment of 
VAT, and reduces trade-related compliance costs in firms" (Wijkman: 1995, p.7). 
Finally, it was argued by representatives of capital and labour that inward FDI was 
unlikely to go to Sweden in the case of the EEA, since it did not guarantee complete 
access to the Internal Market (Interview No.66; Stockholm, 29/1111996; Interview 
No.67; Stockholm, 29/1111996; Wijkman: 1995, pp.9-11). In short, even from a 
strictly economic point of view, the EEA did not represent an alternative to 
membership for the pro-EC groups in Austria and Sweden. 
1.2. The Treaty of Maastricht: accession business as usual. 
When the negotiations came finally into sight, the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 
December 1991 had changed the EC once more. It consisted now of three pillars, the 
pillar for justice and home affairs, the pillar for a CFSP, and the one consisting of the 
original EC. Additionally, EMU was incorporated into the latter pillar. 
At first sight, one should assume that these changes made Austrian and 
Swedish pro-EC forces rethink their position and restart the debate about membership. 
Especially the project of a CFSP, further threatening the countries' neutrality, and 
EMU, forcing them to give up their monetary sovereignty and to adopt a budgetary 
policy of austerity via the neo-liberal convergence criteria, could be causes of concern. 
Nonetheless, nothing of this kind happened. 
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1.2.1. The Austrian reaction: 
In a declaration on the occasion of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the Austrian 
Foreign Minister Mock welcomed the agreement on EMU pointing out that Austria 
was already fulfilling the convergence criteria and would, thus, contribute to the 
achievement of this goal. He also confrrmed that Austria would "participate in the 
common foreign and security policy in an active and solidaristic way" [translation by 
the author] (Aussenministerium: 1992, p.114). An aide-memoir with the same 
message was sent to the Commission and member governments by the Austrian 
government shortly before the European Council meeting in Lisbon in June 1992 
(Bundesregierung: 1992, pp.131-134). In both cases, it was asked for a possibly early 
start of the negotiations. With reference to the CFSP, the official position of the 
Foreign Ministry was that it had a purely intergovernmental nature and was, therefore, 
compatible with Austria's neutrality (Interview No.2; Vienna, 09/05/1995). The SPO 
shared this position (Interview No.4; Vienna, 09/05/1995}.3 
The loss of monetary sovereignty posed even a less severe problem, as Austria 
had given it up long time ago by pegging the AS to the DM and by fully liberalising 
its financial markets (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.2). Moreover, a single currency was 
favoured by all social forces of the pro-EC historic bloc, since this would prevent 
countries such as Italy - next to Gennany the most important Austrian trading partner 
within the EC - from boosting their exports via devaluations on the shoulders of 
countries with a strong currency such as Austria (see Interviews). However, the 
convergence criteria presented a problem. On the one hand, the ANB (Interview 
lOne interviewee. however, pointed out that it would have been much more difficult to achieve a 
majority in favour of application. if the CFSP had been in place two and a half years earlier (Interview 
No.2S; Vienna. 25104/1996). See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the issue of neutrality in the 
cases of Austria and Sweden. 
~14 
No.16; Vienna, 18/05/1995) and the VOl (Interview No.18; Vienna, 22105/1995) 
considered the fulfilment of the convergence criteria to be necessary in any case in 
order to consolidate the budget. The Finance Ministry regarded them as a help for its 
budgetary policy of austerity due to the possibility of transferring responsibility for 
economic and social hardship to Brussels (Interview No.7; Vienna, 11105/1995). On 
the other hand, the employees' associations were disappointed about the missing 
European social dimension in the convergence criteria and the Maastricht Treaty as a 
whole. Nevertheless, OGB President Verzetnitsch concluded that this made Austria's 
membership even more urgent, as one could participate in the decision-making 
process only as a member (OGB: 1991). Additionally, there were some voices within 
the AK and the 6GB, which demanded the adding of an unemployment criteria 
(Interview No.1; Vienna, 08/05/1995; Interview No.22; Vienna, 23/04/1996; 
Sallmutter: 1993, p.166). Membership as such, however, was not rejected. To sum up, 
despite the problems for the Austrian trade unions with the convergence criteria, the 
Treaty of Maastricht did not pose new problems for the pro-EC groups and the hopes 
were set on the start of the negotiations. 
1.2.2. The Swedish reaction: 
In Sweden, the Maastricht Treaty did not have a massive impact on the debate either. 
On 11 December 1991, shortly after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, Carl 
Bildt (MS), the new Swedish Prime Minister, released a statement, in which he 
welcomed the results of the meeting at Maastricht. In particular, he stated that 
"Sweden will actively participate in the foreign policy and security cooperation which 
has now been decided at Maastricht ... [and that] ... Sweden wishes to participate in 
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the task of successively realizing economic and monetary union as soon as possible" 
(Bildt: 1991 b, p.117). Against the background of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
break-up of the Eastern Bloc, neutrality had not been abandoned, but redefmed. 
Participation in the CFSP was regarded as one way of contributing to the 
establishment of a post-Cold War European security order (see Chapter 5, section 3). 
Both peak trade union organisations LO and TCO were disappointed about the neo-
liberal convergence criteria of EMU, perceived to make the combat of unemployment 
more difficult. The lack of democratic control of the ESCBs was also criticised (see 
below). Nonetheless, the pro-EC forces argued during the debate that this was a 
question, which was to be decided later and should, therefore, be treated separately 
from the issue of EC membership. This strategy was successful and there was no 
debate about amending the convergence criteria before accession. Only after the 
referendum, when the date for the decision of the country's participation in the third 
and final step of EMU came closer, EMU in general and the convergence criteria in 
particular, became an issue. 
The EC' s emphasis on deepening integration postponed the start of accession 
negotiations. Eventually, it took until the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in 
December 1992, when the question of the future financing of the Community was 
settled and it looked as if the Treaty of Maastricht could be ratified soon, that the go-
ahead for negotiations was given. 
216 
1.3. The negotiations in Brussels: bargaining in view of the referenda. 
1.3.1 The Austrian negotiation position: 
The official opening of the EC's negotiations with Austria and Sweden was on 1 
February 1993. In a joint report to the cabinet on 21 January 1993, Chancellor 
Vranitzky and Foreign Minister Mock outlined Austria's negotiation position 
(Bundeskanzleramtl Aussenministerium: 1993). Apart from preferably low 
contributions to the EC and the participation in structural fund money, the individual 
points reflected the compromise of the historic bloc of 1989. Austria's neutral status 
was mentioned in combination with a reiteration of its commitment to the CFSP. The 
right to maintain its environmental standards, higher than in the EC, its social 
standards and the continuation of the transit agreement with the EC of 1991 were part 
of the position as were demands for special provisions in the area of agriculture in 
order to keep Austria's particular structure of small- and medium-sized farms across 
the whole country. In support of this, a transitionary period in the adaptation to the 
rules of the CAP and for the closely related food processing industry was asked for 
plus financial restructuring aid paid by the EC. Finally, the issue of EC citizens 
buying secondary residences in Austria was identified as important, especially in the 
rural areas. 
The points of this list can be related to the demands of the various groups in 
favour of membership. Neutrality was mainly the response to the Spa having it made 
a precondition of their support for application four years earlier, but it also reflected 
the concern about the looming referendum. When, opinion polls during the period 
between October 1988 and May/June 1992 asked whether people would give up 
neutrality or EC membership in case of their incompatibility, between 64 per cent and 
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82 per cent answered that they would give up membership rather than neutrality 
(Neuhold: 1992, pp.lOl-103). Austrian negotiators, consequently, could not drop 
neutrality. The SPO had also demanded the maintenance of the environmental 
standards and the transit agreement. The social standards had mainly been a quest by 
the OGB and AK. Again, however, taking into account the high environmental 
consciousness in Austria, the fact that the transit issue was of great importance in 
some Lander such as Tyrol and that the agreement of 1991 with the EC in this area 
was deemed to be a great success by the Austrian people (Interview No.32; Vienna, 
08/05/1996), they could hardly be sacrificed in view of the referendum. Finally, the 
agricultural sector and the closely linked question of secondary residencies by EC 
citizens had been at the heart of the LK and the OBB. 
Unsurprisingly, during the negotiations, it was the areas of environmental 
standards, transit, secondary residencies and agriculture, which caused problems 
(Woschnagg: 1996, pp.l35-141). The Austrian negotiation team did not have much 
room for manoeuvre, as they had to deliver the compromise of the historic bloc on the 
one hand, and to achieve satisfactory results in view of the referendum on the other 
(Interview No.32; Vienna, 08/05/1996). 
1.3.2. The Swedish negotiation position: 
Between the application to the EC in July 1991 and the start of the negotiations in 
February 1993, a four party coalition of the MS, FP, CP and the Christian Democratic 
Party under Prime Minister Bildt (MS) replaced the Social Democratic government in 
Sweden. It was the task of this new government to negotiate in Brussels. and 
Dinkelspiel. the Swedish Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade and chief 
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negotiator, outlined his country's negotiation agenda in his opening statement on 1 
February 1993 in Brussels (Dinkelspiel: 1993). As already stated earlier, Sweden 
committed itself to become a full and active participant in the CFSP, while 
maintaining its policy of military non-alignment, and it declared its intention to 
participate in the EMU. Dinkelspiel pointed out, however, that "a final Swedish 
position relating to the transition from the second to the third stage will be taken in the 
light of future events and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty" 
(Dinkelspiel: 1993, p.31). In other words, Sweden retained the final decision on EMU 
for its parliament (Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/1111996). The EC never openly 
acknowledged this, but it did not refute it either during the negotiations. This allowed 
the pro-EC social forces during the debate before the referendum to argue that EMU 
was not part of the decision on membership (see below). 
The crucial and possibly controversial issues were the higher Swedish 
environmental standards, the alcohol monopolies, the Swedish snuff tobacco and, 
most importantly, the question of budgetary contributions (Interview No.49; 
Stockholm, 14/1111996). All these issues were mainly a result of the looming 
referendum. It was inconceivable that there would have been a positive outcome in the 
referendum, if Sweden had had to lower its environmental standards, give up its 
alcohol monopolies - part of a long battle against excessive alcohol consumption - and 
prohibit the consumption of snuff. Finally, it was realised that Sweden with its very 
high living standard would be a net contributor. Nevertheless, in view of the 
catastrophic economic situation at the time, it would have been difficult to sell this to 
the people from the very beginning. The Swedish negotiators, consequently, sought to 
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obtain a phasing-in of their full contribution to the EC budget over a period of several 
years (Interview No.49; Stockholm, 14/1111996). 
Both TCO and LO had drawn up a list of demands for the negotiations in 
September 1992 and November 1992 respectively (TCO: 1993; LO: 1994). Most 
importantly, it was demanded that EC labour market directives could be enacted, 
according to the Swedish tradition, via collective agreements between the trade unions 
and employers' associations instead of parliamentary legislation as in other member 
states. The unions further asked for the assurance that foreign companies carrying out 
work with their own employees in Sweden had to accept Swedish labour market 
regulations in order to avoid social dumping. Finally, the TCO and LO asked for 
retaining the right to a national regional policy to continue the support of 
disadvantaged regions and for maintaining the higher Swedish standards of the health 
and safety regulations in the work environment. These demands were a part of 
Sweden's official negotiation position (Dinkelspiel: 1993, pp.30-32). 
The negotiation agenda itself was drawn up in close co-operation with the 
political parties and main interest associations. It was the government's approach to 
treat membership as a national question and to give everybody a chance of input. The 
referendum was unlikely to be won against the opposition of the SAP and, therefore, a 
very close relationship with the Social Democrats was maintained throughout the 
negotiations. For example, the opening statement by Dinkelspiel of 1 February 1993 
had been gone through with the SAP word by word and several changes were made, 
some without discussion, others after negotiations. Interest associations such as the 
SAF, SI, and the trade unions co-operated fonnally in working groups and advisory 
boards. The political parties were involved via the parliamentary committee on EC 
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matters. Additionally, Dinkelspiel frequently met trade union leaders to discuss 
important issues in a more informal way (Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/11/1996).4 
In short, the negotiation position was the result of close co-operation between the 
pro-EC forces. During the negotiations, then, the importance attached to individual 
issues by the negotiators was the result of an evaluation of their possible effect in the 
referendum (Interview No.49; Stockholm, 14/1111996; Interview No.61; Stockholm, 
26/1111996). 
1.3.3. The membership negotiations: 
At the end of 1993, first negotiation chapters were closed. On 21 December 1993, the 
EC accepted Foreign Minister Mock's oral explanation of Austria's status of 
neutrality (Interview No.32; Vienna, 08/05/1996) and Sweden's policy of non-
alignment. All applicants and the EC signed a joint declaration, in which the 
commitment to the Treaty of Maastricht in general and the CFSP in particular was 
stated (Luif: 1996, p.31 0).5 Common positions were also achieved on EMU. These 
issues did not present a problem during the negotiations (GranelI: 1995, p.132). More 
importantly, agreement was reached in the area of environmental standards and the 
health and safety regulations in the work environment. It gave the applicants a four-
year transitionary period. "During this period the EC directives would be reviewed 
and - that was the hope of the applicant countries - be adjusted to the stricter rules in 
the new member states" (Luif: 1996, p.311). The problem of alcohol monopolies was 
solved through a compromise. Sweden accepted to abolish its state monopolies for the 
4 This close involvement in the drawing up of the Swedish negotiation agenda was confinned by 
interviewees from the political parties and interest associations (see Interviews). 
S This declaration was not only important to the applicants. It also satisfied those critical voices within 
the member states, which doubted the neutral countries' willingness to co-operate in matters of foreign 
and security policy (Interview No.36; Vienna. 15/0511996). 
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import, production and wholesale distribution of alcohol, while it retained the 
monopoly on retail sales. Finally, it was also accepted that Swedish collective 
agreements were acceptable for the implementation of labour market directives. 
In the case of both environmental standards and alcohol monopolies, Austria 
and Sweden were far from achieving their negotiation targets. The general impression 
that these agreements were a victory for the applicants had very much to do with the 
presentation of them in the view of the referenda. There was no guarantee that they 
did not have to lower their environmental standards after four years and Sweden had, 
in fact, given up several of its alcohol monopolies (Miles: 1994b, pp.l11l2). The 
agreement on snuff - Sweden was allowed the consumption within the country, while 
the export of snuff was prohibited - can be seen in the same light. There were strong 
indicators that the BC dragged this issue on for three months in order to make its 
giving-in appear to be a success of the Swedish negotiators in the eyes of the 
popUlation (Interview No.49; Stockholm, 14/1111996). 
Several difficult issues remained on the agenda after December 1993. In the 
Austrian case, the issues of transit and secondary residencies were settled in the 
')umbo" ministerial meeting from 26 February to 1 March 1994. Austria gained a ten 
years (in reality probably 6 years) extension of its transit agreement and a transition 
period in the area of secondary residencies, allowing Austria to keep its restrictive 
legislation for further five years. Agriculture, however, represented a major problem. 
According to Foreign Minister Mock, the EC had signalled over one year that it was 
prepared to accept a transition period for Austria's agricultural sector. Then, it 
suddenly changed its opinion and argued that it would accept Austrian national 
financial aid instead. Mock was unhappy about that, as it implied an additional burden 
.,")") 
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for Austria's budget, and at one stage, the negotiations were nearly called off 
(Interview No.36; Vienna, 15/05/1996). Eventually, Austria accepted on the basis that 
the EC took over some of the financial aid towards Austria's farmers (Luif: 1996, 
p.312). 
In the case of Sweden, the contributions to the budget presented the most 
difficult hurdle. In the end, a phasing-in of the full amount was impossible for 
technical reasons, but the Swedish negotiators "gained a budgetary rebate worth up to 
ECU 2 billion in the first three years as a farm adjustment payment" (Miles: 1994b, 
p.14). The chapter on regional policy was closed with the introduction of Objective 6 
as a new criterion for structural fund assistance. Sweden was allowed to continue its 
national regional policy and could even expect EC financial aid for its arctic areas. 
Overall, this section demonstrates that the negotiations functioned as a link 
between the agenda-setting process and the struggles in the run-up to the referenda. 
The negotiation agendas reflected the compromise of those in favour of membership 
and the negotiations themselves were conducted in view of the later referenda. While 
not without importance, the inter-state negotiations played only a secondary role in 
the Austrian and Swedish accession to the EC. 
2. The referendum struaale in Austria: 
2.1. The pro-EC historic bloc reconfirmed: 
After the successful completion of the negotiations, the pro-EC forces reconfinned 
their unity. On 22 April 1994. the SPO and OVP passed a "Europe Treaty", in which 
the concessions to the various social forces of the bloc were spelled out in detail. Point 
six outlines the financial restructuring help and the setting-up of work foundations for 
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those industrial sectors, which were under pressure due to membership. The food 
processing industry, transport companies and the suppliers of parts were mentioned in 
particular (Parteienvereinbarung: 1994, pp.2/3). Degressive payments over four years 
were planned for the agriCUltural sector in order to help farmers with the immediate 
adaptation to the EC price levels and opening of the markets (Parteienvereinbarung: 
1994, p.8). The employees' associations were further satisfied with a common 
commitment for the establishment of work councils throughout the EC 
(Parteienvereinbarung: 1994, p.S). Finally, the continuing participation of the social 
partners in the decision-making process in EC matters at the national and European 
level was identified (Parteienvereinbarung: 1994, pp.5/6). The foundation for the 
referendum campaign was laid. 
This campaign had already started earlier. Against the background of an 
increasingly intensive and critical debate about the EEA and unfavourable public 
opinion polls - supporters of EC-membership had declined to 48 per cent - the 
government presented its EEA-ABC as the first larger product of its information 
campaign in August 1991 (Schaller: 1994a, p.214). In December 1991, the 
government gave the contract for its pro-membership campaign to the advertisement 
agency Demner & Merlicek. From then onwards, with increasing intensity towards 
the referendum itself, the government, individual ministries, the pro-EC parties and 
the social partners were actively engaged in a campaign with telephone lines, 
infonnation bus tours, placards, mailings etc. (Schaller: 1994b, pp.75-79). 
The VOl also started a wider campaign. It did not, however, want to be too 
prominent, since many people would have viewed this as too one-sided. Therefore, 
"independent" EC representatives were identified in companies and provided with 
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infonnation material by the VOl, the so-called EuroNews, covering issues such as the 
costs of non-membership, transit etc. The Europa-Telegramm, leaflets with short and 
precise information about Ee issues to be pinned on the blackboards of companies, 
were also distributed. Although drawn up by the VOl, they were published by the 
"Osterreichische Gesellschaft fUr Europapolitik" with the reputation of an independent 
information institute (see below). The social partners organised together information 
meetings in companies, during which representatives ofVOIIBWK and AKl6GB 
spoke at the same time. They presented membership as an economic necessity for 
Austria as a whole, not as the interest of one particular fraction of society (Interview 
No.18; Vienna, 22/05/1995). In general, these initiatives mainly reached the particular 
clientele of a party or social partner. 
To achieve a broader appeal, those in favour of membership founded the 
"6sterreichische Gesellschaft fUr Europapolitik" (Austrian Society for European 
Politics) in November 1991. The "Gesellschaft" was supported by all social partners, 
i.e. the V61, the BWK, the LK, the AK and the 6GB (the latter two only logistically, 
not financially), the ANB, now more openly involved in the campaign, the financial 
sector of the Raiffeisenverband, but also big companies such as IBM Austria, the 
Japanese TNC Mita and Alcatel Austria. The "Gesellschaft" did not have the task to 
develop ideas and positions on the question of membership. The positive stance on 
membership was its starting-point and the arguments in favour of membership had 
been developed during the process leading to application (see Chapter 3, section 1). It 
had to disseminate information on the EC and, thereby, campaign for a "yes" in the 
referendum. Keeping an equal distance from all supporting organisations, it succeeded 
in establishing a reputation of independence, which greatly enhanced its standing 
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among journalists and the public and, thereby, strengthened the credibility of its pro-
EC campaign (Interview No.29; Vienna, 03/05/1996). 
Special brochures for individual organisations, which paid for them, such as 
the 6GB, the Conference of Land Governors or Foreign Minister Mock as an 
individual, were published under the label of the "Gesellschaft", again in order to give 
them an independent, objective flair. In contrast to parties and social partners, the 
"Gesellschaft" had the opportunity to reach people beyond their influence sphere. 
Teachers and events in local parishes, firebrigades and the anny were supported with 
infonnation material. Material produced by the "Gesellschaft" included pages for the 
overhead-projector, a book with caricatures in favour of membership, a school 
newspaper called "Schule und Europa", which was distributed to all school speakers, 
politics teachers and headmasters, and even a Christmas calendar for kindergarten 
children in order to reach housewives via their children. Advertisements, some of 
them pointing to splits within the GA, were placed in the Kronenzeitung, having a 
readership of about two million, and pro-EC statements by local functionaries were 
published in regional newspapers. In order to co-ordinate the campaign, the 
"Gesellschaft" had a weekly meeting from mid-1993 onwards, in which 
representatives of the social partners, the Land governments, the ANB and various 
ministries participated (Interview No.29; Vienna, 03/05/1996). 
In short, the "Gesellschaft" provided the opportunity for the pro-EC groups to 
organise their campaign from an independent platform, thereby giving their campaign 
a higher degree of credibility and allowing the material to reach wider sections of 
society. 
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2.2. The social forces opposed to membership: weakened by ideological divisions. 
The opposing social forces did not remain inactive. Considering that the application 
had only been a matter for parliament, it was now that they had a real opportunity for 
the first time. The situation did not look hopeless. At the beginning of 1994, the 
supporters and opponents among the Austrian population were roughly equal. A 
majority in the referendum was possible for either side (Schaller: 1994b, p.52). 
2.2.1. Nationally-oriented capital and labour: 
Despite the "Europa-Abkommen" between the governing parties (see above), the 
nationally-oriented social forces had not completely be won over. Some members of 
the spa did not accept the pro-EC position of their party and tried to forge links with 
dissatisfied farmers (Interview No.17; Vienna, 18/05/95). 
Moreover, shortly before the referendum, about 20 out of 300 mill owners 
talked about starting an anti-EC media campaign. They even contacted an advertising 
company, but, eventually, the whole action came to nothing. Additionally, some 
contacts were made with MPs of the FPO, by now in the camp of the opponents (see 
below), but they did not put forward the issues in parliament, the millers had hoped 
for. Finally, it was attempted to co-ordinate actions with the trade union partners, 
which were, however, constrained by the same adversary circumstances within their 
own chamber (Interview No.21; Vienna, 23/04/1996). 
A similar degree of resistance amongst nationally-oriented capital was 
noticeable within the food processing sector of the Raiffeisenverband. Some 
functionaries, mainly aligned with either the FPO or the GA, being in favour of a 
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nationalist and environmental agriculture policy respectively, opposed membership 
(Interview No.28; Vienna, 03/05/1996). 
Within the two employees' associations, the AK and the 6GB, the fractions 
close to the GA and the Austrian Communist Party generally opposed membership 
(Schaller: 1994b, p.51). Furthermore, members of the GPA participated in the joint 
information meetings in companies, but dared to outline their critical, hesitant 
position. This was controlled and criticised by 6GB officials, who put the GPA 
functionaries under significant psychological pressure and accused them of left 
extremism. Not surprisingly, the GPA did not attempt to form alliances against 
membership (Interview No.35; Vienna, 14/05/1996). 
Overall, there was significant resistance within the nationally-oriented social 
forces before the referendum, but the situation within their Chambers made it almost 
impossible for them to voice their opposition. Moreover, while they were often 
dissatisfied with the situation, a co-operation with either the GA or the FPO, the two 
parties against membership, on a larger scale than outlined above was deemed 
impossible. Both were considered to be too extremist for alliances (Interview No.19; 
Vienna, 23/05/1995; Interview No.2l; Vienna, 23/04/1996). In the end, the party and 
association solidarity, so important and firmly established throughout Austria's post-
war history, carried greater weight than the question of EC membership. 
2.2.2. Political parties opposing membership: 
The GA had maintained its negative position on EC membership from 1989. It had 
already opposed the EEA in parliament and a majority of 87 per cent voted for a no-
recommendation at the party's congress in April 1994. According to Johannes 
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Voggenhuber, spokesperson of the GA for European politics, political integration in 
Europe would be necessary against the background of instabili ty in central Europe 
after the Cold War and the globalisation of markets. Nevertheless, this should not be 
done in the form of a federal state, but as a "system of confederal co-operation in the 
whole of Europe" (Voggenhuber: 1995, p.394). The EC, especially after Maastricht, 
was criticised for its democratic deficit, which took away the power from the people. 
The neo-liberal economic drive behind the Internal Market, reinforced by the EMU 
convergence criteria, moreover, would put downward pressure on environmental and 
social standards, increase traffic and, thereby, the need for new roads. It would 
prevent the support for an environmentally-friendly agriculture. New divisions 
between the poor and the rich, between East and West, between centre and periphery 
would be created. Additionally, Maastricht would incorporate the basis of a new 
military alliance, which made Austria's neutrality impossible. The Austrian 
government was criticised for its unconditional accession to the EC. Apart from 
reaching unsatisfactory results in the negotiations, it did not use them in order to 
obtain some reforms of the EC, for example insisting on social and environmental 
instead of neo-liberal economic convergence criteria and demanding an expansive 
fiscal policy with the goal of full employment. 
During the referendum campaign, the GA adopted a strategy of a loose 
network, a non-institutionalised co-operation with other anti-EC initiatives to 
facilitate the exchange of information (Voggenhuber: 1995, p.397). Many opposition 
groups were investigated but rarely represented the left, progressive type of policy 
expected by the GA from their potential allies. The fonnation of a joint platfonn was, 
thus, not considered to be possible (Interview No.27; Vienna. 02/05/1996). 
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In the course of the EEA negotiations, surprisingly, the FPO had slowly but 
steadily changed its course and, eventually, voted against the treaty in parliament in 
September 1992. At a special party congress in May the following year, its new 
course was outlined. The FPO was in favour of an integrated Europe in the form of a 
confederation as the basis for a strong European security system. The loss of 
sovereignty was rejected as was the idea of a multi-cultural European society (FPO: 
1993, pp.2/3). The FPO's support for membership was linked to a list of "homework", 
including demands for a tax reform, which allowed companies to accumulate more 
capital, to be done by the government in order to prepare Austria for membership. 
Moreover, negotiation targets were set such as the concession of opt-outs similar to 
the ones granted to Denmark and the maintenance of Austria's environmental and 
social standards and the transit agreement (FPO: 1993, pp.4-6). One year later, the 
FPO evaluated the negotiation results negatively and 85.5 per cent of the delegates at 
the party congress on 8 April 1994 supported Haider's motion to recommend the 
parliamentary fraction a "no". The decision in the referendum was left to the public 
(Interview No.26; Vienna, 25/04/1996). 
The party itself denied that it had changed its policy. On the contrary, it was 
the EC, which had changed, it was argued. While the FPO has been in favour of free 
trade and economic integration within the Internal Market, the main goal of the 
Maastricht Treaty to form a political union was not acceptable. The party favoured a 
European confederation of independent states, not a federal state, which implied the 
total dropping of the unanimity principle and the loss of sovereignty (Interview 
No.26; Vienna. 25/04/1996). Siegfried Dillersberger, FPO referent for European 
questions, pointed out that even the HSalzburger Prograrnm" of 1985, which 
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considered membership to be a necessity, had clearly mentioned a European 
confederation as the party's goal (Dillersberger: 1994, p.708). Critics, however, 
maintained that the so-called homework included tasks impossible to be fulfilled by 
the government from the beginning and, thus, only constituted a pretext for opposing 
membership (Schaller: 1994b, p.52). With Haider as the new President, the party had 
significantly increased its share of the votes by mainly drawing on protest voters 
(Riedlsperger: 1992.) and the EC was the perfect issue for such a strategy. Be that as it 
may, important is that the FPO under Haider's leadership had managed to rise from a 
marginal party to a strong third, in some places even second, force in Austria. It had 
increased its share of the votes from about 5 per cent in 1983 to 16.6 per cent in 1990 
(see Table No.4, Appendix) with the tendency to rise further and, therefore, posed a 
strong challenge to the pro-EC bloc. 
In spite of not giving a recommendation for the referendum, the FPO clearly 
conducted an anti-EC campaign. The party concentrated on issues such as "Austria 
first", anti-immigration, the loss of the AS, the alleged rise in unemployment by 
70.000, and the danger of an increase in criminality in a Europe without borders, but 
also transit and agriculture (Schaller 1994b, pp.80/81). Overall, it attempted to gather 
all those people, who were dissatisfied with the pro-EC policy by the government and 
social partners. 
2.2.3. Social movements against membership: 
The anti-EC initiatives were numerous but modest in their media presence due to 
small organisational and financial resources (Schaller: 1994b, p.82). Three exceptions 
were, however, noticeable. The "Kritische Europainformationen" had started 
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publishing the magazine "Europa-Kardiogramm" with reports, analyses and 
comments on European politics, economy and culture (Gmeiner: 1996, p.259). A 
special edition in May 1994 had a circulation of 100.000 copies. 
Since the beginning of 1993, the initiative "Arge EU-Nein DankelZukunft 
Europa" had been active distributing posters, flyers and information-folders. It 
consisted of intellectuals and scientists, such as the former GA presidential candidate 
Freda Blau-Meissner and some former members of the "Initiative Osterreich und 
Europa" such as university professor Jagschitz. It attempted to establish a platform for 
the co-ordination of the anti-EC social forces. 
Thirdly, the "Bfu"gerinitiative gegen den Verkauf Osterreichs an die EU" 
(Initiative against Austria's sell-out to the EC) was of some significance having about 
30.000 members in May 1994. Between March and May 1994, it sent two mailings to 
all households supporting a "no" in the referendum (Schaller: 1994b, p.83). Together, 
these political parties and social movements formed a considerable opposition. 
2.3. The referendum: a clear "yes" in favour of membership. 
The referendum on 12 June 1994 gave a clear majority for the accession to the EC. 
66.6 per cent voted in favour and only 33.4 per cent against membership. There are 
several reasons why the opposition camp was severely weakened. Firstly, the two 
parties themselves did not present an internally united position. In 1993, the Liberal 
Forum had split away from the FPO, partly because of its xenophobic credentials, but 
partly also because of its negative position towards the EC (Schaller: 1994b, p.52). 
During the campaign, it strongly lobbied on the yes-side. Moreover, inside the party. 
the Liberal Club, a think tank mainly consisting of liberal party members in Vienna, 
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openly opposed the official party line and commissioned a brochure by the 
"Osterreichische Gesellschaft fUr Europapolitik" along these lines. The divisions 
within the Green camp were also exploited by the "Gesellschaft". It nominated 
Herbert Fux as one of the pro-EC representatives for a television debate. Fux had left 
the GA in 1988. However, having been one of the frrst Green representatives in local 
government, he still carried a lot of Green esteem amongst the population and, 
therefore, discredited the GA's anti-EC stance (Interview No.29; Vienna, 03/05/1996). 
Even more significant was the ideological split between the GA and the FPO. 
There were many common issues such as the negative evaluation of the negotiation 
results in the area of environmental standards and transit. Nevertheless, the 
ideological distance between the two parties was by far too big for the formation of a 
common platform. The FPO' s strategy had a nationalist character concentrating on 
"Austria first" slogans and included anti-foreigner arguments, while the GA focused 
on the demand for a reformed EC, a different type of European integration without 
discrimination against non-EC citizens. The pro-EC groups used this split and 
transformed the debate on membership into a fight against Haider, i.e. pro or contra 
right-wing extremism (Schaller: 1994b, p.70). The GA constantly had to distance 
itself from Haider instead of focusing on its arguments against the EC (Interview 
No.27; Vienna, 02/05/1996). Haider's exaggerated argumentation, moreover, accusing 
Vranitzky to be an agent of the Bilderberg group and free masons to mention just one 
example, deeply discredited the whole anti-EC group.6 In general, the FPO's shift 
towards an anti-EC stance was seen as an assurance of the success of the yes-
campaign by other opponents (Interview No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996). 
t. It is estimated that this tactic cost the anti-EC group between five and six per cent in the referendum 
(Int~rview No.32; Vienna. 08/05/1996). 
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The ideological split between the GA and the FPO was also reflected in the 
sphere of social movements. The "Kritische Europainformationen" opposed the EC 
because of its dominance by big capital, which implied the exploitation of developing 
countries, the neglect of a social dimension, an increase in unemployment and the 
continuing pollution of the environment. Moreover, the internal security policy 
against immigrants and the external security policy towards a common security and 
defence policy around a Euro-army were rejected. The overall goal was a general 
critique of the EC project "Fortress Europe" to facilitate a European-wide formation 
of progressive forces in favour of a just economic policy, solidarity and the respect of 
everybody's human dignity (Gmeiner: 1996, pp.263-272). On the other hand, the 
"Btlrgerinitiative gegen den Verkauf Osterreichs an die EU" followed a nationalist 
road, warning against the flooding by foreigners and the sell-out of Austria's wealth 
(Gmeiner: 1996, p.261). A co-operation between these two larger initiatives was as 
impossible as between the GA and the FPO. The "Arge EU-Nein Danke/Zukunft 
Europa" attempted to remain neutral along its objective to co-ordinate the opposition, 
but, thereby, ended up distributing information by right-wing organisations (Gmeiner: 
1996, p.278). Its credibility among the left opposition suffered as a consequence. 
Additionally, the opposition was also split between parties on the one hand, 
and social movements on the other. For example, the "Arge EU-Nein Danke/Zukunft 
Europa" rejected a close co-operation with the GA, because it wanted to stay 
independent. Eventually, the positions of the GA and the "Kritische 
Europainformationen" were the closest and both co-operated in setting up an 
alternative press agency called "Euro-Watch-Agency-Report (Interview No.27; 
Vienna, 02105/1996), which published a weekly report in the time before the 
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referendum. The lack of financial funding, however. limited the success of this 
undertaking (Gmeiner: 1996, p.278). 
Finally, the pro-EC group could rely on a huge financial backing, which 
allowed it to conduct a massive media campaign (Interview No.26; Vienna, 
25/04/1996; Interview No.27; Vienna, 02/05/1996). An additional "angst-campaign" 
arguing that Austria would either be part of a wealthy Western Europe or part of a 
poor, underdeveloped Eastern Europe with countries such as Poland in the same 
league had an irrational but effective impact on the population (Interview No.26; 
Vienna, 25/04/1996). Membership was presented as yielding direct economic gains 
for everybody. Slogans such as "EC membership secures the pension system" were no 
rarity (Interview No.26; Vienna, 25/04/1996) and every household was promised to 
gain AS 1000 per month in case of accession (Interview No.35~ Vienna, 14/05/1996). 
Overall, the EC opposition was unable to fonn a joint platfonn in contrast to 
the pro-EC bloc. There were no "organic intellectuals", who developed a hegemonic 
project capable of uniting the opposition and offering a credible alternative to 
membership. With reference to the debate itself, the closer the referendum was, the 
more irrational the debate became from both sides. This was no climate, which would 
have allowed the careful evaluation of membership and alternative possibilities. 
3. A debate at last: social forces mobilise in Sweden. 
As it was shown in Chapter 3, section 2.4, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime 
Minister's Office played a crucial role in putting the membership application on the 
agenda, while other ministries were sidelined. Once this decision had been taken. 
ministries as such did not play an individual role in the debate. In 1991. the new 
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Prime Minister Bildt (MS), who had already laid down a detailed strategy of how to 
become a member of the EC the year before, demanded that all coalition partners 
signed a declaration, which included a commitment to Sweden joining the EC. 
Consequently, the approach to the EC was a matter of strategy for the government, not 
a fundamental issue of debate (Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/1111996). Dinkelspiel, 
Sweden's main negotiator, made each minister responsible for the success of the 
negotiations in hislher particular area. This tactical manoeuvre ensured every 
ministry's commitment to membership (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 15/1111996). 
After the September 1994 elections, government changed again and the SAP 
retook office. Individual ministers took part on both sides of the campaign, but as 
individual persons, not in their function as main representatives of their particular 
ministry (Interview No.47; Stockholm, 13/1111996). In short, the ministries can be 
neglected during the debate on membership before the referendum. 
3.1. Labour: EC membership to counter transnational capital. 
3.1.1. The La and TCO peak organisations: 
Both big peak trade union organisations, the La and TCO, assessed the question of 
membership against the background of the changes in the world economy. It was 
realised that ''the labour market for employees is becoming more and more 
international. Capital and ownership have become almost completely mobile in 
international tenns" (TCO: 1993, p.4). These changes in the global economy would 
require a change in trade union strategy. "Internationalisation in itself means that the 
Swedish trade unions must cooperate across national borders - primarily in Europe 
where we have the major part of our economic ties and commitments" (TeO: 1994. 
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p.5). Representatives in the LO headquarters even argued that there has never been an 
alternative between membership and staying outside. A Keynesian expansive fiscal 
policy at the national level could not be a possible way forward, as the French 
example between 1981 and 1983 had demonstrated. Outside the EC, Sweden would 
be even more in the hands of the international financial markets and would, 
consequently, have to adopt even harsher austerity measures. In short, membership 
would offer to recover some control over capital lost at the national level (Interview 
No.56; Stockholm, 2111111996; LO: 1994, p.4). Furthermore, Sweden's economy and 
welfare system depended on a few big lNCs, and it would be impossible to remain 
outside the EC, while the lNCs were a part of the Internal Market through their 
investments (Interview No.62; Stockholm, 27/1111996). Thus, membership would 
support rather than endanger the Swedish welfare system (Interview No.46; 
Stockholm, 13/11/1996). 
The acknowledgement of the pressure caused by the transnationalisation 
processes did not, however, imply that the LO and TCO accepted the neo-liberal 
logic. Competition was regarded as beneficial for economic growth and efficiency, but 
the importance of regulations at the EC level was stressed. In this sense, great 
emphasis was put on the further development of the social dimension and the Social 
Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty was welcomed (Interview No.56; Stockholm, 
21/11/1996). The "TCO has stressed that European cooperation must have a Social 
Dimension that counteracts the negative effects of internationalization, free 
competition and the free movement of capital" (TeO: 1993. p.9). By the same token, 
the neo-liberal convergence criteria of EMU were criticised. The LO preferred a less 
austere monetary policy and wanted to include employment as a criterion for the 
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convergence of European economies. "A balance is needed between the nonns for 
price stability and for growth and employment" (La: 1994, p.6). It was further 
pointed out by some La officials that the economy could also be run with four or five 
per cent inflation at the European level instead of the three per cent envisaged by the 
Maastricht Treaty, thereby allowing for more expansive measures (Interview No.62: 
Stockholm, 27/11/1996). Along the same lines, the TeO demanded that "Sweden 
should work actively to ensure that economic and monetary co-operation also 
comprises concrete goals for the reduction of unemployment" (TeO: 1993, p.18). The 
latter should be the primary aim. "The clear political will must be expressed by the 
convergence criteria being made subordinate to clear employment goals" (TeO: 1994, 
p.1S). An additional criticism was the lack of democratic control of the ESeBs (La: 
1994, p.S; Teo: 1993, p.18). 
Despite this criticism, the La and Teo were satisfied with the negotiation 
results. Their individual concerns such as the right to establish Ee labour market 
directives via collective agreements and the maintenance of the higher Swedish health 
and safety regulations had been met. Of course, the problem of the convergence 
criteria remained unresolved, and this was pointed out and criticised. The 
TCO is seriously concerned about the fact that the Swedish Government has 
supported the restrictive economic policy recommended by the .,. [ECl's ... 
Finance Ministers in December 1993 on the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
This gives the fight against inflation the highest priority and thus hinders the 
fight against unemployment (TeO: 1994, p.IS). 
Eventually, however, it was accepted that the convergence criteria had not been up for 
negotiation. The focus should, therefore, be on future common initiatives for the 
creation of employment at the European level (Interview No.40; Stockholm, 
11111/1996). In other words, while the peak trade union organisations were not 
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entirely happy about the neo-liberal policy co-ordination at the European level, 
considering the transnationalisation pressures, they did not see any viable alternative 
to membership. 
Nevertheless, many of their members and affiliated unions were opposed to 
membership. The LO and TCO, therefore, could not recommend a "yes" for the 
referendum. Instead, they decided to adopt a neutral position and to provide members 
with information to help them make up their minds. They, however, pointed out that 
only membership would allow them to participate fully in institutions at the EC level, 
such as the Economic and Social Committee (LO: 1994, p.3). The EEA was not 
deemed to be an alternative in this respect (TCO: 1994, p.II). 
3.1.2. The split within the trade unions over Europe: 
Within the unions, there was a split between transnational sector, industrial unions in 
favour of membership and national sector unions opposing it. The LO affiliates the 
Paper Workers' Union and the Metal Workers' Union played a leading role in the 
transnational sector. The Paper Workers' Union decided at its congress in autumn 
1993 that it would recommend a "yes" for the referendum on trade union grounds, but 
leave the final decision to its members whether the consideration of other issues such 
as security policy still justified a "yes". This decision had encouraged the Metal 
Workers' Union. In early 1994, the union's committee decided that it would not give a 
recommendation, but it made clear that as the committee it was strongly in favour of 
membership.7 The argument was three-fold. Firstly and most importantly. considering 
that the Swedish TNCs had already established themselves on the Internal Market and 
7 These qualified yes-recommendations have to be seen in the light that even in the case of these two 
unions. a majority but not every member supported membership. 
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taking into account the export dependence of the two sectors - the paper sector 
exported about 80 per cent of its products, the engineering sector more than 50 per 
cent - remaining outside the EC was economically impossible. Secondly, the EC 
regulations had to be accepted anyway due to the EEA. There was, consequently, no 
reason why the option of participating in the decision-making process via membership 
should not be taken. Finally, the EC was also regarded as a peace project, in which 
Sweden should take part. The Eastern enlargement had already been on the agenda in 
1993/1994, and it was likely that the EC would comprise more and more countries in 
the future (Interview No.66; Stockholm, 29/1111996). 
On the other hand, there were the LO-affiliates the Commercial Workers' 
Union and the Municipal Workers' Union, which, although they did not give a 
recommendation, came out heavily against membership. It was feared that future 
decisions made in Brussels, for example with reference to the harmonisation of tax 
systems, could lead to rules, which implied cut-backs in the public sector and, 
thereby, cause job losses. The negative position can be explained by referring to the 
production structure. The jobs, especially in the public sector, did neither depend on 
exports, nor were they part of the transnational sector. Hence, the economic argument 
did not playa role. Moreover, both unions predominantly represented female blue-
collar workers - up to 80 per cent in the case of the Municipal Workers' Union. The 
participation of women in the labour market of the EC members was, with the 
exception of Denmark, much lower, and these unions were afraid of experiencing a 
negative impact through Inembership. In short, the Swedish Model with its generous 
welfare system. full employment policy. large public sector and gender equality via 
high female participation in the work place (see Chapter 2, section I) was considered 
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to be endangered by the EC's neo-liberal economic policies (Interview No.59; 
Stockholm, 26/1111996). 
The Transport Workers' Union, also a LO-affiliate, gave a no-recommendation 
to its members in 1994 after conducting an internal referendum, in which 62.3 per 
cent of the participating members had rejected the EC. There had been technical 
regulation problems - Swedish lorries are in general larger than EC lorries - and the 
problem of "cabottage", which implied that EC companies were allowed to set up 
companies in Sweden to transport goods exclusively in Sweden. Since the cost level 
for transport was lower in the EC than in Sweden, this implied strong competition and 
likely job losses (Interview No.57; Stockholm, 2111111996). 
This split between the trade unions of the transnational and national sectors 
could also be observed in the case of the LO-affiliates the Industrial Workers' Union 
and the Union of Service and Communication Employees. Here, the unions did not 
give a recommendation, because they represented several sectors with different 
production structures and, thus, an unanimous position proved to be impossible. In the 
Industrial Workers' Union, the board and members were divided. Transnational 
sectors such as textile and the chemical industry were in favour, while the sugar sector 
without markets outside Sweden was opposed (Interview No.46; Stockholm, 
13/11/1996). The Union of Service and Communication Employees also gave no 
recommendation at its 1993 congress. The transnational sectors such as 
telecommunications supported membership, but the postal workers were against, 
fearing that membership would imply further deregulation, the loss of the postal state 
monopoly and. thereby, the loss of jobs (Interview No.58; Stockholm, 26/11/1996). 
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A similar division along the production structure, was apparent in the TCO. 
The Swedish Association of Supervisors (Ledarna), which represented managers and 
supervisors working in production in both the private and the public sector. 
recommended a "yes" on the ground of economic necessity. Moreover, the Swedish 
Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry (SIF), and the Union of 
Financial Sector Employees, which organised white-collar workers in industry and 
finance respectively, i.e. transnational social forces, exhibited a strong yes-tendency 
without official recommendation. On the other hand, the Swedish Teacher's Union. 
which represented teachers throughout the entire education system from pre-school to 
university level and, thus, public sector workers, had a tendency towards a "no". Its 
chairman even openly opposed membership. As in the case of the Municipal Workers' 
Union, EC membership was viewed as a threat to the Swedish welfare system and the 
equal treatment of women and men at the workplace (Interview No.40; Stockholm, 
1111111996). 
The SACO considered the question of membership to be a matter of foreign 
policy and, therefore, to be beyond trade union concerns. There was no big internal 
discussion, no recommendation, only a study about the pros and cons with the result 
that no significant disadvantages for academic employees due to membership were 
identified. This did not, however, prevent affiliated unions from taking a position and 
a similar division between transnational and national social forces could be observed. 
The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers, the members of which often 
occupied high positions in the private sector industry, recommended a "yes" in 1994: 
a logical step considering its demand for application in May 1990 (see Chapter 3, 
section 2.1.1). The Swedish Association of Graduates in Social Science, Personnel 
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and Public Administratio~ Economics and Social Work, on the other hand. was rather 
reluctant. It did not recommend a "no", but large numbers of its members, who were 
predominantly employed in the public sector, clearly opposed accession to the EC 
(Interview No.41; Stockholm, 1111111996). 
The position of the Swedish trade unions can be summed up as follows: the 
two large peak organisations, the TCO and LO, were positive towards membership, 
although they could not recommend a "yes" for the referendum because of the 
different opinions of their affiliated unions. They argued that Sweden had to 
restructure its economy anyway due to transnational pressures, which implied the loss 
of government autonomy and trade union influence in economic matters. In this 
situation, co-operation at the European level offered the chance of regaining partly the 
lost control over capital and of providing a securer basis for the welfare system. The 
neo-liberal tendencies expressed in the convergence criteria were worrying, but there 
was some hope of joint actions at the EC level to combat unemployment. The 
transnational sector unions, mainly unions in the industrial and financial sector, 
followed this position. They stressed in particular Sweden's export dependence on the 
EC and the fact that the big TNCs had already established themselves on the Internal 
Market. On the other hand, the trade unions of the national sector, mainly the big 
public sector unions, opposed membership. They considered accession to the neo-
liberal EC to be a threat to the Swedish Model and argued that the retaining of as 
many national policy tools as possible offered a better chance to preserve it. 
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3.2. The position o/Swedish capital including the agricultural sector: 
The employers' associations, reacted immediately positive towards the SAP's 
announcement of application to the EC. As outlined in Chapter 3, section 2.1.2, they 
had been in favour of membership before, but did not consider it to be possible in the 
view of the SAP's opposition. Their main arguments were of an economic nature. 
Participation in the Internal Market would lead to more competition and, thereby, 
more efficiency. This would result in higher economic growth and, eventually, more 
jobs. The argument that membership would be a good way of getting rid of the 
Swedish Model played only partly a role. The Swedish Model was considered to have 
already been abandoned at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s 
(Interview No.43; Stockholm, 1211111996; Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996). 
Some sections of industry, however, considered membership as a safeguard against 
future Swedish experiments different from the other countries' neo-liberal course. 
Membership would foreclose them for good (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 
15/11/1996). It was additionally pointed out that the higher degree of the 
transnationalisation of production, with parts and finished products being increasingly 
traded to and fro across borders and the close links of Swedish companies to EC 
companies in this respect, had made membership necessary. Moreover, while the 
hannonisation of standards and regulations supported economic growth within the 
EC, companies from countries outside would face unequal tenns of competition as a 
result. GAIT was not deemed to be far-reaching enough to present a viable alternative 
(Interview No.67; Stockholm. 29/11/1996). 
There was no organised opposition from nationally-oriented companies. No 
branch as such opposed membership openly. This can partly be explained by the fact 
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that many small- and medium-sized companies were themselves export-oriented 
(about 15 - 23 per cent, estimated figure) and, thus, represented intemationally-
oriented forces, which were likely to support transnational capital's drive for 
liberalisation and deregulation (see Chapter 2, section 3.1). The removal of trade 
barriers was even more important for them than for mcs, which could rely on 
production units within the EC (Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996). Another 
substantial part of small- and medium-sized companies operated as sub-contractors to 
mcs and were, therefore, also internationally-oriented. 
There was some opposition in the food processing industry, but only on a 
moderate scale. Firstly, because the farmers had adopted a pro-EC position. 
"Sweden's farmers, via their memberships of co-operative associations, are involved 
in the further processing and marketing of their agricultural products. These co-
operatively owned processing industries are predominant in Sweden" (The Swedish 
Institute: 1995, p.l). Being in favour of membership as farmers, they were unlikely to 
vote differently in the capacity of owners in the food processing industry. Secondly, 
because the LRF, which was in favour of membership from the beginning of the 
debate, represented most of the wholesale producers and could enforce some pressure 
on them. A restructuring programme was initiated in 1992 to raise efficiency in order 
to cut the, by about 25 per cent too high, cost level (Interview No.50: Stockholm, 
14/11/1996). The structure in the food processing industry was, furthennore, 
extremely concentrated - TNCs such as Nestle were part of it - and many companies 
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viewed the EC as an opportunity of gaining access to a bigger market for their 
products (Interview No.65; Stockholm, 28/1111996).8 
At the same time, however, the opposition should not be underestimated. 
Foretagarnas, the Federation of Private Enterprises, which represented small- and 
medium-sized companies, did not give a recommendation and only conducted an 
information campaign. There was uncertainty among its members and many were 
against membership. They asked what the use of membership was apart from more 
regulations from Brussels. A sectoral picture of resistance was not available, since the 
delegates at the association's general meeting either represented themselves or their 
district, but opposition came mainly from small companies in the North of Sweden, 
which were deeply integrated into the local community and produced exclusively for 
the local market. Firms in the South, on the other hand, had often export links to 
Germany, Denmark, etc. and were, therefore, more positive towards membership. The 
headquarters itself supported membership. It was accepted that the whole Swedish 
economy and, thereby, also the small- and medium-sized companies depended on the 
big TNCs. Their threat to leave Sweden in the case of non-membership loomed large 
in the back of the minds and, although it was not openly acknowledged, decisively 
influenced the debate (Interview No.69; Stockholm, 03/12/1996). 
A similar argument was presented by the transport industry. Despite the 
economic problems due to membership, the reasons which made the Transport 
Workers' Union reject membership (see above), a vast majority of the companies 
came out in favour. Firstly, because these changes had already been part of the EEA to 
• The construction sector had always been protected in Sweden. but it had collapsed when the bubble 
economic boom crashed at the end of the 1980s. Consequently. it did not playa role in the debate on 
EC membership (Interview No.65; Stockholm. 28111/1~7). 
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a large extent. Secondly and more importantly, the argument prevailed that 
membership was essential for the Swedish economy as a whole, being dependent on 
equal access to the EC market. This would, eventually, also benefit the transport 
. 9 
companIes. 
The LRF, which had been in favour of membership from 1990 onwards (see 
Chapter 3, section 2.1.3), gave a yes-recommendation for the referendum. There were 
some internal splits. Sections of the food processing industry were sceptical (see 
above) and some farmers, especially in the North, could never be convinced. They 
probably had not been aware of the negative consequences of the 1990 agricultural 
deregulation programme in Sweden, it was argued by the LRF (Interview No.50; 
Stockholm, 14/1111996). It must, however, be pointed out that the farms in the North 
were generally small in contrast to the large farms in the southern part of Sweden (The 
Swedish Institute: 1995, p.I). The EC as a bigger market did hardly have any 
significance for them. The LRF also played an important role vis-A-vis the CPo It 
constantly put pressure on it, until the latter finally adopted a pro-EC position in 
spring 1994 (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 14/11/1996). 
To sum up, Swedish capital was overwhelmingly in favour of accession to the 
EC. Participation in the Internal Market was considered to be vital, firstly, in order to 
get equal access to it and secondly, in order to participate in its dynamic effects of the 
stronger competition. Even small- and medium-sized companies showed support for 
membership, partly because they were export-oriented, partly because they were sub-
contractors ofTNCs. The negotiation results were generally welcomed. For capital. it 
was important that Sweden became a member. The critical issues such as 
9 Telephone call with the EC expert of the Biltrafikens Arbetsgivaretbrbund (Road Transport 
Employers); Stockholm. 26/11/1996. 
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environmental standards did not affect them very much (Interview No.43; Stockholm, 
12111196; Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/11/1996; Interview No.69; Stockholm, 
03/12/1996). There was some hesitation, even rejection amongst nationally-oriented 
industry in the food processing industry and by small companies in the North, but they 
did not mount a no-campaign. The argument that the Swedish economy as a whole 
benefited from membership due to the gains of the TNCs, on which it depended, was 
too strong to be neglected. Splits parallel to the ones between transnational and 
national sector unions were not visible. 
The employers' associations kept EMU from the referendum agenda. It was 
realised that this issue could tip the balance towards a "no". The later positive position 
on EMU - the SAF declared its support in spring 1995, the SI followed in February 
1996 - however, demonstrated a different basis of capital's interest in membership in 
contrast to the trade unions. It was argued that Sweden could not have an economic 
policy different from other countries in times of globalisation. Austerity and not 
further devaluations were, consequently, the way forward and the earlier there was a 
monetary union, the better (Interview No.67; Stockholm, 29/1111996). Especially 
small companies would benefit from EMU membership. While mcs could hedge 
against fluctuating exchange rates, small companies did not have any opportunity to 
do so. Additionally, EMU membership was regarded as a necessary continuation of 
the changes in economic policy from the late 1980s towards a neo-liberal, market-
oriented economy (Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996).10 In view of the 
Swedish economic crisis, Per Magnus Wijkman, chief economist of the SL argued 
10 The dollar-dependent industries. e.g. the basic industries of mining and minerals. within the SI 
rejected EMU membership. They feared a higher exchange-rate risk through a single currency. Since 
they were. however. only responsible for about five per cent of Swedish exports. they were llutvntcd. 
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that "Sweden could indeed benefit from the peer pressure exercised in the framework 
of the ... [EC's] ... convergence and excessive deficit programmes" (Wijkman: 1995. 
p.7). By the same token, the employers' associations rejected a strong social 
dimension and Keynesian-type employment programmes at the European level. 
Instead, the neo-liberal drive should further continue in the EC so that European finns 
were competitive vis-a-vis the New Industrialising Countries of Asia (Interview 
No.43; Stockholm, 12/1111996). In short, rather than emphasising the need for co-
operation at an intemationallevel to regain lost control over economic policy and to 
fight unemployment in a common effort, a continuation and stabilisation of neo-
liberalism was behind the employers' drive towards EC membership. 
3.3. The political parties:1l 
Two main positions characterised the pro-EC social forces mainly organised in the 
MS, FP and the majority part of the SAP and CP. Firstly, in a compromise decision of 
June 1991, it had been decided that Sweden's policy of neutrality was compatible with 
EC membership. A second compromise redefined neutrality as military non-alignment 
in May 1992 to make it compatible with the CFSP (see Chapter 5, section 3). 
Secondly, while the convergence criteria of EMU were considered to be the basis for a 
sound economy, it was agreed that participation in the third stage of EMU would be 
decided later by the Swedish parliament and, thus, should not play a role in the 
referendum campaign. 
II With reference to the positions of the political parties. some material is used. which was published 
by the parties after the referendum, be it as the position for the ele~tions t~ ,the EP in September 1995 
or a general position on Europe. This is justified. because the parties' poSitions on the EC have not 
changed since the referendum. 
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3.3.1. The position of/he MS and FP: 
Similar to the employers' associations, the MS and FP immediately supported the 
drive for membership, after the SAP had announced its intention of applying to the 
EC in October 1990. The FP regarded the EC as a peace project. Further enJargement 
to the East could lead to a peaceful, prosperous and stable Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Ural. For Sweden, membership would imply lower interest rates, inward FDI and 
be good for the economy in general (Interview No.55; Stockholm, 19/1111996). 
Membership would be necessary, because in times ofa transnationalised economy, 
isolated national measures "tend not to have effects that could previously be 
expected" (Folkpartiet Liberalema: 1995, p.16). The EC was further considered to be 
important for the combat of unemployment, not however through common 
employment programmes,12 but through an emphasis on efficiency via competition on 
the Internal Market. The EC "can play an important role to help increase the growth of 
the European economies through market oriented reforms. Europe shall be a continent 
of entrepreneurship, enterprise and competitiveness in order to fight unemployment 
and secure welfare systems" (Folkpartiet Liberalerna: 1995, p.3). The social 
dimension was regarded as a system of unnecessarily detailed regulations, which 
should be dealt with at the national level (Folkpartiet Liberalema: 1995, p.7). 
The MS put a similarly strong emphasis on economic arguments. Swedish 
industry would greatly suffer from non-membership. Additionally, membership was 
regarded as an institutional safeguard against future Swedish experiments such as the 
EIFs (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). In other words, it would guarantee that Sweden 
remained on a neo-liberal course parallel to the other countries. Finally, Sweden 
12 The FP regarded co-ordinated actions concerning the infrastructure as an exception in this respecl 
(Folkpartict Liberalema: 1995. pp.16117). 
belonged to Europe and membership would be the only way to allow participation in 
the decision-making process of the EC (Interview No.5l; Stockholm, 15/1111996). 
Although EMU was kept off the agenda before the referendum. both parties 
supported Swedish participation as soon as possible. EMU would constitute an 
improvement of the Internal Market and its positive competitive effects. Non-
membership, on the other hand, would cause doubts in the international financial 
markets with respect to Sweden's commitment to a hard currency. Higher interest 
rates would be the likely consequence (Interview No.55; Stockholm, 19/1111996). The 
negotiation results were welcomed by the MS and FP. In any case, membership as 
such, not particular issues, had been the main goal. 
3.3.2. The position of the SAP: 
The SAP and CP, on the contrary, faced internal splits over membership, which both 
parties countered by allowing their members to form pro-EC and contra-EC campaign 
groups. The SAP yes-group argued in a similar way to the pro-EC sections of the 
trade union movement. The transnationalisation of capital and markets and the 
concomitant erosion of national sovereignty over economic policy were accepted as 
facts. Membership would allow European Social Democracy to recover some power 
vis-A-vis capital via co-operation at the intemationallevel. It was important, it was 
argued, to create a political and trade union counterbalance to capital, especially 
towards TNCs in order to protect working conditions and rights, and to fonnulate a 
common strategy of employment and welfare (SAP: 1993, p.13). These common 
objectives at the European level needed to be defined as ambitious as the convergence 
criteria for monetary co-operation. In short, "in order to reinstall the chances for 
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politics to control the capital markets it is necessary for politics to challenge the 
markets at an international level" (SAP: 1996, p.66). Membership would. furthermore. 
allow to combat transnational problems such as air and water pollution in a better 
way. Finally, the EC was considered to be a peace project. "For Social Democrats our 
historical task as Europeans is to unite the countries in Eastern and Western Europe. 
thereby paving the way for increased prosperity and an all-embracing peace and 
security order on the European continent" (SAP: 1996, p.57). Enlargement was, 
therefore, one of the top priorities. Only membership in the EC would allow Sweden 
to participate in the making of the future European order (Interview No.47; 
Stockholm, 13/1111996). 
In contrast to some voices within the pro-EC trade union camp, a watering-
down of the convergence criteria or an amendment with an employment criterion was 
not considered. EMU membership as such was to be discussed at the SAP annual 
congress in September 1997, but the SAP committed itself to the policy of austerity as 
laid out in the criteria. Full employment was not dropped as a policy goal, but the way 
of how to achieve it was different. Instead of budget deficit spending, the emphasis 
was now on a balanced economy and low levels of inflation (Interview No.44; 
Stockholm, 12/11/1996). In a global economy, where the Swedish mes had become 
increasingly transnationalised and the flow of capital had dramatically risen, it was 
pointed out that new means were required to achieve the same goals (Interview No.48; 
Stockholm, 14/11/1997). Employment was regarded as the result of the fulfilment of 
the criteria and should not be mixed up with the criteria themselves (Interview No.4 7; 
Stockholm, 13/1111996). 
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The SAP no-group, on the other hand, criticised the loss of national 
sovereignty implied by membership. The removal of border controls would lead to a 
higher level of international crime, the CFSP was regarded as a danger for Sweden' s 
policy of non-alignment, the Internal Market and EMU as a threat to the Swedish 
welfare system (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 12/1111996). Especially the 
convergence criteria would imply a risk for the solidaristic Swedish society, the tax 
system and, thereby, the Swedish Model as such (Interview No.58; Stockholm, 
26/1111996). Margareta Winberg and Marita Ulvskog, both Ministers and leading 
SAP figures in the no-camp, published an article in the LO-owned newspaper 
Aftonbladet shortly before the referendum. They strongly warned against membership, 
which would result in a permanent high level of unemployment, and advocated an 
inflationary national economic policy to create new jobs (Svensson: 1994, p.3). In 
other words, the neo-liberal argument that higher competition would lead to more 
efficiency and economic growth and, eventually, to more jobs was rejected. 
The two groups, established at the SAP annual congress in September 1993, 
prepared two motions for the extra-ordinary party congress in June 1994. The 
outcome of the vote was a soft yes-recommendation for the referendum, but both 
groups were allowed to continue their campaign until the referendum. The SAP leader 
Carlsson made clear that one could be a good Social Democrat whether one voted in 
favour or against membership (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 12/11/1996). Clearly, the 
primary goal was not to split the party before the September 1994 general elections. 
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3.3.3. The position of the CP: 
After much hesitation, the CP annual congress in June 1991 decided to support closer 
co-operation with, and application to, the EC. The party's final decision on 
membership would be taken on the basis of the negotiation results. It was also 
demanded at the congress that the non-alignment policy and Sweden's higher 
environmental standards would be maintained and that there would be a regional 
development programme for Sweden's arctic regions. The more sceptical members of 
the party demanded the adoption of a new position after the Maastricht Treaty, but 
this was not deemed possible or necessary by the party leadership. Firstly, because the 
party had signed a document, when it joined the new government in 1991, which 
stated its obligation towards a positive attitude on the question of EC membership and 
secondly, because the Ministers of Agriculture, of Labour and of Environment were 
all from the CP. The party, consequently, felt to be in a strong position to make sure 
that the negotiation results were positive in the areas it was concerned about. 
Eventually, the party leadership was satisfied with the negotiation results. Non-
alignment, not considered to be threatened by the intergovernmental CFSP, was 
retained and the Swedish environmental standards did not need to be lowered. Of 
course, the four-year transitionary period was a set-back, hut it was accepted that. 
overall more could be done for the environment within the EC than outside , 
(Interview No.42; Stockholm, 1111111996). 
There were, however, two groups within the party. The yes-group argued that 
the EC was a pan-European peace project and membership would allow to do more on 
a larger scale for the environment. The no-group, on the other hand, feared the 
negative impact on Sweden's higher environmental standards and the centralisation of 
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decision-making in Brussels. Especially the CFSP and EMU - the loss of sovereignty, 
not the convergence criteria, which the party as a whole had supported as necessary to 
clean up the economy - gave rise to concern. Opposition within the party was 
represented in the youth organisation and roughly half of the party's women group. 
On 2 and 3 May, 1994 a motion recommending a "yes" for the referendum was passed 
by a two-third majority at the party's congress. Due to the many sceptical members, 
the party as such kept a low profile during the referendum campaign and only 
published a pamphlet with a short version of the congress recommendation (Interview 
No.42; Stockholm, 1111111996). 
Nevertheless, many members still felt overruled. The CP members and voters 
were predominantly small fanners from the North and the forestry areas, which hardly 
benefited from the possible access to a larger market. Many saw only tougher 
competition ahead as the result of membership and, therefore, disagreed with the CP 
on the EC question (Interview No.42; Stockholm, 1111111996). 
The LRF's decision to support membership was crucial for the CP, since 
without its backing the party would hardly have decided in favour of membership 
(Interview No.42; Stockholm, 1111111996). This was even more important with 
reference to the overall balance. If the CP had come out in opposition to the EC, the 
soft yes-recommendation would have been extremely difficult for the SAP, because to 
be against membership would no longer have been a leftist thing to do (interview 
No.51; Stockholm, 15/1111996). Be that as it may, of the four main parties. two 
strongly recommended a "yes", while the other two came to a soft yes-conclusion. 
Similar to the division between the SAF and SI on the one hand and the unions on the 
other. the FP and MS also emphasised the neo-Iiberal policies of the EC. while the 
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yes-group of the SAP focused on the need for European co-operation to regain contro I 
over capital. 
3.3.4. The position of the VP and GP: 
The VP and GP were the only political parties, which opposed membership. They had 
rejected application and they continued on this course. The VP regarded the 
negotiation results as a failure. Transitionary periods, it was pointed out, were no 
guarantee to maintain the higher environmental standards and to keep the alcohol 
monopolies. It was, furthermore, criticised that the EC had not explicitly 
acknowledged Sweden's status of neutrality (Interview No.38; Stockholm, 
08/1111996). In general, the VP condemned the neo-liberal economic drive behind the 
EC. It opposed "the ... [EC] ... rules about free movement of capital and economic 
standardisation" (VP: 1995, p.l) and the concentration on low inflation as embodied 
in the convergence criteria, because this would cement mass unemployment rather 
than create new jobs, and exclude environment and social conditions. "For these 
reasons, the Left Party intends to oppose the monetary focus, working instead to 
ensure that full employment, good environment and equality between the sexes are 
given priority over demands of the marketplace" (VP: without date, p.4). This was to 
be supported by a global tax on currency transactions to control financial markets 
(VP: without date, p.16). The VP rejected the strengthening of supranational 
institutions. Their power should be even cut-back, while national parliaments and 
their control of EC policy-making had to be enhanced. This did not mean, however, 
that the VP sported a nationalist outlook. On the contrary. it envisaged pan-European 
co-operation via institutions such as the CSCE. the ECE of the UN. which 
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encompassed most of the European states, and via more transnational links to parties 
and social movements in other countries. The goal was a just economic order through 
wide-ranging international co-operation in contrast to a "Fortress Europe" of the rich 
against the Third World (VP: without date, pp.4/5). 
The EC, it was further argued, would compromise Sweden's policy of 
neutrality. The VP demanded that the connection between the EC and the WEU be 
severed and that Sweden should neither be a member of, nor observer at, the WEU. 
"Every similar connection diminishes the country's credibility when it comes to re-
establishing Sweden's neutrality policy ... " (VP: without date, p.13). Overall, the VP 
rejected the idea that EC membership was a necessary response to global changes. A 
national strategy, combined with international intergovernmental co-operation, was 
still considered to be the better option to combat unemployment, preserve the 
environment and to achieve equality between the sexes (Interview No.38; Stockholm, 
08/1111996). 
The GP argued along similar lines. The Maastricht Treaty did reinforce the 
party's opposition to the EC. The CFSP raised the fears about the Swedish status of 
neutrality, and EMU was rejected because it would imply a loss of sovereignty, 
transferred to an undemocratic institution in the new centre (Interview No.45; 
Stockholm, 12/1111996). In order to maintain the non-aligned status, Sweden should 
neither be an observer at, nor become a member of, the WEU, and a common foreign 
policy department and joint financing of the CFSP were rejected (GP: 1995, p.2). 
With reference to EMU, the position was not completely clear. While the third stage 
of EMU was rejected, the GP accepted the convergence criteria as necessary to obtain 
a stable economy. It, consequently, supported the new SAP government and its 
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convergence criteria plan in 1995. This view, however, was not shared by the whole 
party (Interview No.70; Stockholm, 03/12/1996). In its programme for the 1995 
elections to the EP, the party even stated that "Sweden shall ... not accept the 
convergence criteria of the EMU as a goal for the economic policy and not join the 
third stage of the EMU" (OP: 1995, p.2). 
Apart from this, the line resembled again the VP's position. The rejection of 
the EC did not imply a nationalist stance. Instead, pan-European co-operation should 
be conducted in a flexible way beyond the forced arena of the EC. For example, the 
GP suggested intergovernmental measures in order to control the financial markets. 
including fees on speCUlative currency transaction. In the area of security policy, the 
OP wanted to focus on the CSCE and included issues such as pollution in addition to 
military aspects. It was deemed to be timid to argue that Sweden would have to adapt 
to global changes in any case. The chance of reforms at the EC level were discounted 
- four votes in the Council of Ministers would not be much - and many issues should 
be dealt with at the national level anyway. Moreover, environmental co-operation 
would also be possible outside the EC, be even necessary with reference to many 
problems as, for example, the pollution of the Baltic sea, because the relevant 
countries were not EC members. There was, in short, no big hope for progress within 
the EC from the OP's point of view (Interview No.70; Stockholm, 03/1211996). 
3.4. The campaign of the referendum: 
3.4.1. The yes-campaign: 
The first group to be formed in view of the referendum was the group "Yes to 
Europe" in 1991. It became the platfonn of the employers' associations and the MS 
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and FP. As soon as it had become clear that the final decision on membership would 
be taken in a referendum, capital realised the importance of a well prepared and 
professionally run campaign (Interview No.43; Stockholm, 1211111996). The two 
parties provided mainly the personnel, while industry put forward the huge financial 
backup. The chairman of the group was a member of the MS and industry at the same 
time and the work was predominantly carried out in local offices across the country 
(Interview No.51; Stockholm, 15/1111996). The MS and FP conducted their own pro-
EC campaigns in addition to "Yes to Europe" and especially the MS wanted to make 
the EC an integrated issue of the party's appearance (Interview No.51; Stockholm, 
15/1111996; Interview No. 55; Stockholm 19/1111996). 
The yes-group of the SAP set up its own campaign group after the party's 
1993 annual congress. It worked closely together with the pro-membership forces of 
the LO; a co-operation which was no-surprise considering the close institutional 
relations between the two. A common platform with "Yes to Europe" was deemed 
impossible after the attacks on each other during the 1994 election campaign 
(Interview No.44; Stockholm 1211111996). Moreover, too close a co-operation was 
regarded from both sides as a danger. In some occasions, trade unions asked 
employers not to address the workers, because this could result in a negative opinion 
(Interview No.66; Stockholm, 29/1111996). Similarly, employers feared that a 
common platform could lead to a conspiracy theory amongst the population and, thus, 
be detrimental to the whole undertaking (Interview No.43; Stockholm. 12/11/1996). 
There were, however, many informal contacts in order to exchange information about 
each other's strategy (Interview No.47; Stockholm, 13/1111996; Interview No.58; 
Stockholm, 26/11/1996; Interview No.61; Stockholm, 26/1 111996). 
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One reason for setting-up additional platfonns was the impression that "'Yes to 
Europe" could not reach workers and the countryside. The SAP-LO group attracted 
workers, but pro-EC members of the CP fonned, together with well known public 
figures and representatives of other small groups, the "Network for Europe" with the 
financial help of the LRF in 1993 to cater for their particular constituency, mainly the 
small farmers in the countryside (Interview No.50; Stockholm, 14/1111996).13 In 
general, this fonnation of three different groups on the yes-side was not viewed as 
detrimental to the aim of EC membership. On the contrary, they all addressed a 
different clientele and, thus, complemented each other rather well (Interview No.44; 
Stockholm, 1211111996). 
The general arguments were the same. All three groups regarded the EC as a 
peace project, capable to overcome the separation between Eastern and Western 
Europe. Only membership would guarantee the participation in this project. It was 
further pointed out that membership was an economic necessity and allowed to tackle 
certain problems such as the protection of the environment at an international level. 
There was, however, a difference with reference to the particular emphasis. "Yes to 
Europe" stressed the economic side. Tougher competition, more inward FDI and 
lower interest rates as a result of membership would lead to higher economic growth 
and, then, more jobs (Interview No.54; Stockholm, 19/1111996; Interview No.55; 
Stockholm, 1911111996). Non-membership, on the other hand, would endanger the 
position of Swedish TNCs and, thereby, the whole Swedish economy (Interview 
No.51; Stockholm, 15111/1996; Interview No.67; Stockholm, 29/1111996). The EC 
IJ Some people argued that the SAP-LO platfonn and the "Network for Europe" actually fo~~ one 
group (Interview No.SO; Stockholm, 1411 111996). but this was denied by SAP-LO group a~lvlsts 
(Interview No.44; Stockholm, 12111/1996; Interview No.47; Stockholm. \3/11119(6). While there 
were two different groups, the unclear boundaries may indicate strong co-operation and overlapping 
interests in contrast to the "Yes to Europe" group. 
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was the best option along a neo-liberal economic policy course, which should not be 
undermined through the introduction of Swedish Model type solutions such as an 
active manpower policy or the development of a strong social dimension (Interview 
No.43; Stockholm, 12/1111996). 
The SAP-LO group, on the other hand, emphasised the need to combat 
unemployment at the European level and stated that they wanted a chapter on 
employment to be included in the revised Maastricht Treaty (Interview No.58; 
Stockholm, 26/1111996; Interview No.66; Stockholm, 29/1111996). Finally, the 
"Network for Europe" focused on the EC as a pan-European project and regarded it as 
a better way of protecting the environment, while the counterbalance of transnational 
capital did not feature highly on its agenda. In short, the different groups were not 
only a tactical way of addressing different clienteles. They also represented clear 
differences between the groups' reasons for supporting membership, especially 
between "Yes to Europe" and the SAP-LO group. 
3.4.2. The no-campaign: 
The no-side, on the contrary, was united in the "No to the EU" platfonn, which also 
had local organisations throughout the country. Membership was on an individual 
basis, but the various groups and associations had representatives on the board. These 
were mainly the SAP and CP sections against membership, the trade unions against 
membership, some interest groups such as "People against Drugs", youth 
organisations and environmental groups, and the VP and GP. The latter two were 
extremely active, but did not want to, or were not allowed to, develop too high a 
profile. Both were electoraJly weak at the time, had a radical reputation which 
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threatened to endanger the group's non-partisan people's movement appeal. and it was 
agreed that the most important task was to convince the SAP and CP voters (Interview 
No.38; Stockholm, 0811111996). To the outside, the platform was, consequently, 
represented by the SAP-LO and CP networks (Interview No.45; Stockholm, 
12/1111996). 
"No to the EU" rejected the idea that Sweden could contribute to changes by 
being a member of the EC. A country as small as Sweden would have no say. Rather 
than Sweden influencing the EC, the EC would influence Sweden, causing lower 
environmental standards and undermining the welfare state via the required 
harmonisation of the tax systems. Instead of regarding the EC as an area of prosperity 
for everybody, "No to the EU" viewed it as a fortress of the rich against the poor in 
the Third World (Interview No.47; Stockholm, 13/1111996). An increase in drug 
trafficking and lower food standards were presented as further possible dangers of 
membership (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 12/1111996). The EC was also rejected 
because of its democratic deficit; firstly, due to the restriction of national sovereignty 
and secondly, due to undemocratic supranational institutions. The CFSP was regarded 
as a threat to Swedish neutrality. 
The VP's argument that the EC was a project of big capital and that the 
convergence criteria would cement mass unemployment was not part of the platform's 
position. It has to be remembered that many CP politicians, who had supported the 
criteria as a good basis for a sound economy, were a part of the platform and the VP 
did not want to break up the unity (Interview No.38; Stockholm, 08/11/1996). It was 
also considered to be difficult by the whole no-group to put forward a strong 
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economic case against membership, since this area was widely used and dominated by 
the yes-side (Interview No.70; Stockholm, 03/12/1996). 
3.5. The outcome: a narrow Hyes"for membership. 
The result was close. The yes-side won by a very narrow margin on 13 November 
1994.52.7 per cent voted "yes" versus 47.3 per cent "no", after the no-side had led 
from spring 92 to shortly before the referendum (Luif: 1996, p.214). In contrast to 
Austria, the opposition had been in a much better position in Sweden. Firstly, it was 
not divided into a nationalist and a progressive opposition and, therefore, could form a 
common platform. Secondly, the social forces of nationally-oriented labour were not 
constrained by organisational discipline and participated openly in the debate. 
Nevertheless, the no-side still failed to win the referendum. 
Several reasons can account for this. Firstly, the financial power behind the 
yes-group was significantly larger, stemming mainly from industrial sources. An 
academic investigations found out that the ratio was about 20 to 1 in favour of the yes-
side. Moreover, although there were separate campaign groups, this did not hinder the 
SAP-LO group to accept money from business (Interview No. 71; Stockholm, 
04/12/1996). Secondly, the no-side did not have a well-developed alternative to EC 
membership. What held them together was their rejection of accession to the EC. 
After the referendum, there was an immediate inter-party competition between the GP 
and the VP for the votes of the no-voters in the referendum, which demonstrated the 
fragility of the alliance (Interview No.70; Stockholm, 0311211997). Furthennore, 
although many reasons for why the EC was opposed were shared by all groups of the 
"No to the EU" alliance, in the area of economic policy, the differences could not 
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have been clearer. While the VP and large sections of the GP and the SAP-LO no-
group rejected the convergence criteria and their focus on low inflation at the expense 
of an employment criterion, the CP politicians but also some SAP and LO members 
still considered them to be the necessary basis for a sound Swedish economy, even in 
the case of non-membership. In this situation, it was impossible to formulate an 
economic programme, which could rival the neo-liberal project. Considering the 
overall emphasis put on economic issues by the various yes-groups, this would, 
however, have been a crucial prerequisite for success. 
This also demonstrates that the no-side at no point had managed to form a 
historic bloc. It did not have a common basis in the sphere of production nor a 
common ideological project. It was only a short-term alliance with a single goal, the 
prevention of Swedish EC membership. Some participants in the no-side considered 
the lack of an alternative as not important with reference to the defeat in the 
referendum (Interview No.38; Stockholm, 08/1111996). Political commentators, 
however, argued that it was responsible for the no-side loosing supporters during the 
crucial final phase of the campaign (Svensson: 1994, p.l). 
A further factor might have been the tactic by the no-side to rely on 
comparatively little known representatives for their presentation to the public. Kenth 
Petterson, the President of the Commercial Workers' Union, Eva-Britt Svensson, a 
member of the SAP, and Eva Hellstrand, close to the CP. had a difficult time in 
opposition to well established, high profile politicians such as Prime Minister 
Carlsson and Bildt, the former Prime Minister and now leader of the main opposition 
party MS. The VP and GP as such. but especially the party leader of the VP and Per 
Gahrton of the GP. both well known politicians with a lot of experience in debates. 
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might have been able to convince the public in a better way. In sho~ some sections 
within the VP and especially the GP criticised the no-side for having sidelined the VP 
and GP during the campaign, thereby failing to use two potential strong factors 
(Interview No.45; Stockholm, 12/1111996). This point might have been of some 
relevance, taking into account the Swedish elections to the EP in September 1995, 
when the VP and the GP, with 12.9 per cent and 17.2 per cent respectively, scored a 
massive success, mainly on the expense of the SAP (The Swedish Institute: 1996b, 
p.2). 
A few days before the referendum, 19 out of the 22 Presidents of LO affiliated 
unions wrote an article, in which they declared their support for membership. This 
gave the yes-side a general boost, since it was large sections of the workers, which 
favoured a "no" and/or still hesitated in their decision (Interview No.56; Stockholm, 
2111111997). May be more significantly, amongst them was Lillemor Arvidsson, the 
President of the Municipal Workers' Union, who also spoke out in favour of 
membership, despite the fact that her union had not given an official recommendation 
and that it was known that a majority of its members opposed the EC. Her decision 
came as a total shock to the ''No to the EU" group and damaged its campaign 
(Interview No.45; Stockholm, 12/1111996). 
Finally, the SAP's move towards economic arguments during the last week of 
the campaign seemed to have been important. Prime Minister Carlsson and other 
high-profile SAP politicians, now free to campaign after the general elections had 
been won in September, threw their weight behind the yes-campaign. Membership, 
they argued, would lead to lower interest rates, more jobs and be the only way to save 
the Swedish welfare state (Interview No.44; Stockholm, 12111/1996). 
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Capital used its structural power to underline this argument. In the fonn of 
open letters and advertisements in major Swedish newspapers in September 1994, 
"the four largest companies explicitly threatened to move within the boundaries of the 
.. [ECl ... if Sweden did not join the ... [Community] ... "(Fioretos: 1997, p.31S). The 
fmancial markets also lent their structural support. "When the publication of a poll on 
6 November 1994 showed the 'no' side again gaining ground, interest rates went up in 
Sweden" (Luif: 1996, p.321). As a result, home owners feared that they would have to 
pay higher interest rates outside the EC. Everything boiled down to the question of 
whom do you trust more with the economy. Eventually, it was the Prime Minister's 
credibility, which decided the point; something which was acknowledged by members 
of both the no- and the yes-side (Interview No.4S; Stockholm, 12/1111996; Interview 
No.50; Stockholm, 14/1111996). Again, the no-side's lack of an alternative economic 
programme and more high-profile representatives might have been crucial in this 
respect. 
4. Conclusion: 
As it was demonstrated in this Chapter, there was little new movement of the Austrian 
social forces in favour of membership. The pro-EC historic bloc had been solidly 
formed in the process leading to application. During the referendum campaign, it was 
merely confirmed and reinforced. The main focus was on how to structure the 
campaign in order to achieve a yes-result in the referendum. The social forces 
opposed to the EC. on the other hand, attempted to mobilise their support and to form 
a stronger and broader alliance. Quantitatively, the FPO's shift towards a no-position 
strengthened the no-side, but in practice it undermined the cause of the anti-EC forces. 
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The ideological rift was too big to fonn an alliance and the social forces against the 
EC but in favour of international co-operation had constantly to distance themselves 
from nationalist, if not racist groups. 
In Swede~ the debate started in earnest. To some extent, the fonnation of the 
social forces showed interesting parallels to the Austrian situation. It was the 
transnational forces of capital and labour, not internationally-oriented forces due to 
the different production structure, which were in favour of application. They were 
supported by those institutions linked to the global economy. Especially the Finance 
Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office were important, although more in bringing 
about application than during the referendum campaign. Unlike in Austria, the social 
forces of the transnational sector of production fonned only a strong alliance with 
reference to the issue of membership. They did not fonn a historic bloc. While they 
agreed on membership as a necessary response to globalisation and the Internal 
Market initiative, the exact reasons for it differed significantly. Capital regarded the 
EC as a good way of continuing the neo-liberal restructuring of the Swedish state and 
rejected a strong social dimension and joint employment programmes at the European 
level. On the other hand, transnational labour demanded additional joint employment 
programmes and sometimes even a relaxation of the convergence criteria and the 
acceptance of a slightly higher rate of inflation in order to create more jobs. In short, 
there was no inner coherence of the alliance of social forces behind the Swedish pro-
EC groups. The goal of membership was the issue they rallied around. 
Similar to Austria~ the national forces opposed accession. It was the public 
sector in Sweden, which was sheltered and it was, consequently. the workers of this 
sector, which played a leading role in opposing membership. An interesting difference 
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was, however, the position of nationally-oriented capital, which can be explained by 
referring to the different economic structure of the two countries. In Sweden, the 
economic structure and the economic well-being of the whole country was dominated 
by big TNCs. Many nationally-oriented companies either depended directly on the 
TNCs or argued that the good performance of them, overall, also benefited the 
Swedish economy and, thereby, the nationally-oriented companies. There was, 
consequently, little incentive to oppose membership and to participate in the 
campaign on the no-side. In contrast, small- and medium-sized companies were 
predominant in the Austrian economic structure. They had always had a strong say in 
economic policy-making and faced little if no opposition by TNCs. At the same time, 
many were directly negatively affected through membership and the concomitant 
deregulation of the sheltered sectors. It was natural for them to support the no-side 
during the campaign and to form alliances with nationally-oriented labour and, 
although to a lesser extent, the GA and FPO. 
In both countries, the no-side did not manage to form a strong alliance, let 
alone an historic bloc. They did not succeed in formulating a "hegemonic project" as 
an alternative to EC membership and were especially unable to present a coherent 
concept, which could rival neo-liberalism. They were mainly united by their common 
rejection of membership. In Austria, even this was impossible due to the ideological 
rift between the social forces around the GA and the FPO. 
SO far, the emphasis of the discussion has been on political economy 
arguments. It has been stated that mainly transnational forces in Sweden and 
internationally-oriented ones in Austria pursued membership, because it offered the 
best way forward to continue the accumulation of capital, after the Keynesian 
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arrangements at the national level of the post-war era had run out of steam. There are, 
however, serious claims, that it had actually been the changes in the international 
security structure which made Austria and Sweden join the EC. In other words, 
membership was a response to a feeling of insecurity after the end of the stable, 
bipolar Cold War structure. The next Chapter explores this question. 
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Chapter 5: Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC and the changing 
security structure. 
1« Introduction: 
1.1. Neo-realism, neutral states and the end of the Cold War: 
Neo-realists regard the bipolar Cold War period between 1947 and 1989, based on 
nuclear weapons and an equal amount of military capabilities between the USA and 
Soviet Union and their respective allies, as extremely stable ensuring a long-lasting 
peace in Europe (e.g. Mearsheimer: 1990, pp.10-21). The end of the Cold War 
implied the end of this stable structure and, consequently, more instability, more 
insecurity and a greater likelihood of conflict in Europe. 
Neutral countries benefited from the bipolar, peaceful structure as did those, 
which were a member of one of the two military alliances. The end of the Cold War 
removed this cosy arrangement. New conflicts, real or potential, have emerged at the 
borders and endangered these countries' security. The conflicts in fonner Yugoslavia 
bordering Austria and the potential conflicts between the three Baltic states and 
Russia in the vicinity of Sweden underline this point. In this situation, it is argued 
along neo-realist lines, Austria and Sweden might have joined the EC in order to 
become a part of a strong alliance of states. The close relationship between the EC and 
the WEU and, therefore, NATO, but also the emerging CFSP (see Introduction, 
section 2.2) would provide security guarantees for Sweden and Austria without 
becoming a member ofNA TO or the WEU itself. In short, EC membership was 
regarded as a way of ensuring the security guarantees of the WEU and NATO through 
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the backdoor. I 
This neo-realist argument directly contradicts the conclusions of Chapters 3 
and 4 that it was alliances of internationally-oriented capital and labour in Austria and 
transnational capital and labour in Sweden, which brought about EC membership in 
response to domestic economic recession, revived regional integration in Europe and 
global structural change. It is the task of this chapter to assess the impact of the 
changing security structure and to analyse whether it actually had such a predominant 
influence, as suggested by neo-realism. 
1.2. Neo-Gramscianism and the examination of the security structure: 
At first sight, neo-Gramscianism and its focus on production seems to be unable to 
account for changes in the security structure and their impact on political processes. 
Nevertheless, Holman makes clear that the emphasis on transnational social forces 
"does not mean that ... [neo-Gramscians] ... argue for a simple replacement of a state-
centric for a 'TNC-centric' approach. In order to become effective, concepts of control 
... must also be translated into state policy" (Holman: 1992, p.19). The globalisation 
concept of production and finance appears to be contradicted by the territorial concept 
of security provision. These two concepts, however, are not only opposed, but also 
interrelated, because "ultimately the security of globalisation depends upon military 
force with a territorial basis" (Cox: 1996, p.287). As an example for an interrelation of 
this type, Cox identifies the war against Iraq, during which the USA. a state. 
responded as the principal guarantor and enforcer of the global economic order (Cox: 
1996, pp.287-292). In other words, global economic accumulation depends on 
I In the case of Austria. this is argued. for example. by Neuhold: 1994. pp.IIO/lll; Pedersen. I'N·l. 
p.83: Schneider: 1994. pp.17118; and Sucharipa: 1993. p.158; for Sweden. see Huldt 1')')5. r l-lq 
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security arrangements by states for protection. 
In sum, an analysis of the security structure and its impact is not only possible 
but also necessary from a neo-Gramscian perspective. A focus on states and slip into 
state-centric language cannot be completely avoided, since military power is still 
controlled by states. This analysis must, however, eschew the neo-realist assumptions 
of a monolithic state, a fixed state rationale of behaviour and the explanatory primacy 
of structure. Instead, it must investigate how state interests in the security area are 
constructed at the national level by looking at the struggle of social forces against the 
background of the international structure. Here, it is to be examined why it was 
suddenly deemed to be possible by which forces in Austria and Sweden to combine 
neutrality with membership. 
2. Austria: the silent redefinition of neutrality. 
2.1. The history of Austrian neutrality: 
Austrian neutrality is mainly a product of World War Two and the Cold War. The 
Soviet Union could only accept Austrian independence, if it was assured that Austria 
would not strengthen the rival bloc. Permanent neutrality of the Swiss type provided 
the solution. Nevertheless, Rotter points out that discussions about neutrality had 
already started before World War Two and immediately after 1945 due to the 
country's geographical position on the border between different cultural traditions and 
interest zones. The East-West conflict was crucial, but there had also been some 
domestic Austrian considerations in favour of neutrality (Rotter: 1991, pp.26127). 
Austria's status of neutrality was not part of the State Treaty of 15 May 1955. 
which gave Austria back independence and full sovereignty. Austria did not want to 
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tie its neutrality to other countries' pennission and it is often pointed out that only 
Austria decides on the fonnulation and contents of neutrality (JankowitschIPorius: 
1994, p.52). In the so-called Moscow Memorandum of 15 April 1955, however. 
Austria promised to commit itself to pennanent neutrality constitutionally and via 
international law. On 26 October 1955, one day after the last foreign soldier had left 
Austrian territory, a constitutional law was, consequently, passed declaring the 
pennanent neutral status. This was, then, notified to the states, with which Austria had 
diplomatic relations at the time, which led to a quasi-treaty relationship with other 
states in respect of Austria's neutrality. Overall, although not part of the State Treaty, 
neutrality must be regarded as the Soviet Union's precondition for Austrian 
sovereignty and is, therefore, in a close relationship with it (Neuhold: 1987, pp. 7 -10; 
Ucakar: 1991, p.89). 
It is generally accepted that pennanent neutrals such as Austria are not onJy 
committed to neutrality in all wars, but that they also have to "avoid such peacetime 
ties and policies as would make its neutrality in war impossible or unlikely" 
(Hakovirta: 1988, p.9). Neuhold presents a list of peacetime obligations from an 
Austrian perspective (Neuhold: 1992, pp.88/89): 
• no support for parties/states engaged in warfare; 
• no pennit for parties/states engaged in warfare to use Austrian territory and 
atrspace; 
• the restrictions related to private selling of anns to war parties must be equal with 
reference to all war parties; 
• no participation not only in military alliances, but also in systems of collective 
security because of possible military measures against aggressors from outside and 
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inside the system; 
• no participation in supranational economic organisations because of, for example. a 
possible one-sided embargo of weapon exports; 
• maintenance of a strong national defence; 
• intensive international activities to improve the respectability of neutrality. 
In contrast to Sweden, Austria's defence efforts were less determined (Kramer: 
1996, p.162), but, similar to Sweden and Finland, Austria pursued an active 
internationalist policy. The link between foreign policy and active neutrality had 
already been made at the end of the 1950s, but the real upturn in internationalist 
policies occurred between 1970 and 1983 and was associated with the person of 
Chancellor Kreisky (SPO). Austria actively participated in the CSCE process and the 
United Nations (UN), it launched independent initiatives in respect of the North-South 
and Middle East conflicts and handed a large centre in Vienna over to the UN. 
(Kramer: 1996, pp.156-169). 
2.2. Application against the background of bipolarity: 
As it was outlined in Chapter 3, section 1, a majority of Austrian social forces 
accepted in 1989 that membership was compatible with neutrality. In contrast to 
Sweden, this occurred against the background of the Cold War. Austria applied to the 
EC before the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification. In the government's 
report to parliament of April 1989, the EPC was considered to be of no risk to 
Austrian neutrality. because it excluded co-operation in military aspects. At the same 
time, it was declared that Austria would not participate in future developments 
towards a defence community or a binding foreign policy with majority decision-
274 
making (Luif: 1996, p.238). Nevertheless, application at this time implied that the 
definition of neutrality, which stated that neutrality was incompatible with 
membership in supranational economic organisations, was turned into its opposite 
without a prior explicit change in the Austrian doctrine of neutrality (Hummer: 1996, 
p.I3). The rationale for this reinterpretation had been given in a study by Waldemar 
Hummer and Michael Schweitzer, commissioned by the VOl in 1987 
(Hummer/Schweitzer: 1987; see Chapter 3, section 1.1). The two experts of 
intemationallaw pointed to the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. Austria could 
declare neutrality a matter of important national interest to prevent majority decisions. 
They further pointed to Articles 223 and 224 of the 1957 EEC Treaty, which allowed 
exceptions for the protection of essential security interests. The problem that Article 
225 gives the ECJ the final say in these matters could be overcome in that the EC 
agreed not to use the control powers of the ECJ, when Austria sought exceptions 
because of its neutrality. 
It became soon clear that the Soviet Union had reservations against Austrian 
membership. They did not say no, but they did not give a positive signal either, 
neither while the Chancellor Vranitzky and the Foreign Minister Mock visited 
Moscow in September 1988, nor during the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze to Vienna in the same year (Interview No.2; Vienna, 09/05/1995; 
Interview No.14; Vienna, 17/05/95). During Mock's discussions with Shevardnadze 
in Moscow, the latter said that he objected to Austrian participation in military 
alliances. Mock pointed out that the EC was not an alliance of this type, and the 
matter was not mentioned again (Interview No.36; Vienna, 15/05/1996). The section 
within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, responsible for policy fonnulation with reference 
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to Germany and Austria, consisted of old-style hard-liners, who tried to influence 
Soviet foreign policy in a way that opposed Austria's EC membership. Overall, while 
they did not succeed in their task, it became clear that the Soviet Union would have 
preferred Austria to stay outside the EC (Interview No.II; Vienna, 12/05/95). 
Not surprisingly, after Austria's official application to the EC on 17 July 1989. 
the Soviet Union issued an aide-memoir, in which the Austrian application was 
"regretted". It pointed out that the EC had not only an economic character, but also 
pursued the aim of establishing a political union with a common foreign and security 
policy. Membership of a permanently neutral country in such an organisation would 
lead to the loss of the real possibilities inherent in the neutral status. Simultaneously. 
the Soviet Union positively recognised Austria's insistence on maintaining its neutral 
status and it expected that Austria would honour the obligations, which stemmed from 
the State Treaty (Soviet Union: 1989, p.562). 
Austria dealt with this pressure in a diplomatic way. On the one hand, it tried 
to appease the Soviet Union by writing its policy of neutrality into the application. In 
an article clearly addressed to Soviet ears, the Foreign Minister Mock emphasised 
both Austria's necessity to join the EC for economic reasons and its insistence on 
neutrality, declared to be a part of the Austrian national identity and to be used to 
further the dialogue between all European countries. Mock called the pursuit of both 
policies a "double challenge", which would not contradict each other. since the EC 
was no military alliance, since the EPC did not conflict with Austria's duties related to 
neutrality and since the development of the EC into a political alliance was unlikely 
(Mock: (989). On the other hand. Austrian decision-makers did not pay attention and 
applied to the EC despite Soviet reservations. Partly, because the decline of the Soviet 
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Union had already been noticeable and it was deemed possible to disregard Soviet 
opinion (Interview No.9; Vienna, 1110511995); partly, because, since Gorbachev had 
come to power in 1985, it had become clear that the Soviet Union deideologised 
international relations and pursued a more liberal foreign policy. It would not attack 
Austria militarily in order to make it change its mind. Every country should be 
allowed to decide its own foreign policy was the new line. This was stated by 
Gorbachev in an official visit to Finland in 1991, but had already been clear in the late 
1980s (Interview No.ll; Vienna, 12/05/95; Hafner: 1992, pp.167 -178). 
To sum up, the changes in the international security structure, at this stage 
only expressed in the decline of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's liberal foreign 
policy, played a role as a background condition in that they made the re-interpretation 
of neutrality and the EC membership strategy by the VOl a feasible option (Interview 
No.2; Vienna, 09/05/95; Interview No.33; Vienna, 09/05/1996). Since the drastic 
changes leading to the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Eastern bloc 
occurred later, the decision on application cannot have been due to a higher degree of 
insecurity in the international system. Interviews with officials of the Foreign 
Ministry and the Chancellor's Office confirm this point. There was no higher level of 
international insecurity perceived from 1985 onwards (Interview No.2; Vienna, 
09/05/1995; Interview No.9; Vienna, 11105/1995). Rather, there was first the decision 
on membership due to economic reasons, taken by the social forces of internationally-
oriented capital and labour (see Chapter 3, section I) and then, the problem of how to 
combine this with neutrality was tackled (Interview No.33; Vienna. 09/05/1996). 
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2.3. Austria's new foreign and security policy after Maastricht: 
When the CFSP was added to the EC as an additional pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Austria immediately stated its intention of active participation. Neutrality was neither 
renounced nor restated and the application to the EC of 1989 was pragmatically, not 
officially, changed into application to the new, post-Maastricht EC. This implied that 
pennanent neutrality was also considered to be compatible with the Maastricht Treaty 
and the CFSP (Hummer: 1996, p.26). The CFSP, it was pointed out, was no military 
organisation, and its nature was purely intergovernmental, as decisions are taken 
according to the principle of unanimity. If there were changes towards a more 
supranational structure in this pillar, the Austrian government would ask for opt-out 
clauses (Interview No.2; Vienna, 09/05/95; Interview No.6; Vienna, 10/05/1995; 
Interview No.9; Vienna, 11105/95). 
From a neo-realist perspective, one could argue that the real new international 
instability occurred after 1989 and that Austria was happy to continue its commitment 
to the EC application in 1991, as the EC included the new pillar of a CFSP, offering 
more security via membership. There were some statements by the Chancellor 
Vranitzky and the Foreign Minister Mock, which indicated such a change in foreign 
and security policy: 
Considering the international conditions of security policy, the potential of the 
EC for peace and stability was also one of the central arguments of the 
Austrian government in favour of EC membership [translation by the author] 
(Vranitzky: 1995, p.13). 
From a geopolitical point of view, we also have to take into account that 
Austria is situated in the new Europe along a dangerous area in East and 
South-East Europe [translation by the author] (Mock: 1994, p.6). 
Interviewees in Vienna, however. made clear that Austria did not feel threatened in a 
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military way (Interview No.2; Vienna, 09/05/1995; Interview No.9; Vienn~ 
11105/1995). "There are, of course, some experts who regret the loss of stability in 
Austria's security environment, but the majority seems ready to accept some 
instability as the price for change in a system that has been artificially frozen for four 
decades" (Lehne: 1992, p.206). The war in former Yugoslavia may have had an effect 
on the population and their decision in the referendum, but not on the political elite 
(Interview No.6; Vienna, 10/05/1995; Interview No.33; Vienna, 09/05/1996). Even 
this should not be overrated, since it did not change "the fact that a majority of 
Austrians still preferred neutrality to EC ... membership" (Luif: 1996, p.244). 
Active participation in the CFSP was officially related to the establishment of 
a new European security system as the primary target. Importantly, the definition of 
security was not limited to the military sphere, but contained other areas as well. 
Chancellor Vranitzky stated: 
In this context, it appears to me to be important that European security policy 
will be defined in an encompassing way, beyond the framework of a merely 
military perspective and instruments and that it also consists of questions of 
social, ecological, democratic and of all policy areas described nowadays as 
'internal security' - I only mention terms such as immigration, organised 
crime, terrorism [translation by the author] (Vranitzky: 1995, p.13). 
To conclude, EC membership even after the end of the Cold War was not seen 
as a method of gaining higher security, but rather as a possibility of attaining 
influence on the shaping of the new European security system. According to Austri~ 
this new system should be all-encompassing, i.e. include policy spheres such as social 
security and international terrorism and also countries such as Russia and Ukraine. In 
this sense, there was no contradiction between neutrality and active co-operation in 
the CFSP perceived. The abandonment of neutrality may only be discussed in the 
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event of having actually succeeded at establishing this new, pan-European security 
system (Interview No.14, 17/05/1995). 
Despite this rhetoric, however, traditional Austrian peacetime policies of 
neutrality were abandoned. In 1994, a new article was added to the Constitution to 
make the CFSP compatible with neutrality. It allowed Austria to participate in 
measures of restricting, suspending, or cutting of economic relations with one or more 
states, thereby safeguarding its co-operation in possible economic sanctions of other 
countries by the EC via the CFSP (Hummer: 1996, p.27; Luif: 1996, pp.334/335). EC 
membership, as already mentioned, contradicted the requirement of non-participation 
in supranational economic organisations and the constitutional change related to the 
CFSP made Austrian support for a party/state engaged in warfare possible. Correctly, 
some observers pointed out that Austria's neutrality had been reduced to its military 
core, i.e. the non-participation in military alliances and combat (Hummer: 1996, p.44; 
2 Kunnert: 1993, pp.321-323). 
2.4. Social forces and the construction of Austria's official position: 
This official Austrian position on neutrality was mainly a compromise between the 
pro-EC social forces represented by the two governing parties, the SPO and OVP. A 
strong group within the SPO had mobilised against application, because it perceived 
neutrality as incompatible with membership. To minimise opposition to the EC as 
much as possible the SPO declared before the decision on application that neutrality 
was not negotiable; a demand which was supported by the AK and OGB. The fact that 
2 Austria's decision to allow the use of its air and ground space for the transit of weapons and military 
personnel during the Gulf War in 1991 and legal changes, which declared that measures taken by the 
UN against aggressors did not constitute an instance of war within the meaning of the term in 
international law (JankowitschiPorius: 1994, p.54; Luif: 1996, pp.1441145), further underlined this 
restriction of neutrality. 
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a majority eventually decided in favour of compatibility was due, fIrStly, to a change 
in the frameworks of thought, partly brought about by the study of Hummer and 
Schweitzer (1987), and secondly, to the evaluation by the international law office in 
the Foreign Ministry, which sanctioned compatibility (see Chapter 3, section 1.2.2 and 
1.2.4). After Maastricht, it was especially the sPa, which supported the wider 
definition of security with the goal of avoiding situations such as in fonner 
Yugoslavia from the beginning. It never regarded EC membership as a way of 
entering the WEU and/or NATO through the backdoor, which were both considered to 
be unsuitable as the basis for a future pan-European security system. Moreover, 
neutrality was deemed to be an untouchable issue, at least until the day the new all-
encompassing security order had been established. Even in this event, membership in 
military alliances such as WEU and NATO would not be on the Social Democratic 
agenda (Interview No.4; Vienna, 09/05/1995). While the internal party opposition to 
EC membership supported this position, it was criticised that a clear concept of what 
this new order could look like and how to bring it about was missing (Interview 
No.23; Vienna, 24/04/1996). 
Social forces, represented by the GVP, on the other hand, were critical about 
making neutrality a non-issue of the debate. They were reluctant to include the 
neutrality clause into the application letter and large sections would have preferred 
neutrality to be renounced and Austria to become a WEU and, although to a lesser 
extent, NATO member (Kunnert: 1993, p.327; Interview No.36; Vienna, 15/05/1996). 
Neutrality was deemed to be an obstacle for Austria's foreign and security policy, 
hindering it from taking up full responsibility in a new European security system. 
Should the CFSP move towards further integration in defence, the OVP preferred to 
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avoid Austrian demands for opt-out clauses. OveralL however~ the GVP had to pay 
attention to the coalition partner SPG and the Austrian population, for which 
neutrality was something like a "sacred cow" (Interview No.12; Vienna, 12/05/1995). 
Even the former Foreign Minister Mock, who was more in favour of membership in 
the WEU and NATO, identified merely traditional peace-keeping functions such as 
search and rescue as well as humanitarian operations, when it came to the question of 
Austria's active contributions to European security policy (Mock: 1995, p.9). 
The opposition parties rejected this government compromise. The Liberal 
Forum argued that neutrality was obsolete after the end of the Cold War and should be 
replaced with WEU membership. The CSCE would be too inflexible due to its 53 
members and, therefore, could not provide the basis for a new European security 
order. Instead, this order should be grounded in the transatlantic alliance between the 
EC and the USA via the WEU and NATO, the structures of which had to be redefined 
(Hummer: 1996, pp.43-44). The FPG also stated that neutrality had been obsolete 
since the end of the 1980s because of the changes in the international security system. 
Now, Austria's large borders with Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia would 
require Austria to look for whatever security it could get. Because the WEU was 
considered to exist only on paper, NATO membership was the preferred option. 
Overall, a pan-European security order would be welcomed, but this was only 
regarded as a possibility in the long-run (Interview No.26; Vienna, 25/04/1996). 
On the other hand, the GA rejected the government compromise because of its 
alleged negative implications for Austria's neutrality. In contrast to the SPO and 
OVP, the GA did not think that EC membership was compatible with neutrality. The 
government was accused of deceiving the Austrian population in this respect. It would 
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still use the word "neutrality" to protect it against the "emotional shock" of loosing it. 
while it knew perfectly well that neutrality was incompatible with the CFSP (GA: 
1993, pp.69/70). The EC was considered to have been developed into a military bloc. 
which made the overcoming of aggressive structures towards a European peace order 
impossible. A higher degree of international instability, exemplified in the wars in 
former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union and the danger of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, was acknowledged. This should not, however, be countered by an 
offensive Western European military strategy with military units of flexible 
intervention (GA: 1993, pp.64/65). Instead, the WEU and NATO should be dissolved 
and make way for an integrated, co-operative security system, which also included 
Russia. Participation in the development of new transnational practices of peace-
movements was one way of working towards such an alternative security policy. The 
extension and strengthening of all-European organisations such as the CSCE at the 
international level was another (GA: 1993, pp.67/68). Finally, neutrality should not be 
undermined but reinstated in its full original meaning, as expressed in the 
internationalist policies of the former Chancellor Kreisky in the 1970s and early 
1980s, to become one of the constitutive elements of the new European security 
system (GA: 1996, pp.4/5). 
During the referendum campaign, neutrality and questions of foreign and 
security policy did not playa dominant role, neither for supporters nor for opponents 
of membership. It was only the sixth and the fourth respectively most important 
motive for voters, influencing their decision in the referendum (Luif: 1996, p.328). As 
it was outlined in Chapter 4, section 2.3, economic arguments and especially the 
irrational debate that turned the referendum in an anti-Haider campaign dominated the 
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final stages of the campaign in Austria. The pro-EC social forces seem to have 
succeeded at convincing the population that membership did not contradict neutrality 
and that this, consequently, was not an issue of the campaign. 
3. Sweden: neutrality redefined as non-alignment. 
3.1. The historical background of Swedish neutrality: 
Swedish neutrality goes back to 1814/15 and the Europe of the Vienna Congress. 
Since then, Sweden has not been involved in any war (Logue: 1989). During World 
War Two, Swedish neutrality was stretched to its limits. In contrast to its neighbours 
Denmark and Norway, Sweden managed to stay out of war. Nevertheless, it supplied 
Gennany with war material and even allowed a whole Gennan division to cross its 
territory from Norway to Finland. This experience, Carlsnaes maintains, changed 
Swedish neutrality. "The neutrality practised since then is essentially a post-l 945 
phenomenon, differing in all but name from the preceding fonns of Swedish neutrality 
... " (Carlsnaes: 1993, pp.72/73). 
The official Swedish definition of its post-war neutrality was "freedom from 
alliances in peace aiming for neutrality in war" (Sundelius: 1989, p.4). Although 
Sweden is considered to be a "conventional neutral" without restrictions by 
international law (Hakovirta: 1988, p.l 0) and, thus, to be less limited in its foreign 
policy than Austria (e.g. Neuhold: 1987, p.3; Pedersen: 1994, p.17), there was no real 
difference in Swedish foreign policy compared to Austria's. "Both types of neutral 
countries aim at maintaining their status during wartime. Therefore, they have to 
adjust their peacetime behavior accordingly" (Luif: 1996, p.132). Goldmann argues 
that credibility rested. firstly, on a finn and consistent defence policy, demonstrating 
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to others Sweden's ability to defend itself. Moreover, a strong public support for 
neutrality and the detennination to remain unfettered in its foreign policy orientation 
further sustained Sweden's credibility. "Sweden thus has wanted to project the image 
of a country taking an independent stand on the issues dividing the great powers, 
boldly facing up to them when they make 'might into right' , and taking the side of the 
poor in spite of being one of the rich" (Goldmann: 1991, p.l26). Similar to Austria, 
this was further supported by an internationalist policy for peace and security with the 
focus on strengthening international law, especially via the UN, and on foreign aid to 
developing countries. Throughout the post-war era, neutrality was backed by a broad 
alliance of social forces from all the different parties and interest associations. Even 
those forces of capital, which demanded EC membership in the early 1960s, did only 
do so with the request for an escape clause related to Sweden's neutrality (see 
Introduction, section 3.3). 
From the late 1970s, early 1980s onwards, a military build-up by the 
superpowers in Northern Europe and several intrusions into Swedish territory by 
foreign submarines, probably of Soviet origin (Huldt: 1995, pp.l43/144), put 
Sweden's neutrality policy under pressure. The question arose to what extent Sweden 
was actually able to defend itself successfully in the case of being attacked. This 
pressure was increased by Sweden's difficulties of maintaining an independent anns 
production, since both possibilities to finance it, the export of anns and higher taxes, 
were extremely unpopular (Kruzel: 1989, pp.85-87), Sweden's acceptance of US 
restrictions on technology exports to the Eastern bloc in exchange for access to 
Western high technology (Dohlman: 1989, p.I07; Luif: 1996, p.143.; Kruzel: 1989, 
p.85), and the increasing economic interdependence with the West (Dohlman: 1989; 
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Kruzel: 1989, p.83). Overall, however, neutrality in general was not questioned. It was 
the revival of European integration and the end of the Cold War, which put neutrality 
on the agenda. 
3.2. Neutrality and the application to the EC: 
As it was stated in Chapter 3, section 2.3.1, the FP and MS declared immediately after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall that Sweden should apply to the EC for membership while 
retaining its neutrality policy. From their point of view, the changes in the European 
and international security structure had removed the last hindrances to the 
compatibility of membership and neutrality. The Social Democratic government, 
however, which had the last say in this matter, did not follow this line. In fact, Prime 
Minister Carlsson, assessing the changes in a speech to the Labour Movement Peace 
Forum in December 1989, maintained that "a lower political temperature and the 
democratic process in several East European countries have not reduced the value of 
the Swedish policy of neutrality" (Carlsson: 1989, p.l40). NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact still maintained big military arsenals and their might be possible setbacks and 
increasing international tension due to the severe economic situation in the Soviet 
Union. Closer co-operation with the EC would be attempted except for the areas of 
foreign and defence policy. "Swedish membership is not an objective in the 
discussions with the EC which are about to take place" (Carlsson: 1989, p.138). This 
point was confirmed in a publication by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which also acknowledged the changes in the European security structure, but repeated 
the party compromise of spring 1988: 
Swedish participation in EC co-operation in foreign policy might affect 
confidence in Sweden's policy of neutrality. And a substantial pari iamentary 
majority has affirmed that Swedish membership is not an objective in the 
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discussions which are about to take place with the EC (Jacobsson: 1990. p.14). 
As late as 27 May 1990, Carlsson stated in his article in the daily newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter that "concern for the credibility of our policy of neutrality is the reason why 
we are not applying for EC membership" (quoted in Sundelius: 1994, p.l79). He 
pointed to the EC's supranational character and its security and defence policy 
aspirations. In short, changes in the security structure did not cause a change in the 
SAP's neutrality policy. As it was demonstrated in chapter 3, section 2.4, the 
economic crisis in general, and the capital flight and the problems on the financial 
markets in particular convinced SAP leaders that EC membership was the only way 
forward. The predominant role of the economic problems was also reflected in the fact 
that it was the Finance Ministry and the Prime Ministers' Office, which were at the 
centre of the decision in favour of application. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
not in the forefront (Interview No.60; Stockholm, 2111111996) and the announcement 
of application was not cleared in advance with its senior civil servants (Sundelius: 
1994, p.191). 
When the decision on application had been taken, its relation with neutrality 
needed to be clarified. In this situation, the first official change in Swedish neutrality 
policy was made. It was not redefined or abandoned but simply declared compatible 
with membership due to the changes in the international security structure. Sten 
Andersson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that "Sweden's attitude, I would 
say, is characterized more by continuity than by change. What has changed is not 
Sweden's position. It is Europe" (Andersson: 1991, p.48). According to Pierre Schori. 
the influential Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, membership had been 
impossible during the Cold War because of the division of Europe in two alliances. 
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The EC had been perceived as a part of the Western bloc. Nevertheless, "when the 
external environment changes, the prerequisites for the Swedish policy of neutrality 
also change" (Schori: 1991, 62). Now, the EC could "become the hub around which 
broader European cooperation revolves, the core around which it is built" (Andersson: 
1991, p.49). While intending to participate in this newall-European project, neutrality 
should be maintained. "We must avoid making any changes in our security policy that 
could give the impression of Sweden being incorporated in the Western security 
system" (Schori: 1991, p.67). 
An overall assessment of foreign and security policy aspects by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in 
spring 1991 took fully into account the EC intergovernmental conference (IGC) on 
European Political Union, initiated in December 1990 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
1991, pp.37-43). The discussions within the EC on a possible future common defence 
policy and common defence, but also some form of link between the EC and WEU 
were, consequently, known in Sweden before the eventual application on 1 July 1991. 
Prime Minister Carlsson's address to the Swedish parliament, on 14 June 1991, 
concerning Sweden's application to the EC, was based on this assessment. He 
acknowledged these EC-internal discussions but concluded that it was extremely 
unlikely that the EC would introduce QMV for security and foreign policy questions 
(Carlsson: 1991, p.ll). Sweden, he continued, could not participate in a common 
defence policy or a mutual defence commitment within the EC framework because of 
its neutrality. Nonetheless, "there is no reason to believe that the EC is now in the 
process of turning into a military alliance, or of creating other forms of binding 
common defence arrangements" (Carlsson: 1991, p.12). There was one incidence, for 
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which Carlsson foresaw the possibility of a change in Sweden's neutrality policy. "1 f. 
in the future, a durable European security order is established, based for example on 
the CSCE, the foundations on which Sweden's policy of neutrality has rested hitherto 
will change" (Carlsson; 1991, p.12). Until then, neutrality should be maintained 
because of the unexpected. 
Overall, it can be concluded that Sweden's application for membership was 
the response to severe economic problems, not the attempt to gain more security in a 
world of higher insecurity (Interview No.53; Stockholm, 18/1111996). If at all, 
Sweden was characterised by a general euphoria about the developments in Europe. In 
1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and Soviet troops withdrew allover Eastern 
Europe. The military threat lost importance in the Swedish debate on European 
security (Lindahl: 1995, p.174).3 In the time between the decision in parliament on 12 
December 1990 and the application on 1 July 1991, the implications for the neutrality 
policy were assessed and membership was declared compatible with it. While the 
changes in the international system did not cause Sweden's application, they formed 
an important background condition in that they allowed the SAP government to 
justify the change in its policy on membership and neutrality. 
3.3. The redefinition of neutrality: 
The coming to power by the coalition government under Prime Minister Carl Bildt 
(MS) in October 1991 marked the start of a new phase in Sweden's neutrality policy. 
3 This was confinned by interviewees across the different political parties, ministries and interest 
associations. Two assessments by the Swedish Ministry of Defence in 1995 and t 996 further supported 
this conclusion. They stated that there were no current military threats directed against Sweden 
(Swedish Ministry of Defence: 1995, p.4; Swedish Ministry of Defence: 1996, p.7). A contrary 
evaluation is presented by W8!ver. He argues that the Swedish discussion about EC membership, 
neutrality and non-alignment "points to an intense feeling of insecurity, of loss of ground" (W;rver 
1992, p.90). He offers, however. little empirical evidence for his conclusion. 
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Margaretha afUgglas, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, indicated a first shift in 
parliament on 17 October 1991. She described the EC as the engine of international 
co-operation and argued that Sweden's foreign policy should have a clear European 
identity in contrast to the SAP's internationalist focus on "exotic" places. 
Nevertheless, she reaffirmed the traditional neutrality policy for a last time: "the 
strategic realities in our immediate vicinity mean that the main theme of our security 
policy - summarized as 'non-participation in alliances in time of peace, aiming at 
neutrality in time of war' - retains its significance" (Ugglas: 1991a, p.86). This was to 
change soon afterwards. Roughly a month later, Bildt spoke about the necessity of 
adjusting Sweden's foreign and security policy in the light of the new European 
realities and the development within the EC towards a CFSP. "It is obvious", he 
argued, "that the term 'policy of neutrality' can no longer adequately be applied as an 
overall description of the foreign and security policies we wish to pursue within the 
European framework" (Bildt: 1991a, p.lOO).4 Now, neutrality and EC membership 
were no longer considered to be compatible. "That there is a conflict between 
retaining a policy of neutrality and joining the European Community is too obvious to 
need pointing out" (Bildt: 1992, p.222). The SAP accepted the changes with 
surprisingly little opposition (Carlsnaes: 1993, p.84). 
The result was a compromise on foreign and security policy by all parties in 
parliament except for the VP (the GP was not in parliament between 1991 and 1994). 
In May 1992, two reports were passed. The first initiated the phasing out of the word 
"neutrality". "Military non-alignment" became the new official tenninology. This had 
practical implications. "The old fonnula 'nonalignment in peacetime aiming at 
4 This change in policy was reiterated by Ugglas on 16 December 1991 (Ugglas: 1991b. p.120). 
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neutrality in wartime' was qualified so as to say that Swedish nonalignment aimed at 
'making it possible to be neutral' in case of a war in the neighboring area" (Huldt: 
1995, pp.1581159). Lars-Ake Nilsson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, made clear that this change implied that neutrality "is an option, not 
an absolute goal in every conceivable situation" (Nilsson: 1993, p.225). What 
remained of the old neutrality policy was the commitment to non-membership in 
military alliances and a strong national defence (U gglas: 1993, pp.300/30 I). The 
second report of the party compromise of May 1992 spelled out that ''the Maastricht 
Treaty was compatible with Sweden's aim of becoming a member of the EC" (Luif: 
1996, p.247). Significantly, motions tabled by the VP and individual Social 
Democrats demanding a re-affirmation of the December 1990 party compromise, in 
which the intention of seeking membership while retaining neutrality was stated, were 
not endorsed by parliament. In sum, the old policy of neutrality "is now defined as the 
'hard core' of Swedish defence policy, as distinguished from a foreign and security 
policy outlook which will become much more adaptively orientated towards Europe 
and its emerging security arrangements than has been the case hitherto" (Carlsnaes: 
1993, p.84). 
Membership iil general and the CFSP in particular were considered to be the 
best way of participating in the establishment of a new, pan-European system of 
security, peace and prosperity. "As we see it," Ugglas stated, "only the European 
Community is sufficiently powerful and comprehensive to serve as an engine for the 
reunification of Western and Eastern Europe" (Ugglas: 1992, p.120). Unlike 
neutrality, military non-alignment was deemed to be compatible with participation in 
the CFSP, provided unanimity in CFSP decision-making was retained. Consequently. 
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Sweden's position for the 1996/97 IGC stated, that "there is no question of abolishing 
the right of veto for foreign and security policy decisions. In questions which involve 
vital foreign and security policy interests, Sweden cannot allo\\T itself to be outvoted 
by a majority of ... [EC] ... members" (Swedish Government: 1995, p.27). 
Bildt and the bourgeois government attempted to follow up the new definition 
in all its consequences. On 17 November 1993, in a speech to the Swedish Institute 
for International Affairs, Bildt stated with reference to Russian threats against the 
Baltic States that he "finds it difficult to see neutrality as a probable choice in the 
predictable cases of conflict in our vicinity" (quoted in Bierfeld: 1995, p.186). This 
led to a heavy conflict with the Social Democratic opposition (Huldt: 1995, 
pp.156/157). While there was a consensus of all social forces on the need of 
supporting the three newly-independent Baltic States, the SAP did not want to give 
any quasi guarantee of military assistance. Nevertheless, it was not only the SAP, but 
also the coalition partner CP, which criticised Bildt and demanded the maintenance of 
the "limited" version of neutrality (Miles: 1995a, p.14). When the SAP returned to 
power in September 1994, it moved back to a stricter interpretation of non-alignment. 
During a parliamentary debate in February 1995, it stated that "we must not lead other 
states to expect a Swedish military involvement in the event of an armed conflict. 
Sweden neither needs or wishes to impose restrictions on itself' (quoted in Miles: 
I 995a, p.35). The 1996 security evaluation by the Swedish Ministry of Defence 
spelled this out even more clearly: "it must ... be perfectly clear that Sweden is not in 
a position to give security guarantees to the Baltic countries" (Swedish Ministry of 
Defence: 1996, p.6). 
There were some indicators that the MS and the FP would have preferred 
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Swedish membership in the WEU and/or NA TO to the defence policy of military non-
alignment. Before the party compromise of May 1992, Bildt had not excluded 
Swedish membership in the WEU (Luif: 1996, p.246). Moreover, "in 1995, the 
Liberal and Conservative members of the Parliamentary Defence Committee walked 
out in protest against Social Democratic refusal to discuss Swedish membership in a 
military alliance such as NATO" (Cordier: 1995, p.l 7). The FP affirmed that 
Sweden's current non-alignment policy did not mean that Swedish NATO 
membership might not be reconsidered in the future. It also demanded that the WEU 
was incorporated in the EC and that Sweden became a member of it (FP: 1995, 
pp.13/14). 
On the other hand, as it was outlined in Chapter 4, section 3.3.4, both the VP 
and GP argued that the EC and the CFSP compromised Sweden's status of neutrality. 
They demanded a cut of the link between the EC and the WEU and that Sweden be 
neither an observer nor a member of the latter. In short, these two parties represented 
those social forces, which still adhered to the traditional policy of neutrality and 
rejected the 1992 party compromise on redefinition. On the event of the annual 
meeting of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 5-9 July 1996 in Stockholm, the GP 
together with the Green Group of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly published its 
concept of a future European security order. Firstly, it advocated a broader concept of 
security, which went beyond military power balance and international conflict 
resolution via force. Instead, "aspects of an economic, social, ecological, religious, 
psychological and cultural nature must be a part of the concept security" (GP: 1996, 
p.l). The CSCE should have the leading role in the peaceful solution of conflicts and 
the establishment of a pan-European, collective security system, not NATO or the 
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WEU, which were attached to the "old-fashioned", military-oriented security model. 
The conversion of the defence industry to civil production and the emphasis on 
economic co-operation on equal trade terms with developing countries were further 
parts of the green concept of security. Finally, the potential positive role of neutral 
countries for negotiations, infonnation and active conflict prevention was identified. 
"The Greens therefore regard it as being of utmost importance that Sweden, Ireland, 
Austria and Finland can and may remain outside both WEU and NATO (OP: 1996, 
pp.1I2). Overall, the OP did not only insist on the traditional definition of neutrality. it 
also attempted to place it within a European-wide concept of security and to form 
transnational links, which could support this concept across borders. 5 
In conclusion, neutrality was redefined as non-alignment and reduced to its 
military core in 1992. However, this was not the response to the perception of 
increased international insecurity, since the basic decision on application had already 
been taken at the time. Rather, it was due partly to the new government's different 
emphasis in foreign policy and partly to the understanding that traditional neutrality 
was incompatible with the CFSP. 
Despite this change in the official Swedish foreign and security policy, the 
population continued being in favour of neutrality. "In August 1992, 71 percent of all 
Swedes wanted the government to continue with neutrality policy. Only 18 percent 
thought that in view of the changing world Sweden should abandon its traditional 
foreign policy stance" (Luif: 1996, p.248). This implied potential problems for the 
yes-side in the referendum. "It was a well known fact that the military aspect of 
5 The fact that the Austrian GA was a part of the Green Group of the CSeE Parliamentary Assembly 
and, thus, co-author of this concept for a future European security order indicated first fonns of such 
transnational links. 
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security - the envisaged 'Common Defence Policy' and 'Common Defence' 
mentioned in the ... [Maastricht Treaty] ... - for a large part of the electorate would 
constitute a psychological obstacle that could have a decisive effect on their vote in 
the referendum" (Lindahl: 1995, p.176). It consequently concentrated on the non-
military aspects of foreign and security policy and emphasised that the EC "should be 
seen as having at its disposal the most important means - economic and political - of 
ensuring peace and stability in Europe" (Lindahl: 1995, pp.178/179). Eventually. 
Sweden's security and non-alignment policy played only a minor role in the 
referendum to the disadvantage of the no-side. "Sweden's severe recession between 
1990 - 1993 meant that ultimately the electorate placed economic recovery above all 
else" (Miles: 1995a, p.26). 
4. Conclusion: 
In both countries, neutrality was reduced to its military core of non-participation in 
military alliances and combat. This was openly acknowledged in Sweden and silently 
brought about via political practice in Austria. Social forces represented by 
conservative parties in both countries, i.e. the GVP and FPG in Austria and the MS 
and FP in Sweden, would have preferred to abandon neutrality all together and to join 
the WEU and/or NATO, while the Social Democratic parties and additionally the CP 
in Sweden opposed such a step. This discussion, however, was not related to EC 
membership, but had to do with general foreign policy. On the other hand. the Green 
Parties in both countries and the VP in Sweden favoured the retaining of the 
traditional neutrality policy, which they continued to consider incompatible with 
accession to the EC. 
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With reference to the countries' drive towards EC membership, the analysis of 
the impact of changes in the security structure has clearly shown that they were not a 
primary force. There was no perception of higher levels of international insecurity in 
the two countries, which made them apply to the EC in order to gain the security 
guarantees of the WEU and/or NATO through the backdoor. Rather, there was first 
the decision on application due to economic reasons and then neutrality was defined 
in a way which made it compatible with membership. The changes - in Austria it was 
Gorbachev's liberal foreign policy and a general decline in Soviet power, in the case 
of Sweden the end of the Cold War - were, however, an important background 
condition, which facilitated the redefinition of neutrality and made pro-EC strategies 
feasible. 
There was a slight difference between the two countries. In Austria, neutrality 
had been discussed from the very beginning of the EC debate and was mentioned in 
the letter of application, while this occurred only after the SAP's turnaround in 
October 1990 in Sweden and remained unsaid in the application. This can be 
explained by referring to the different timing of the two applications. When Austria 
applied in July 1989, the Cold War was still in its place. Neutrality was a much more 
sensitive issue. Two years later, the Swedish government could be more easy about 
this. 
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Conclusiop; Globalisatioo, EC membership and the limits of nen-liberalism in 
Austria and Sweden. 
1 . Theories of Integration and the 1995 EC enlargement: 
During most of the post-war era, Austria and Sweden did not join the EC for two 
reasons. Firstly, they considered their Social Democratic economic-political systems 
to be superior to those of the EC members. Policies to avoid unemployment, the 
development and maintenance of a generous welfare state and the move towards more 
equality in society seemed to be endangered by membership in a community, 
dominated by conservative governments. Secondly, both countries had chosen to 
pursue a neutral policy between the USA and Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
Membership in the EC was deemed to be incompatible with this policy. Although the 
EC was not a military alliance, it predominantly consisted of NATO members and had 
close ties with the USA. In this situation, trading links were the furthest both countries 
were prepared to go in their relation to the EC. After the bids for association had 
failed during the 1960s, FT As provided the basis for the relations between 1973 and 
1985. 
Against the background of globalisation, Austria and Sweden, similar to other 
Western countries, although slightly later, experienced the end of the Fordist 
accumulation regime and endured dramatic economic recessions at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The superiority of the two countries' economic-political systems was 
doubted and they were eventually abandoned - in Austria in 1985/1986 and in Sweden 
approximately five years later. In this situation, rather than representing a hostile 
system, the EC
9 
revived around the Internal Market initiative. offered some hope for a 
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fast recovery and help for the necessary restructuring of the apparently backward 
Austrian and Swedish systems. Additionally, the international system was changing. 
While this did not push Austria and Sweden towards membership, it ensured, as 
outlined in Chapter 5, that neutrality was a much less severe obstacle to EC 
membership than during the previous four decades. Gorbachev's liberal foreign policy 
and the decline of the Soviet Union in the case of Austria and the end of the Cold War 
in the case of Sweden made a redefinition of neutrality and, thus, the fonnulation of a 
pro-membership project feasible. While the rough outlines of the story are told 
quickly, this does not say much about the actual processes leading first to application 
and then to membership after a referendum. It does not say anything about the main 
actors involved, the opposition put forward against the EC and the reasons why the 
pro-membership forces won. In order to do so, a theoretical lens is required for the 
analysis. 
In Chapter 1, it was demonstrated that established theories of integration have 
to-elate been unable to provide an adequate lens in this respect. Neo-functionalism, 
although it experienced a revival in the wake of the new dynamics of European 
integration from 1985 onwards, was a partial explanation at best. It was employed to 
highlight the role of transnational actors and central EC institutions, but the original 
neo-functionalist notion of automatic spill-over excluded a full-scale neo-functionalist 
analysis of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. Intergovernmentalist 
approaches also had their limits. They failed to take into account the impact of neo-
liberalism as a set of economic ideas and the role of transnational actors such as 
Swedish TNCs, the reach of which goes beyond national borders. Finally. 
intergovemmentalist concentration on the negotiation process between states 
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overlooked the crucial importance of the process leading to application and the 
conflict around the referenda on membership. 
It was argued that these problems were partly due to the positivist foundation 
of the established theories of integration. They were ahistoric and took existing social 
and power structures as given. Their inability to take the independent role of ideas 
into account was due to the separation of facts from values. Structural changes such as 
globalisation since the early 1970s, characterised by the transnationalisation of 
production and finance at the material level and the shift from Keynesianism to neo-
liberalism at the ideological level, could not be accounted for. Neo-Gramscianism, it 
was maintained, was remedying these analytical deficiencies. Firstly, its emphasis on 
the sphere of production and social forces as the main actors, allowed neo-
Gramscianism to take into account globalisation. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, 
globalisation has engendered new social forces, which led to an intra-class conflict in 
Austria and Sweden. In Austria, nationally-oriented social forces of capital and labour 
opposed internationally-oriented forces. Both were engendered by a domestic 
production structure, but had a different geographical orientation as expressed in their 
trading patterns - the former produced solely for the domestic market, while the latter 
exported to markets outside Austria. By contrast in Sweden, labour mainly from the 
national, public sector opposed transnational social forces represented in the big 
Swedish TNCs. Thus, unlike intergovemmentalist approaches, actors such as the 
Swedish TNCs could be accounted for in their transnational significance. 
The focus on social forces did not imply that the state was excluded from the , 
analysis. In contrast to state-centric approaches. however. it was not assumed to be a 
unitary actor. but split into the various state institutions. which were treated according 
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to their place in the global economy. A distinction was made between institutions 
linked to the global economy and those which merely dealt with national issues. 
Moreover, similar to pluralist approaches, parties and interest associations were 
deemed important in the domestic policy-making process. Nevertheless, agai~ they 
were not regarded as unitary actors, but considered to be institutions, within which 
various social forces attempted to establish their particular interest as the one 
generally accepted. This different treatment of the state and interest associations 
resulted in the generation of new empirical material, since not only the final positions 
of states and interest associations, but also the internal processes, which led to these 
positions, were considered. 
~ 
Furthermore, in contrast to established integration theories and thanks to the 
combination of constructivist and cognitive insights, neo-Gramscianism was able to 
account adequately for the role of ideas. The importance of neo-liberalism as a part of 
the structure in the form of intersubjective meanings could, thus, be highlighted. This 
made it extremely difficult for forces opposed to the EC to formulate a convincing 
alternative to membership. Simultaneously, pro-EC social forces gained credibility for 
their course of action by justifying accession to the EC in neo-liberal terms. 
Membership simply appeared to be the natural solution to Austria's and Sweden's 
economic problems. 
Finally, neo-Gramscianism eschewed any notion of determinism in its 
analysis. Swedish and Austrian accession to the EC were neither due to an automatic 
process of functional and political spill-over, nor a response to structural necessity in 
the wake of a new international distribution of economic and military capabilities. 
Rather, it was one of several possible outcomes of an open-ended struggle hetwecn 
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different social forces against the background of global structural change. 
Overall, the neo-Gramscian approach to Austria's and Sweden's accession to 
the EC constituted a coherent, analytical framework! capable of overcoming the 
theoretical shortcomings of the established integration theories. Moreover, it 
generated additional empirical material, which is presented in the following section. 
2. Social forces and the Austrian and Swedish accession to the EC; 
2.1. The social forces behind the drive towards membership: 
During the process leading to application between May 1987 and June 1989, a historic 
bloc was formed in Austria. It consisted of an alliance of internationally-oriented 
social forces of capital and labour. It was rooted in the economic structure through its 
location in the internationally-oriented sector of production and extended into the 
superstructure by defining the dominant ideas of a neo-liberal economic policy and a 
re-interpretation of neutrality, deemed compatible with EC membership. It formed a 
solid structure of political society and civil society by encompassing both institutions 
of the state apparatus such as the ANB and the Finance Ministry and organisations of 
civil society including the two main parties SPG and GVP and the four social 
partners, the BWK., the LK, the AK and the 6GB. The driving force behind the 
establishment of this historic bloc were the "organic intellectuals" of the VOl. They 
developed the hegemonic project based on the re-interpretation of neutrality and on 
neo-liberalism, arguing that EC membership and participation in the Internal Market 
would lead to more efficiency via higher competition and eventually to the creation of 
wealth and more jobs. 
The historic bloc was reconfirmed after the successful negotiations. As shown 
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in Chapter 4, concessions to various social forces were acknowledged. The protected 
industrial sectors and the agricultural sector were guaranteed financial restructuring 
help and the setting-up of work foundations. The social partners were given the right 
to participate in the decision-making process in EC matters at the national and 
European level. While an ideological consensus was an important element of the 
historic bloc, material pay-outs were also crucial at attracting other social forces. 
In Sweden, there was an alliance of transnational social forces of capital and 
labour and forces emanating from the agricultural sector in favour of membership. 
They were supported by the institutions linked to the global economy, notably the 
Prime Minister's Office and the Finance Ministry. In contrast to Austria, however, 
this alliance did not develop into a historic bloc. While its members agreed on the 
need for EC membership, the reasons for it differed significantly. On the one hand, 
transnational capital regarded membership as a way of continuing the neo-liberal 
drive, which had started to dismantle the Swedish Model since 1990. They were not 
interested in a strong social dimension and joint employment programmes at the EC 
level. The convergence criteria, regarded as the guarantee for the continuation of neo-
liberalism should not be watered down or amended. On the other hand, transnational , 
social forces of labour looked at the EC as a broader context in which to regain some 
control over capital. Globalisation, it was argued, made autonomous national 
economic policy impossible. The EC, therefore, provided a platform to counter the 
increased power of the international financial markets and TNCs and to modify, if not 
to halt, neo-liberalism. 
A second apparent difference in Sweden was the lack of a hegemonic project 
related to EC membership. There was no institution similar to the VOL which 
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provided the platform for "organic intellectuals" to launch a project of this type. Two 
clear reasons can be identified. Firstly, in contrast to the sPa, the SAP had been 
hegemonic in the Swedish party system and the decision on application was taken by 
it. Until the economic recession of 1989/1990, the SAP had always considered an 
EEA-type strategy to be sufficient vis-a.-vis the EC. Only when it had lost the 
confidence in its own ability to run the economy differently from the rest of Europe _ 
when the "third way" strategy had failed - the SAP started to change its economic 
policy. During 1990, it first accepted that full employment could no longer be the 
primary policy objective and then announced its decision to apply to the EC in 
parliament. Secondly, Swedish capital did not have this absolute necessity of 
formulating a political strategy. The transnational production structure and the 
deregulation of the Swedish financial markets gave it the structural power to transfer 
production units to the EC. Thereby, it became a part of the Internal Market and 
applied pressure on the SAP government towards application at the same time. In the 
end, the ongoing capital flight was a major reason why the SAP saw no other option 
than to seek EC membership. In Austria, on the other hand, internationally-oriented 
capital, with its national production structure, had to achieve membership in order to 
gain access to the Internal Market. The transfer of production units was no alternative. 
2.2. The/orees against membership: 
In both countries, various social forces opposed EC membership. The Austrian 
historic bloc achieved its aim of accession to the EC. but it only obtained a position of 
supremacy, not hegemony. Opposition came from two sides. indicating a nationalist 
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and a progressive form of resistance to supranational integration and globalisation.1 
Firstly, the FPO's xenophobic anti-EC campaign, concentrating on issues such as anti-
immigration with "Austria first" slogans and stressing the importance of national 
sovereignty including the maintenance of the AS, clearly represented the first fonn. 
The same is valid with regard to the anti-EC group "Biirgerinitiative gegen den 
Verkauf Osterreichs an die EU", which warned against the flooding of Austria by 
foreigners and the sell-out of Austria's wealth. 
On the other hand, the GA put up progressive opposition to EC membership. 
The "Initiative Osterreich und Europe" before the application and the "Kritische 
Europainformationen" during the campaign exhibited a similar tendency. Instead of 
retreating to a nationalist outlook, the GA favoured active co-operation in Europe 
between sovereign states in tandem with reforms at the national level. Rather than 
concentrating on efficiency via neo-liberal convergence criteria, an expansive fiscal 
policy to create employment was demanded. Additionally, environmental and social 
standards and an environmentally-friendly agriculture should be economic priorities. 
The EC was also rejected for its democratic deficit. Democratic control should be 
decentralised rather than centralised. At the security level, an integrated, co-operative 
security system based on all-European organisations such as the CSCE was favoured 
over the EC, which was alleged to have developed into a military bloc. Austria's 
neutral status in its original meaning could provide a useful role in bridge-building 
between Eastern and Western Europe and, thus, become one of the constitutive 
elements of a future European security system. 
I A similar division into a nationalist and a progressive ronn of opposition is Identified by Rupert in 
relation to workers' response to neo-liberalism and global capitalism in thl' liSA (Rupert 1995. 
pp.198-203 ). 
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By contrast, there was no nationalist, reactionary challenge to EC membership 
in Sweden. The VP and GP had been sceptical about closer ties with the EC 
throughout the 1980s. After the Swedish application to the EC, these forces were 
joined by large parts of the SAP and CP, but also the trade unions mainly from the 
public sector. As discussed in Chapter 4, membership was rejected for endangering 
the Swedish Model with its policies of full employment, a generous welfare state and 
gender equality. The EC was also alleged to threaten Sweden's environmental 
standards and to display a democratic deficit. Additionally and similar to the Austrian 
GA, the VP and GP argued that the EC and CFSP compromised Sweden's neutrality 
and thus undennined its potential role as a bridge-builder between East and West in 
the new European security order. 
While the social forces opposing the EC were quite strong in both countries, 
they proved to be unable to fonn a joint platform based on a common project, which 
offered a credible alternative to membership. Numerically, the FPO's shift to an anti-
EC stance strengthened the opposition forces before the referendum in Austria. In 
practice, however, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, its right-wing ideology split the anti-
EC camp down the middle. A united opposition of the nationalist FPO and the 
progressive forces around the GA was impossible. Moreover, the progressive 
resistance opposed the EC for a variety of reasons ranging from economic via military 
to environmental concerns. In this situation, it was the lack of "organic intellectuals". 
which precluded the formulation of an alternative hegemonic project. able to 
transcend these particular interests and to provide the basis for a counter neo-liberal 
historic bloc. A further problem was the reluctance of nationally-oriented capital and 
labour to join openly the FPQ or GA. Once they had lost the struggle within their 
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interest associations, little resistance was put forward. 
In Sweden, a joint movement against membership could be established. 
Nonetheless, apart from rejecting membership, the no-side did not deVelop a coherent 
alternative to the neo-liberal EC. The potentially strong platform between national 
labour and the OP and VP was undermined by the rejection of the former to give the 
two parties a stronger role within the no-camp. These forces, moreover, failed 
especially in the economic sphere in that they were unable to present a viable 
alternative to membership, partly due to the forces represented by the CP. which 
opposed membership but accepted neo-liberal economics. 
Overall, while the opposing social forces lost the struggle about membership 
in both countries, their numerous existence indicated that there might be a successful 
challenge to neo-liberalism and, if not EC membership itself, the current neo-liberal 
course of the EC in the future. These forces might be supported by transnational 
Swedish labour, which, although it argued for membership, opposed the neo-liberal 
convergence criteria. 
2.3. The timing of application: 
Austria applied to the EC two years earlier than Sweden. This can be explained by the 
different Austrian and Swedish economic situations during the 1980s and the different 
position of the labour movements in both countries, expressed by the strength of the 
two Social Democratic parties in the political system and of the trade unions in the 
sphere of interest associations. In the early 1980s, the Austrian economic situation 
was as bad as the Swedish. In contrast to the SAP, however. the SP(} and its trade 
union allies did not have a tradition of developing their own refonn programmes. 
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When Keynesianism seemed to have failed, Austrian forces of labour, consequently, 
were much more receptive to neo-liberal ideas as the new way of capital accumulation 
and to a "hegemonic project" of EC membership by internationally-oriented capital. 
An alternative to neo-liberalism, now a part of the overall structure, could not be 
formulated. The importance of achieving a just distribution of the gains, expected 
from a neo-liberal course of deregulation and liberalisation, was stressed~ but the 
policy of focusing on inflation instead of full employment was readily accepted as an 
economic necessity. In particular, internationally-oriented Austrian labour supported 
the restructuring of the Austrian state towards the night-watchman state and regarded 
EC membership as a good way of continuing the new neo-liberal policy course, most 
importantly with reference to the opening of the sheltered sectors to international 
competition. However, even if the Austrian labour movement had proposed an 
alternative, it would have found it difficult if not impossible to put it into practice. In 
contrast to Sweden, it did not enjoy a hegemonic position. The SPO was part of a 
grand coalition together with the OVP and the trade unions were faced with equally 
strong forces of capital in the ESP, mainly represented by the BWK and VOL 
In Sweden by contrast, as outlined in Chapter 2, the SAP back in government 
in 1982 relied on its hegemonic position and programmatic capacity. It developed a 
"third way" strategy as an alternative to traditional Keynesianism and neo-liberalism 
alike. Thus, the neo-liberal revival of the EC from the mid-1980s onwards did not 
present a logical continuation of domestic restructuring. Rather, it appeared as a 
different system, the adoption of which was not tempting due to the domestic 
economic success. In short, the SAP's programmatic capacity allowed it to withstand 
the structural pressures of neo-liberalism throughout the 1980s. Only when this 
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strategy ended in another economic recession in 1989/1990. did the Swedish SAP 
government decide on application. The SAP had lost its confidence in being able to 
manage the national economy. It turned away from full employment and adopted 
price stability as the main concern of economic policy. At this stage, membership 
suddenly became attractive as a solution for the continuation of capital accumulation 
after the failure of Keynesianism and the end of the Fordist accumulation regime. 
This also supported the conclusion of Chapter 5 that the changes in the 
security structure did not drive Austria and Sweden towards application. Austria did 
not wait until the end of the Cold War, which could not be foreseen in 1987 and even 
the summer of 1989, for the launch of its application. The perceived economic 
necessity drove the process and then made a reappraisal of the compatibility of 
neutrality and membership necessary. Similarly, the Swedish SAP, initially, did not 
deem a change in the EEA course necessary in relation to the EC after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in late 1989. Only when it saw no other way out of the economic 
recession and had lost its confidence in a special Swedish way, did it opt for 
application. The end of the Cold War facilitated this policy shift, but it did not cause 
it. 
3. An evaluation ofneo-Gramscianism as an approach to European inteiD'tjon: 
In Chapter 1, neo-Gramscianism was outlined as an alternative approach to European 
integration. The discussion of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the Ee 
demonstrated that neo-Gramscianism can provide a detailed analysis of the processes 
leading first to application and then to membership. 
There are, however, some qualifications to be made. Firstly, as already stated 
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in the Introduction, the results of this analysis cannot be generalised and transferred to 
other cases ofEC enlargement as, for example, the Finnish EC membership. It is not 
the goal of critical theory such as neo-Gramscianism to generate general findings. It is 
only the method of how to analyse a case of European integration in general and of 
EC enlargement in particular, which can be transferred. Moreover, in Chapter 1, it was 
argued that globalisation makes cross-class alliances between transnational/ 
internationally-oriented capital and labour on the one hand and national capital and 
labour on the other likely. This proved to be correct in the Austrian and Swedish 
cases. Nevertheless, the firmness of such cross-class alliances should not be 
exaggerated. It has already been pointed out that the alliance of transnational capital 
and labour in favour of EC membership in Sweden was formed to achieve the same 
goal for totally different purposes. In Austria, the alliance was strong enough to form 
a historic bloc. This did not, however, imply that there were no conflicts between 
internationally-oriented capital and labour. As the Association of the Austrian Textile 
Industry made clear, while labour and capital of this sector pursued membership for 
the same reasons, a combined strategy was not devised. The employers did not want 
to give labour any kind of bargaining chip for future wage negotiation rounds 
Onterview No.24; Vienna, 24/04/1996). In short, cross-class alliances are likely 
against the background of globalisation, but the main conflict in capitalism is still 
between capital and labour as such. 
Furthermore, the neo-Gramscian emphasis on ~~organic intellectuals" and 
"hegemonic projects" tended to give the impression that events such as the application 
and accession to the EC could only occur via a well developed project. The Swedish 
case contradicted this. There, it was the decision of a few crucial individuals within 
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the SAP government, which led to the Swedish application. Considering transnational 
capital's pressure on the SAP through the transfer of production units to the EC. it 
can be concluded that structural power might make long-tenn political strategies 
unnecessary. A "hegemonic project" in Sweden can only be identified by looking at a 
longer period between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s, when transnational 
Swedish capital led by the SAF was engaged in the successful launch of a neo-liberal 
project against the Swedish Model. EC membership was only the logical last step in 
this undertaking. 
Finally, it has to be pointed out that, although neo-Gramscianism is an 
alternative to the established theories of integration, it is not the only possible one. 
Another could be a feminist approach to European integration.2 Women in both 
countries were less in favour of membership than men. In Austria, 70 per cent of the 
men voted "yes" in comparison to 62 per cent of the women and in Sweden, 59 per 
cent of the men voted "yes" compared to 46 per cent of the female population (Luif: 
1996, pp.324/327). As one interviewee stated, from a feminist perspective, the EC 
could be viewed as a male, macho project concentrating on centralisation, motorways, 
traditional, unecological economic growth and big projects such as bridges across 
waterways in Scandinavia between Denmark and Sweden (Interview No.45; 
Stockholm, 12/1111996). It can be countered that the high female rejection of the EC 
in Sweden was not due to gender but to the fact that women were predominantly 
employed in the public sector. The possibility of a feminist approach to European 
integration, however, should not be rejected. 
Similarly, European integration could also be analysed from a "green politics" 
2 For an overview of critical feminist IR theory. see. for example. Syh'cstcr: tl)Q6 ;lIld frue tqq6 
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critical perspective.3 In both Austria and Sweden, the EC was rejected by a significant 
number of forces, mainly represented by the Green Parties, for its lower 
environmental standards and its focus on the traditional logic of economic growth. 
Again, one could reply that this was primarily due to the neo-liberal course of the EC 
and its focus on efficiency and profits, but this does not mean that a "green politics" 
analysis of European integration should be rejected in general. 
To conclude, while neo-Gramscianism was able to provide a critical 
alternative to established integration theories, it also had a particular perspective. It 
put primary emphasis on the sphere of production and concentrated on the struggle 
between social forces over the development of the economic-political system. This 
excluded a focus on other issues such as gender and "green politics". This is 
acceptable, even unavoidable, but it also indicates that other alternative, critical 
approaches to European integration could be constructed. 
) For an overview of the critical"green politics" approach. see Paterson' 1996 and Sachs Iqq) 
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